Nachtweih v. Mo. Dep't of Corrs.

Decision Date31 March 2022
Docket Number4:21-cv-00371-SEP
PartiesTODD L. NACHTWEIH, Plaintiff, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SARAH E. PITLYK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Missouri Department of Corrections, Anne Precythe, Melissa Massman and Stanley Payne (collectively, MDOC Defendants).[1] Doc. [4]. The Motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.

Background[2]

Plaintiff Todd L. Nachtweih was an inmate at the Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Correctional Center (ERDCC) in Bonne Terre Missouri, from September 21, 2017, until September 1, 2019. Doc. [1] ¶ 1. His Complaint asserts claims against the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC); Anne Precythe, the Director of MDOC; Melissa Massman, MDOC's Director of Operations of Constituent Services; and Stanley Payne, the Warden of ERDCC. Id. ¶¶ 2-5. Specifically Plaintiff alleges that the individual MDOC Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Doc. [1] at ¶¶ 66-73. And he alleges that Defendant MDOC violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §12132, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), by “fail[ing] to maintain appropriate policies to protect prisoners with [his] disability, ” failing to provide him access to personal hygiene facilities so that he could properly clean his wounds, and refusing his requests for reasonable accommodations. See Id. ¶¶ 41-65.

Throughout his incarceration, Plaintiff suffered from bilateral leg infections, right ankle dysfunction, and Hepatitis C, all of which limited his ability to walk, stand, and care for himself. Id. ¶ 25. On September 27, 2017, medical staff at ERDCC performed an evaluation on him and documented his medical conditions, and on October 2, 2017, it was discovered that Plaintiff was also suffering from a staph infection. Id. ¶¶ 26, 27. Despite “repeatedly report[ing] his concerns that he was receiving deficient treatment, his medical conditions worsened during his confinement. Id. ¶¶ 28, 29. Specifically, because of Defendants' failure to provide him with proper treatment, testing, and monitoring, Plaintiffs leg infection deteriorated and caused him to require skin graft surgery, which he received on July 11, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 30, 31. While the skin graft was healing, the graft site became infected, and Plaintiff had to be admitted to the Transitional Care Unit (TCU) for additional treatment on August 16, 2018. Id. ¶ 32. When he returned from the TCU, Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation (i.e., solitary confinement) from September 6, 2018, through September 11, 2018, during which time the infection worsened until he was again transferred to the TCU, where he remained until October 1, 2018. Id. ¶ 33. After he was discharged, Plaintiff was again placed in administrative segregation until March 11, 2019. Id. ¶ 34.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had no justification for placing him in administrative segregation, and that the conditions of solitary confinement prevented him from receiving the medical care he needed. Id. ¶¶ 35, 36. Specifically, while he was in administrative segregation, he was not able to obtain medical supplies he ordered or perform medically necessary self-care tasks to control the leg infection, such as taking showers and cleaning his wound. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff believes that he was placed in administrative segregation as punishment for his requests for accommodations and for complaining about his inadequate medical treatment. Id. ¶ 37.

Throughout his incarceration, Plaintiff contends that Defendants failed to review and comply with medical care orders from Plaintiffs outside medical providers. Id. ¶ 38. And despite his doctors' objections to Plaintiffs conditions and lack of proper treatment, Defendants continued to refuse to provide Plaintiff with the most basic medical care necessary to treat his conditions.” Id. ¶ 39. After his release on September 1, 2019, Plaintiff's skin graft continued to regress, requiring him to seek additional treatment until June 5, 2020. Id. ¶ 40.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court assumes the factual allegations of a complaint are true, Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326-27, and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 595 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court clarified that complaints must contain “more than labels and conclusions; a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 678. The issue in considering such a motion is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to present evidence in support of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Discussion
I. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against MDOC for violations of the ADA and RA.

Plaintiff claims that MDOC violated his rights under both the ADA and the RA. Doc. [1] ¶¶ 41-65. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that MDOC failed to implement policies that protected inmates with Plaintiff's disability or similar disabilities from harm by failing to provide sufficient medical care and medical assistive devices, and by not permitting access to facilities that would allow for personal hygiene care or the ability to cleanse wounds. Id. ¶ 45. He asserts that his lack of access to care and adequate facilities “denied [him] equal access to MDOC services, ” and that MDOC denied him reasonable medical care when individuals without disabilities and individuals with other disabilities were not denied adequate care. Id. ¶¶ 46, 59. Plaintiff also alleges that, during his incarceration, he requested reasonable accommodations to allow him to participate “in the activities and benefits accorded to all other individuals . . . of MDOC/ERDCC, ” but Defendants refused to provide any accommodations. Id. ¶ 47.

Title II of the ADA . . . prohibits qualified individuals with disabilities from being excluded from participation in or the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a public entity.” Randolph v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 850, 857 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.). To prevail on a Title II ADA claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he is a person with a disability as defined by statute; (2) that he is otherwise qualified for the benefit in question; and (3) that he was excluded from the benefit because of discrimination based upon his disability. Id. at 858 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.). “A qualified individual with a disability is defined as any person who ‘meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §12131(2)). A state prison is a “public entity” under the statute. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). For all intents and purposes, [t]he ADA and RA are ‘similar in substance' and, with the exception of the RA's federal funding requirement, cases interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable.' Randolph, 170 F.3d at 857 (quoting Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998)).

MDOC argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case under Title II because his ADA and RA claims are based solely on medical treatment decisions.[3] Doc. [5] at 15. MDOC points to Eighth Circuit precedent finding that violations of the ADA and RA may not be based on medical treatment decisions. Doc. [5] at 15 (citing Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882, 883 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)) ([W]e agree with two other circuits that have recently concluded a lawsuit under the [RA or ADA] cannot be based on medical treatment decisions”). Plaintiff argues that his Complaint “demonstrates that [his] claims are not based solely on medical treatment decisions” but rather that he “was denied the benefits of the jail's services due to his disability.” Doc. [16] at 3. In particular, he notes that he was denied access to the jail's “programs for personal hygiene, ” and that those “programs” were available to other prisoners without a disability.” Id.

Assuming all of Plaintiff's factual allegations to be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor Braden, 588 F.3d at 595, he fails to plead violations of either the ADA or the RA. There is a difference between alleging inadequate treatment for a prisoner's disability and alleging that a prisoner was denied access to medical services because of his or her disability. See Postawko v. Missouri Dep't of Corr. 2017 WL 1968317, at *13 (W.D. Mo. May 11, 2017); Rogers v. Missouri Dep't of Corr., 2011 WL 13051907 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2011). Plaintiff has done the former, and only the latter is...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT