N. STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG
| Decision Date | 16 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2938. |
| Citation | 862 F. Supp. 1445 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | NORTH STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
James E. Ferguson, II, Geraldine Sumter, Stephanie H. Webster, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Dept., Charlotte, NC, for plaintiffs.
Jim D. Cooley, F. Lane Williamson, Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, Charlotte, NC, for defendants.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants'1 motion, filed February 9, 1994, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) and 60(b)(6), to terminate a consent decree entered by Judge James B. McMillan on January 9, 1974, and subsequently amended on May 1, 1979 and July 2, 1990. Plaintiffs responded on March 2, 1994 requesting a period of discovery to evaluate whether the termination of the order will result in resegregation of the Charlotte Police Department, obtain information concerning the Department's testing and other employment policies and practices, and to evaluate those testing and employment policies and practices. The Court granted this request and allowed the parties to conduct discovery for a three week period to be followed by a period of briefing. The parties have briefed the motion. On July 29, 1994 the Court also held an evidentiary hearing, at Plaintiffs' request, during which it heard testimony, admitted several exhibits, and heard oral argument. Having now carefully considered the entire record together with the relevant legal standards, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and (6) to terminate consent decrees must be evaluated by "a less strident, more flexible standard" than the "grievous wrong" standard embodies in United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119, 52 S.Ct. 460, 464, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932). Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, ___, 112 S.Ct. 748, 757, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). This flexible standard is two-pronged and allocates to the "party seeking modification ... the burden of establishing..." the two prerequisites to termination. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 760. The first prong is satisfied "by showing either a significant change in factual conditions or in law." Id. Once this burden is satisfied, proof of the second prong, which requires that "the court should consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance." is necessary. Id.
There are three instances in which changed factual circumstances warrant modification of a consent decree. The first is presented where the changes "make compliance with the decree substantially more onerous." Id. The second arises where, "a decree proves to be unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles." Id. The third is presented where "enforcement of the decree without modification would be detrimental to the public interest." Id.
"A consent decree must of course be modified if, as it later turns out, one or more of the obligations placed upon the parties has become impermissible under federal law." Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 762. That is, "a rising constitutional floor — or, ... a falling constitutional ceiling — may make modifications necessary." Ensley Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Seibels, 20 F.3d 1489, 1504 (11th Cir.1994).
Before granting a request under Rule 60 to modify a consent decree, "the District Court should determine whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances." Rufo, 502 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 763. "This requires the court to determine the appropriate scope of the changes, accepting only proposals that are `suitably tailored' to address significant factual developments or conflicts between new legal standards and the requirements of the decree." Ensley Branch, 20 F.3d at 1504. It also involves "a flexible `exercise of that court's equitable power,' ... which is not unlimited." Id., citing, United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1509 (11th Cir. 1993). In evaluating whether the proposed change fits the changed facts or law, it must be clear the change does not "create or perpetuate a constitutional violation." Rufo, 502 U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 763. Additionally, the proposed change must be "tailored to resolve the problems created by the change in circumstances" rather than seek to "conform to the constitutional floor." Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 764. Furthermore, the "public interest" consideration requires "the district court to defer to local government administrators, who have the `primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving' the problems of institutional reform...." Id.
North State Law Enforcement Officers Association (North State) is an organization consisting of black law enforcement officers, including some employed by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (the Police or Police Department).2 On August 13, 1971, North State and others filed this action against the City of Charlotte, the Charlotte Police Department and others seeking declaratory and injunctive remedies for the Police Department's alleged racially discriminatory employment practices. This action was settled by a consent order of injunction entered by United States District Court Judge James B. McMillan on January 9, 1974, and supervised by this Court since that time.
The consent order provides for several remedies all focused on its essential purpose: achieving the "black employment, promotion, and assignment goals set forth herein...." Consent Decree of January 9, 1974 p. 3 ¶ 9.3 No mention is made in the order of why these goals were established. Judge McMillan made no finding of present or past racial discrimination in the 1974 consent decree, and none was subsequently made by the Court at any time during the life of the consent decree. Defendants have consistently denied, and presently deny, any past or present racial discrimination against black police officers or officer candidates, either arising before, during or after entry of the consent decree.4 Plaintiffs have offered no proof, other than accusations in the original complaint, of intentional past or present discrimination by the Police Department against black officers or officer applicants occurring prior, during, or after entry of the consent decree.
North State has only referenced, for example, the disparity of black officers on the police force prior to entry of the decree compared to that presented after compliance with it was achieved. Still, North State has yet to offer, and now offers no proof of intentional race discrimination against black officers or applicants at any time. At best, it has demonstrated only statistical disparities between the percentages of black and nonblack officers prior to and after entry of the consent decree.
The original consent decree enjoins the Police Department to implement a court supervised affirmative action scheme. Specifically, it requires the Police Department to "develop and implement as needed a plan for actively recruiting qualified black applicants for employment as police officers with the Police Department"5 focused on achieving the following hiring goals:
(1) In the first year of the decree, for a period commencing on January 1, 1974 until June 30, 1974, "at least fifty percent (50%) of the appointments to vacancies in the rank of Patrolman shall consist of qualified black applicants;" Id. at p. 2 ¶ 3.
(2) thereafter "at least forty percent of the appointments to vacancies in the rank of Patrolman shall consist of qualified black applicants until the percentage of black Patrolmen constitutes at least twenty percent (20%) of the total number of Patrolmen employed by the Police Department;" Id.
(3) respecting promotions of sergeants, "Effective immediately at least six (6) of the next fifteen (15) promotions to the rank of Sergeant shall consist of qualified black Patrolmen;" Id. at ¶ 5.
(4) "thereafter, the percentage of qualified black officers promoted to sergeant during each successive six-month period shall conform as nearly as possible to the percentage that black Patrolmen comprise of all Patrolmen employed by the Police Department at the commencement of each such six-month period, until the percentage of black Sergeants comprises at least twenty percent (20%) of the total number of Sergeants employed by the Police Department."6 Id.
Thus, the consent decree's hiring goals are ultimately aimed at achieving a police force consisting of twenty percent black patrolmen, and twenty percent black sergeants.7 Conversely, the consent decree envisions a police department racially composed of no more than eighty percent non-black patrolmen and no more than eighty percent non-black sergeants. The decree makes no exceptions from these hiring quotas in the event that no qualified black candidates for promotion or employment are available in the relevant work force. Its twenty percent hiring and promotional targets nowhere appear rationally tied to the actual percentage of minorities in the relevant work pool of qualified candidates.
At oral argument, North State conceded the Police Department has complied with the consent decree since its entry. The affidavit and testimony of Deputy Police Chief-Administrative Division Norman Boger, who has been responsible for the Police Department's recruiting, hiring, training, and promotion of personnel since 1987, corroborates North State's concession. The Court finds the Department has complied with the decree from its beginning.
As previously mentioned, the Court signing the original consent...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In Re Midlands Utility, Inc.
...was warranted. See, e.g., Hadix v. Johnson, 879 F.Supp. 743 (E.D.Mich.1995); North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Dept., 862 F.Supp. 1445, 1447 (W.D.N.C.1994). 6 While the Fourth Circuit has interpreted Rufo as establishing a three-pronged standard, oth......
-
Freeman v. City of Fayetteville
...as a "voluntary affirmative action plan" for purposes of equal protection analysis. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Dept., 862 F.Supp. 1445 (W.D.N.C.1994) (citing N.A.A.C.P., 20 F.3d at 1489). Voluntary affirmative action plans are subject to stric......