Nace v. State
| Decision Date | 25 January 1889 |
| Citation | 117 Ind. 114,19 N.E. 729 |
| Parties | Nace v. State. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from circuit court, Howard county; Daniel Waugh, Judge.
Blacklidge, Blacklidge & Moon, for appellant. The Attorney General, for the State.
This was a criminal prosecution originating before a justice of the peace. The charge in the affidavit is the keeping of a disorderly house. The prosecution rests upon the following section of the Revised Statutes 1881: The appellant was tried and convicted before the justice. From the judgment of the justice he appealed to the circuit court, and was again tried and convicted. In the justice's court he was adjudged to pay a fine of $22.50, and in the circuit court a fine of $100. There was a motion in the circuit court, made by the appellant, to quash the affidavit, which was overruled, and the proper exceptions reserved. This motion brings in question for consideration the section of the statute above set out.
The charge in the affidavit is “that on or about the 27th day of July, 1886, and for a period of one year prior thereto, continuously, at the county of Howard and state of Indiana, William F. Nace, late of said county and state aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully keep a place where intoxicating liquors were sold, bartered, given away, and suffered to be drank in a disorderly manner, by then and there unlawfully harboring and permitting within said place Emma Bradford, Nellie Hamilton, Cora Gray, and divers other persons, both male and female, to this affiant unknown, all of whom were then and there persons of bad repute for virtue, chastity, morality, and peaceableness, and while then and there in said place unlawfully allowing and permitting the said persons of bad character for virtue, chastity, morality, and peaceableness to quarrel, curse, swear, fight, and riot, and use other improper and obscene language, and by then and there unlawfully suffering, allowing, and permitting said persons of bad character for virtue, chastity, morality, and peaceableness to indecently expose their persons, and by then and there unlawfully suffering, permitting, and allowing divers other persons, both male and female, to this affiant unknown, to have unlawful, promiscuous, and indiscriminate sexual commerce, all to the annoyance and injury of William Becktell and divers other persons to this affiant unknown, all of whom were citizens of the county of Howard and state of Indiana, residing within sight and hearing of said place so unlawfully kept by said William F. Nace.”
The contention of the able counsel for the appellant is that the keeping of a place “in a disorderly manner,” where intoxicating liquors are sold, bartered, given away, or suffered to be drank, is not an offense within the statute;that the words “in a disorderly manner” refer not to the place kept, but to the acts of selling, bartering, giving away, or suffering to be drank, at or in the place kept, and, as the affidavit fails to allege any such disorderly acts, it is bad for that reason, and should have been quashed. We are not of this opinion. Suppose the section is transposed so as to read thus: “Whoever keeps a place in a disorderly manner, where intoxicating liquors are sold, bartered, given away, or suffered to be drank to the annoyance or injury of any part of the citizens of this state,” etc. When thus transposed there is no difficulty as to the construction of the statute. It at once becomes manifest that the words “in a disorderly manner” refer to the place that is kept, and not to acts of sale, barter, giving away, or drinking of intoxicants. It will be difficult to transpose the language employed so that the section will bear a different construction from the one we have stated. Again, if a comma is placed between the words “drank” and “in,” the section will read thus: “Whoever keeps a place where intoxicating liquors are sold, bartered, given away, or suffered to be drank, in a disorderly manner.” The use of the comma removes all doubt as to what the construction should be. But we can imagine no reason for which the legislature would prohibit one who keeps a place where intoxicating liquors are sold and drank from carrying on his business in that regard in a disorderly manner, and leave him perfectly free to enlarge and maintain every other species of disorderly conduct at his said place. The intention of the legislature in the enactment of the statute is very manifest.
The appellant moved in the circuit court in arrest of judgment, and for a discharge from the prosecution. There is but one central question raised by these motions, and our reasoning and the authorities cited will apply alike to both. The...
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