N.Y. State United Teachers v. State, 963-13
| Citation | 993 N.Y.S.2d 475,46 Misc.3d 250,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 24282 |
| Decision Date | 23 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | 963-13 |
| Parties | NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS by its President Richard C. IANNUZZI, Naomi Avery, Seth Cohen, Timothy Michael Ehlers, Kathleen Tobin Flusser, Michael Lillis, Robert Pearl as a Parent, Individually and on behalf of his children Kyleigh Pearl, Micaela Pearl, Ava Pearl and Nolan Pearl, Brian Pickford, Hilary Strong as a Parent, Individually and on behalf of her child Kevin Strong, Plaintiffs, v. The STATE of New York, Andrew M. Cuomo as Governor of the State of New York, Thomas P. DiNapoli as Comptroller of the State of New York, and John B. King, Jr., as Commissioner of the New York State Education Department, Defendants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New York) |
Richard E. Casagrande, Esq., for the Plaintiffs.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General for the State of New York (Stephen M. Kerwin, of counsel), for the Defendants.
Plaintiffs bring this action seeking to declare unconstitutional New York's “tax cap” legislation as it applies to public school districts. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, and plaintiffs have submitted a Reply. Various groups moved for, and were granted, leave to file amicus curiae briefs. While the briefs have been beneficial to determination of the issues, the Court agrees with defendants that consideration will be limited to the issues raised in the complaint and argued by the parties to the lawsuit.
Education Law § 2023 —a was enacted as part of Chapter 97 of the Laws of 2011. In pertinent part, that chapter amended the Education Law by adding § 2023–a, and the General Municipal Law by adding § 3–c. Under these statutes, governmental entities seeking to levy taxes in excess of the allowable tax levy limit must obtain the approval of at least 60% of a local government's governing body or, in the case of a school district, the district voters. When a school district seeks to enact a budget which exceeds the statute's threshold, the ballot presenting the budget must bear the following statement:
“Adoption of this budget requires a tax levy increase of ____ which exceeds the statutory tax levy increase limit of ____ for this school fiscal year and therefore exceeds the state tax cap and must be approved by sixty percent of the qualified voters present and voting.”
Education Law § 2023–a[6][b]. There is no similar provision in General Municipal Law § 3–c.
This action is brought by a union representing public and private sector employees and retirees, including persons employed by, or retired from, local public school districts, colleges and universities, hospitals, libraries, municipal governments, and centers for the developmentally disabled (hereinafter “NYSUT”). The majority of the union's members reside in New York, are qualified to vote in their school district elections, and, in some cases, have children who attend New York's public schools. The union is joined as the plaintiff in this action by eight individuals who are variously state residents and taxpayers, parents of children who attend public schools, and voters in their local school elections. Two of the individuals (Pearl and Strong) also sue on behalf of their children who are public school students, and four (Avery, Ehlers, Pearl, Pickford) are teachers in state public schools. All eight individual plaintiffs claim to have voted in favor of local school budgets that included a tax levy in excess of the tax levy limit and failed to garner the 60% vote necessary for passage.
Plaintiffs attack Education Law § 2023 —a as violating the Education Article (Article XI) of the New York State Constitution (First and Second Causes of Action), the Equal Protection (First, Third, Fourth and Sixth Causes of Action), and Due Process (First and Third Causes of Action) clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions, the right to vote under the State and Federal Constitutions (Fifth Cause of Action), and the right to free expression under the Federal and New York Constitutions (Seventh Cause of Action). For relief, plaintiffs seek: (1) a declaration that Education Law § 2023–a is null and void as it violates the New York and United States Constitutions; (2) a permanent injunction against continuation of the tax levy threshold as it applies to school districts; (3) an award of costs, disbursements, and attorneys' fees to plaintiffs; and (4) such different relief which the Court finds appropriate. Ultimately, plaintiffs seek to have Education Law § 2023–a declared unconstitutional.
The Summonses and Complaints were served on or about February 20, 2013. By stipulation of counsel, the time for the defendants to respond was extended to April 1, 2013.On April 1, 2013, the defendants made a motion to dismiss the Complaint. By stipulation of counsel, the plaintiffs' time to respond to that motion was extended to June 7, 2013. It was later agreed that the plaintiffs could serve an Amended Complaint by July 5, 2013 and that the defendants had until August 5, 2013 (since extended to August 12) to respond to the Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was served on July 5, 2013. Defendants then served a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, which after full submission, was argued before Supreme Court (O'Connor, J.) on December 19, 2013. After Acting Justice O'Connor's recusal, the matter was transferred to Justice Devine. The parties appeared for a conference before Justice Devine on April 14, 2013 for “re-arguement” on the motion to dismiss, wherein plaintiff advised that they wanted to serve a Second Amended Complaint to challenge the recently enacted Education Law 2023–b (the Tax “freeze”). Defendants declined to consent. Judge Devine postponed re-argument until after the motion to amend was served, and opposed. On April 15, 2014, Justice Devine was appointed to the Appellate Division, Third Department. The matter was assigned to Acting Justice Platkin, who recused himself, and the matter was then transferred to this Court. On June 3, 2014, the plaintiff served a motion to file a Second Amended Complaint, which is now fully submitted.
Plaintiffs ask the Court to rule on the motion to amend before deciding the instant motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs argue that the proposed amendments causes no prejudice, as the tax cap and tax freeze are intertwined. Further, that consideration of their interrelationship in a single action promotes judicial efficiency. Defendants argue that if the motion to dismiss is fully briefed and argued, and has been pending since December 19, 2013, and that the motion should be ruled on first before consideration is given to the plaintiff's motion to amend. Defendants notes that if they are successful on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs would still be able to present their challenge to Education Law 2023–b in a new proceeding. If not, plaintiffs could then amend to include their challenges to 2023–b.
The motion to dismiss, which argues that the complaint fails to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), has been pending for over a year. Four different judges have been assigned to the matter, and little has been accomplished by way of judicial decree. A decision on the current motion to dismiss will narrow the issues. Further, as the tax cap and tax freeze are interrelated, the instant decision could inform how the parties seek to proceed, as it will constitute the law of the case. Therefore, the Court will render a decision on the motion to dismiss.
Before addressing the merits, the Court must first determine defendants' assertion that none of the listed plaintiffs have standing to maintain this action (with the exception of the Fifth Cause of Action, which alleges that the tax cap has the effect of diluting their voting power). Plaintiffs argue that if standing is denied, an important constitutional issue would be effectively insulated from judicial review. Applying the principles set forth by the Court of Appeals in Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 334 N.E.2d 579 (1975), this Court holds that the concerns of the plaintiffs over the impact of the legislation on them were sufficientto gain them standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Id; see also Prodell v. State, 222 A.D.2d 178, 645 N.Y.S.2d 589 (3d Dept.1996) and Board of Education, Shoreham–Wading River Central School District, County of Suffolk v. State of New York, 111 A.D.2d 505, 507, 488 N.Y.S.2d 887 (3d Dept.1985) (). Additionally, the Court finds that if standing were denied, “an important constitutional issue would be effectively insulated from judicial review.” Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 766 N.Y.S.2d 654, 798 N.E.2d 1047 (2003) ; Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623, 334 N.E.2d 579 (1975) ; Ricket v. Mahan, 97 A.D.3d 1062, 949 N.Y.S.2d 272 (3d Dept.2012). The motion to dismiss for lack of standing is denied.
Plaintiffs claim that the above named defendants are proper because the petition seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, however, even when liberally construed, the petition fails to include allegations of personal involvement by any of the individual defendants. Because personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under Section 1983, the petition is dismissed against the individual defendants. See generally Shelton v. New York State Liquor Auth., 61 A.D.3d 1145, 878 N.Y.S.2d 212 (3d Dept.2009).
On a defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a plaintiff's claim is liberally construed and all facts asserted therein, as well as its...
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