Naber v. Cricchi, Appeal No. 77-556.
Decision Date | 23 February 1978 |
Docket Number | Appeal No. 77-556. |
Citation | 567 F.2d 382 |
Parties | Charles T. NABER and George C. Lockwood, Appellants, v. James R. CRICCHI, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
William J. Birmingham, Chicago, Ill., Attorney of record for appellant; Lowell C. Bergstedt, Dayton, Ohio, of counsel.
James B. Hinson, Pittsburgh, Pa., Attorney of record for appellee; Charles L. Menzemer, Pittsburgh, Pa., of counsel.
Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges.
This appeal is from the decision of the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Interferences (board) awarding priority of invention of the counts in issue to the junior party, Cricchi. The counts were copied by Cricchi1 from a patent to Naber et al. (Naber) No. 3,719,866, issued March 6, 1973, and entitled "Semiconductor Memory Device." The dispositive question, which the board decided in favor of Cricchi, is whether Cricchi was reasonably diligent from a time just prior to Naber's entry into the field (June 1970) until Cricchi's actual reduction to practice (September 1971). We reverse.
The invention is an improved "drain-source-protected" metal-nitride-oxide-semiconductor (MNOS) device which can be used as a nonvolatile, electrically alterable memory element in various integrated circuits. The specific improvement (illustrated by Figure 3 of the Naber patent) is that the silicon oxide layer (56) in the vicinity of the drain (54) and source (55) of the transistor is made thicker (shown at areas 58 and 60) than the corresponding layer in prior art devices.
All of the counts include a recitation of this structure. Count 1 is illustrative and reads as follows:
Proceedings Below
The board also found that Cricchi Exhibit 100, consisting of copies of time cards for four project numbers, "indicates reasonably continuous activity charged to the project numbers . . . used to identify the programs for constructing and testing the MNOS transistor" embodying the counts in issue. The board was not persuaded by Naber's argument that experiments directed at improving layer deposition techniques generally did not satisfy the "reasonable diligence" requirement, not being directed at construction and testing of the MNOS device of the counts. It said:
This work was required in order to reduce to practice the transistor conceived by Cricchi on October 22, 1969. Dr. Corak Cricchi's supervisor testified that improvement in the method of deposition was required in order to produce a useful device rather than a mere laboratory device.
In the Request for Reconsideration, Naber argued that Cricchi was not reasonably diligent during the period from June to October 1970 since work done then was directed at improving layer deposition techniques generally; further, that Cricchi Exhibit 100 was not proof of diligence during the period from October 1970 to September 1971. The board adhered to its original decision.
OPINIONThe record shows that the work done at Westinghouse to improve oxide and nitride layer deposition techniques was generally applicable to all MNOS devices, not merely the "drain-source protected" device of the counts, and that this work had in fact commenced prior to Cricchi's conception of the invention. It is well settled that, to satisfy the "reasonable diligence" requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), the work relied on must ordinarily be directly related to reduction to practice of the invention of the counts in issue. Anderson v. Scinta, 372 F.2d 523, 54 CCPA 1269, 152 USPQ 584 (1967); Martin v. Snyder, 214 F.2d 177, 41 CCPA 1010, 102 USPQ 306 (1954); Gunn v. Bosch, 181 USPQ 757 (Bd.Pat.Int'f 1973); Moore v. Harris v. Hale, 92 USPQ 187 (Bd.Pat.Int'f 1951). However, work in preparation for filing related patent applications may suffice (e. g., Rey-Bellet v. Englehardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 181 USPQ 453 (Cust. & Pat.App. 1974)), as may work required to develop a first invention in order to develop or reduce to practice a second invention (e. g., Keizer v. Bradley, 270 F.2d 396, 47 CCPA 709, 123 USPQ 215 (1959); Thompson v. Dunn, 166 F.2d 443, 35 CCPA 957, 77 USPQ 49 (1948)).
There is no evidence that Cricchi's layer deposition techniques work was in preparation for filing related patent applications or was required to develop a first invention needed to proceed with the invention of the counts. Although the board found that "this work was required in order to reduce to practice" the invention of the counts, both Cricchi and his supervisor admitted that a simple transistor embodying the structure embraced by the counts could have been built and tested for its memory characteristics.3 Cricchi chose not to proceed to a reduction to practice with a simple transistor, but to wait until work on layer deposition techniques progressed.4 Since he admittedly "possessed the capability of conducting such a test," it was his burden to reconcile the waiting period with the "reasonable diligence" requirement. Litchfield v. Eigen, 535 F.2d 72, 76, 190 USPQ 113, 116 (Cust. & Pat.App. 1976).5
The board found, and Cricchi contends, that the work on layer deposition techniques was required to produce a "useful device," rather than a "mere laboratory device." However, there need not be commercial utility to have a reduction to practice. As this court said in Goodrich v. Harmsen, 442 F.2d 377, 383, 58 CCPA 1144, 1153, 169 USPQ 553, 559 (1971): "In the nature of things, testing goes on throughout the process of `commercializing' and often continues after a product is on the market where it usually receives its severest test." Acceptance of the proposition that the "reasonable diligence" requirement was satisfied, notwithstanding delay due to general work (on layer deposition techniques needed to produce a commercially-acceptable device), would, in effect, grant Cricchi a reservoir of "reasonable diligence" arising from work commenced prior to conception on October 22, 1969, and continuing into 1975. We are not persuaded that this accords with public policy favoring the early disclosure of inventions.
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