Nace v. Faith Christian Academy

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
• Writing for the Court: WENDY BEETLESTONE, J.
• Decision Date: 29 March 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-333
• Citation: Nace v. Faith Christian Acad., CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-333 (E.D. Pa. Mar 29, 2019)
• Parties: ELIZABETH ANN NACE, Plaintiff, v. FAITH CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, RYAN CLYMER AND RUSSELL HOLLENBACH, Defendants.

ELIZABETH ANN NACE, Plaintiff, v. FAITH CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, RYAN CLYMERAND RUSSELL HOLLENBACH, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-333

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 29, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case concerns a high school softball coach, Eric Romig, who engaged in an unlawful sexual relationship with a then-fifteen-year-old player on his team, Plaintiff Elizabeth Ann Nace, and a private school, Faith Christian Academy, that had previously forced the coach to resign due to allegations of sexual harassment of a student, but never reported those allegations to outside authorities.

In 2016, this Court issued an opinion, which, inter alia, granted summary judgment to Defendants Faith Christian Academy, Faith Christian Headmaster Ryan Clymer, and Faith Christian Athletic Director Russell Hollenbach (collectively, the "Faith Christian Defendants") on all claims against them. Nace v. Pennridge Sch. Dist., 185 F. Supp.3d 564 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ("Nace I"). Plaintiff appealed. The Third Circuit affirmed this Court's ruling, except as to Plaintiff's negligence per se claim against the Faith Christian Defendants. Nace v. Pennridge Sch. Dist., 744 F. App'x 58, 67 (3d Cir. 2018) ("Nace II"). With regard to that claim, the Third Circuit found a genuine issue of material fact on one element and remanded for this Court "to assess whether there exists a genuine dispute of material fact on the other required elements for a negligence per se claim." Id. at 64.

Accordingly, on remand, this Court undertakes that analysis. Further, in the initial 2016 proceedings, this Court denied two motions as moot after finding that summary judgment would be granted to the Faith Christian Defendants: (1) Faith Christian Academy's motion to preclude the testimony of Plaintiff's expert Brad M. Jackman; and, (2) Clymer and Hollenbach's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. The vacatur of this Court's summary judgment decision on the negligence per se claim renders those motions ripe for adjudication.

For the reasons that follow, the Faith Christian Defendants' motions to grant summary judgment, preclude expert testimony, and preclude punitive damages against Clymer and Hollenbach shall each be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background of this case has been detailed extensively in prior decisions and need not be repeated at length. See Nace I, 185 F. Supp.3d at 570-74; Nace II, 744 F. App'x at 60-62. As relevant here, Romig was employed as a high school coach at Faith Christian Academy between 2003 and 2010. In December 2009, reports surfaced that Romig had an inappropriate relationship with a Faith Christian Academy student, E. Mayer. Mayer was 17 at the time, and turned eighteen on December 29, 2009. When Clymer, the headmaster, learned of Mayer's allegations, he investigated them by speaking to Mayer for about ten minutes the week before Christmas break in 2009; he also spoke with Mayer's parents, the assistant basketball coach who worked with Romig, two other female Faith Christian Academy students rumored to have experienced inappropriate behavior by Romig, Faith Christian Academy's attorneys, and a friend who was a police chief in another jurisdiction. Further, Clymer confirmed through phonerecords provided by Mayer's parents that Romig had sent Mayer over 3,000 texts between September and December 2009, but the texts had since been deleted. Mayer nonetheless provided Clymer with descriptions of some of the text messages, including one in which Romig allegedly texted Mayer, "I want to be in you," and others stating that Romig loved her, did not want her to be with her boyfriend, and wanted to marry her. Mayer did not state that Romig had any inappropriate physical sexual contact with her. For his part, Romig denied that the texts contained inappropriate content. Clymer also followed up on Mayer's statement that Romig had inappropriate relationships with other students, but these students also denied any physical sexual involvement with Romig. Separately, Clymer conveyed at least some of this information with Hollenbach, the athletic director.

Based on his evidence and the advice of school counsel, Clymer asked Romig to resign. On January 5, 2010, Romig did so, citing only health reasons as the reason for his departure. No one at Faith Christian reported Romig's conduct to law enforcement or the Pennsylvania child protective services agencies.

Subsequently, Romig was hired as a coach by Pennridge School District for the 2011-2012 school year. In his application materials, Romig did not reference Faith Christian Academy—but he did list Hollenbach as a personal reference. Pennridge obtained all required background and criminal history checks, which were clear and did not indicate any issue in Romig's history. Plaintiff was a student on Romig's team during the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years. Beginning in April 2013, Romig used text messages to cultivate a relationship with then-fifteen-year-old Plaintiff—a relationship that became physically sexual during the summer. In September 2013, Plaintiff's parents learned of the relationship and contacted law enforcement. Romig pled guilty to state criminal charges arising from his conduct with Plaintiffand was sentenced to 3.5 to 7 years imprisonment.

II. DISCUSSION

As noted, following this Court's grant of summary judgment to the Faith Christian Defendants, the Third Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to consider whether summary judgment in favor of the Faith Christian Defendants on Plaintiff's negligence per se claim is warranted. This vacatur also reopened two related questions: whether Plaintiff should be precluded from offering expert testimony that bears on the negligence per se claim, and whether Clymer and Hollenbach are subject to punitive damages. Each is examined in turn.

a. Summary Judgment on Negligence Per Se Claim

"[S]ummary judgment is appropriate where there 'is no genuine issue as to any material fact' and the moving party is 'entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 344 (2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof." Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-52 (1986)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he reviewing court should view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff's negligence per se claim against the Faith Christian Defendants is premised on their failure to report. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the Faith Christian Defendants had a duty to comply with the mandatory child abuse reporting provisions of Pennsylvania's Child Protective Services Law ("CPSL"), 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301, et seq., and breached that duty byfailing to report Romig's interactions with Mayer. Plaintiff asserts that, if the Faith Christian Defendants had complied with their duty, Romig would not have been able to obtain his coaching position at Pennridge, where he met Plaintiff and initiated an abusive relationship.

Under Pennsylvania law, "[t]he concept of negligence per se establishes both duty and the required breach of duty where an individual violates an applicable statute, ordinance or regulation designed to prevent a public harm." J.E.J. v. Tri-Cty. Big Brothers/Big Sisters, Inc., 692 A.2d 582, 585 (Pa. Super. 1997) (internal punctuation omitted). "[T]o prove a claim based on negligence per se," a plaintiff must meet "the following four requirements:"

(1) The purpose of the statute must be, at least in part, to protect the interest of a group of individuals, as opposed to the public generally;

(2) The statute or regulation must clearly apply to the conduct of the defendant;

(3) The defendant must violate the statute or regulation;

(4) The violation of the statute or regulation must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.

Schemberg v. Smicherko, 85 A.3d 1071, 1074 (Pa. Super. 2014).

The CPSL requires school employees and school administrators to report suspected sexual abuse and exploitation of students. Section 6352(a) addresses reporting by school employees and provides:

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), a school employee who has reasonable cause to suspect, on the basis of professional or other training and experience, that a student coming before the school employee in the employee's professional or official capacity is a victim of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse or sexual exploitation by a school employee shall immediately contact the administrator.

(2) If the school employee accused of seriously injuring or sexually abusing or exploiting a student is the administrator, the school employee who has reasonable cause to suspect, on the basis of professional or other training and experience, that a student coming before the school employee in the employee's professional or official capacity is a victim of serious bodilyinjury or sexual abuse or sexual exploitation shall immediately report to law enforcement officials and the district attorney under section 6353(a). . . . If an administrator is the school employee who suspects injury or abuse, the administrator shall make a report under section 6353(a).

23 Pa. C.S.A. § 6352(a).¹ Section 6353(a) addresses school administrators and school employees and states:

An administrator and a school employee governed by section 6352(a)(2) (relating to school employees) shall report immediately to law enforcement officials and the appropriate district attorney any report of serious bodily injury or sexual abuse or sexual exploitation

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