Nabors v. CRST Malone, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. 1:14–CV–171. |
| Citation | 126 F.Supp.3d 1027 |
| Parties | Dwayne NABORS, Plaintiff, v. CRST MALONE, INC., and CRST International, Inc., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Aaron V. Wallace, Donald Gist, Gist Law Firm PA, Columbia, SC, David P. Jones, Newby Lewis Kaminski Jones LLP, LaPorte, IN, for Plaintiff.
Calvert S. Miller, Michael C. Ross, Eric M. Blume, Carson Boxberger LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, for Defendants.
This matter is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants CRST Malone, Inc., and CRST International, Inc., (collectively "CRST" or Defendants) (DE 21). Plaintiff Dwayne Nabors filed a response in opposition (DE 23) and CRST filed a reply (DE 25). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED.
Nabors was employed by CRST as a truck driver beginning in 2011. Nabors was an independent contractor and leased a truck from CRST on a "lease to own" basis. On May 16, 2012, Nabors fell asleep while driving and crashed the truck. He alleges that he sustained multiple injuries in the crash, including "a fractured eye socket, cervical disc damages and injuries to his left shoulder and left knee." Plaintiff's Response, p. 4. Nabors contends that "[t]he accident has left Plaintiff permanently disabled and he can no longer work to support his family." Id. Nabors filed this lawsuit claiming that CRST is liable for his injuries because the trucking company "was negligent in allowing Plaintiff to operate a vehicle in excess of the maximum amount of on duty hours allowed by the Federal Trucking Regulations, maintaining a culture of noncompliance with Federal Trucking Regulations, and failing to maintain safeguards to ensure that their property carrying motor vehicle drivers complied with Federal Trucking Regulations." Id. More specifically, Nabors contends that CRST forced him (and other drivers) to be "on duty more hours than allowed by federal regulations ..." and that because of this policy he was exhausted, fell asleep while driving, and was injured as a result. Id.
CRST maintains that summary judgment is appropriate in this case for two reasons, which the company summarizes as follows:
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1. Since Nabors did not list physicians as potential expert witnesses on the issue of causation, CRST filed a motion to motion to exclude him from offering any expert testimony on the issue of causation (DE 18). Magistrate Judge Susan L. Collins, to whom this case is on partial referral, granted CRST's motion (DE 20). (Nabors never filed a response in opposition to that motion.)
Nabors identified several physicians who treated him after the accident and listed them in his Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1) initial disclosures as potential witnesses who would be " ‘called to testify regarding the injuries sustained by Mr. Nabors and his subsequent treatment.’ " Court Order (DE 20), p. 3 (). What Nabors failed to do, however, was list these physicians as experts who would testify that the accident was the proximate cause of his injuries, even though he was required to do so pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(C), or to provide expert reports as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B). CRST filed its motion to prevent these witnesses from testifying as to causation. Nabors "opted not to respond to CRST's motion seeking to exclude him from offering expert testimony on the issue of the causation[.]" Id. Accordingly, because he did not properly list the doctors as experts by the court-imposed deadline and did not respond to CRST's motion to prevent them from testifying as to causation, Magistrate Judge Collins granted CRST's motion. CRST now moves for summary judgment on Nabor's negligence claim, arguing that since he has no experts to testify as to causation, he cannot prove that prong of a prima facie negligence claim. CRST states that "[b]ecause causation is a necessary element to a claim of negligence, the Plaintiff will be unable at trial to meet his burden of proof to establish a claim of negligence against the Defendants." Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 22), p. 7.
CRST also argues that summary judgment is warranted since "Nabor's theory of liability against [CRST] is entirely relied upon [sic] by speculation, conjecture, and/or conspiracy theories that are unsupported by any affirmative evidence." Id., p. 9. CRST maintains that the company did not force Nabors to drive more hours than permitted by federal regulation, that he did so of his own accord, and that his attempts to characterize CRST as negligent are based only on speculation and conjecture, which is insufficient to sustain a negligence action under Indiana law.
Nabors opposes CRST's motion by arguing that "expert testimony is not needed to establish causation in cases where a layperson can understand what caused the injury[,]" that he has presented sufficient "affirmative evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact" about CRST's negligence, and that this evidence is based on much more than just speculation and conjecture. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 23), pp. 811.
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). A genuine issue of material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining summary judgment motions, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). After "a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ " Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) ).
Disputes concerning material facts are genuine where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the court construes all facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, neither the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," id., 477 U.S. at 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), will defeat a motion for summary judgment. Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir.2000). If it is clear that a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy the legal requirements necessary to establish his or her case, summary judgment is not only appropriate, but mandated. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir.2003). A failure to prove one essential element "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The party seeking summary judgment on a claim on which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial may discharge its burden by showing an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A plaintiff's self-serving statements, which are speculative or which lack a foundation of personal knowledge, and which are unsupported by specific concrete facts reflected in the record, cannot preclude summary judgment. Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir.2001) ; Stagman v. Ryan, 176 F.3d 986, 995 (7th Cir.1999) ; Slowiak v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir.1993).
To prevail on a claim for negligence under Indiana law, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care at the time the injury occurred; (2) the defendant's behavior did not conform to that standard of care; and (3) the plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the defendant's breach of the duty of care. Neal v. Cure, 937 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind.App.2010). It is CRST's position that Nabors fails to present sufficient evidence to prove, or even raise a genuine issue about, the second and third elements of a negligence action. That is, he cannot establish that CRST breached any duty it owed to him since his allegations on that point are based only on speculation and unsupported conclusions; and he cannot establish that any such breach was the proximate cause of his injuries since he lacks any expert testimony on that point. The court disagrees with CRST's arguments and determines that there are genuine issues of material fact, with regard to both breach of duty and proximate cause, that preclude summary judgment.
As explained above, CRST contends that...
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