Nadeau v. Nye

• Decision Date: 14 March 2013
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:12–cv–01298.
• Parties: Jeffrey NADEAU, Plaintiff v. John J. NYE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

934 F.Supp.2d 932

Jeffrey NADEAU, Plaintiff

v.John J. NYE, Defendant.

Case No. 3:12–cv–01298.

United States District Court,

N.D. Ohio,

Western Division.

March 14, 2013.

David W. Doerner, Coy, Konieczny & Peppel, Toledo, OH, Esteban R. Callejas, Bowling Green, OH, for Plaintiff.

Donald E. Theis, Theis Law Office, Toledo, OH, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JEFFREY J. HELMICK, District Judge.

Introduction

This matter is before me on the motion of Defendant John J. Nye to dismiss Plaintiff Jeffrey Nadeau's complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(c). (Doc. No. 12). Nadeau filed a brief in opposition. (Doc. No. 13). Nye has filed a brief in reply. (Doc. No. 14). For the reasons stated below, Nye's motion is granted.

Background

Nadeau is a tow truck operator employed by Zach's Recycling, LLC. (Doc. No. 1 at 4). Nye was the elected sheriff in Henry County during the time period at issue. (Doc. No. 1 at 2). Many law enforcement agencies, including the Henry County, Ohio, Sheriff's Department, maintain a list of towing and wrecker services whom they contact when a motor vehicle accident results in a disabled vehicle. Zach's Recycling was one of a number of towing companies on the Henry County Sheriff's Department rotation list. ( Id. at 4). Nadeau asserts Nye informed one of the owners of Zach's Recycling that Nye would have Nadeau arrested if he responded to a call for service through the Henry County Sheriff's Department. ( Id.). Nye allegedly made this threat in retaliation for complaints Nadeau made to the Henry County Prosecutor's Office in years prior about the disproportionate allocation of towing calls to a towing company “which Plaintiff Nadeau had identified as providing gifts and favors to the Henry County Sheriff's Department.” ( Id. at 3).

Nadeau seeks to recover, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged violations of his due process and equal protection rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.He also alleges he is entitled to recover for tortious interference with an employment relationship pursuant to Ohio law.

Standard

It is axiomatic that a court at all times must have jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue in order to hear a case. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3). “Rule 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction generally come in two varieties: a facial attack or a factual attack. A facial attack ... questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading.” Gentek Bldg. Products, Inc. v. Sherwin–Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir.2007) (citations omitted). If a jurisdictional challenge “raises a factual controversy, the district court must weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter [jurisdiction] does or does not exist.” Id. If, as is the case here, “an attack on subject-matter jurisdiction also implicates an element of the cause of action, then the district court should ‘find that jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's claim.’ ” Id. (emphasis removed); see also Moore v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 416, 443–44 (6th Cir.2006) (noting the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts “to assume jurisdiction when statutory standing and merits questions converge.” (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681–82, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946))).

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a trial court's function is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. A motion asserting failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted “must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b). A defendant may assert the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, however, by a motion under Rule 12(c). Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(h)(2)(B).

After the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. Fed R. Civ. Pro. 12(c). Motions for judgment on the pleadings are analyzed under the same standard as motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 295 (6th Cir.2008). In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court “must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept the well-pled factual allegations as true, and determine when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir.2007). A court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581–82 (6th Cir.2007). A complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, [but] a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations omitted).

Analysis

Nye argues there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction over Nadeau's claims because Nadeau fails to allege property and liberty interests that “merit constitutional attention....” (Doc. No. 12). It is true that a federal court must have subject matter jurisdiction over a case before it may determine “whether the complaint states a cause of action [for] which relief could be granted....” Bell, 327 U.S. at 682, 66 S.Ct. 773. If, however, the jurisdictional basis is tied up in one or more of the elements of a cause of action, a court should conclude “jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's claim.” Gentek, 491 F.3d at 330. Nadeau seeks to recover for the alleged violation of his federal constitutional rights pursuant to a federal statute—§ 1983—and Nye's factual attack on the basis for subject matter jurisdiction “is intertwined with the merits of [Nadeau's] claim.” Id. at 331. Under these circumstances, I will review Nye's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(c) rather than Rule 12(b)(1). See id. at 330 (noting Rule 12(b)(6) “provides a greater level of protection to the plaintiff who in truth is facing a challenge to the validity of his claim ...” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

A. Procedural Due Process

Nadeau asserts Nye denied him procedural due process “by threatening to arrest [him] for no reason other than to deprive him of an employment opportunity” and in doing so “wrongfully deprived [him] of his property and liberty interests without due process of law as required by the Fourteenth Amendment....” (Doc. No. 1 at 5–6). Nye argues Nadeau has not established a “property or liberty interest sufficient to invoke constitutional protection” and as a result, Nadeau cannot assert a claim for violation of his right to procedural due process. (Doc. No. 12–1 at 11).

“In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in ‘life, liberty, or property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (emphasis in original); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) ( “Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons ... from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”). While a constitutional violation “is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process,” a plaintiff also must prove he in fact has been deprived of a constitutionally protected interest. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126, 110 S.Ct. 975.

In his complaint, Nadeau frames Nye's threat as designed “to deprive him of an employment opportunity.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5). Nye asserts this does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because Nadeau has not been discharged from his job and does not allege he is precluded from working as a tow truck driver. (Doc. No. 12–1 at 5). In response, Nadeau attempts to redefine the fundamental right allegedly infringed, as he asserts Nye's interference with Nadeau's employment “was accomplished through a restriction on travel.” (Doc. No. 13 at 7). Nadeau claims Nye has violated his procedural due process rights in restricting Nadeau's fundamental right to travel locally through public spaces and roadways without proper notice or a hearing. ( Id.).

Nadeau's redefinition lacks factual and legal support and therefore is unpersuasive. The complaint contains no allegations regarding restrictions on Nadeau's right to travel public roads. Viewing the allegations in the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the nature of the alleged threat does not support the new interpretation Nadeau attempts to portray. Nadeau alleges Nye threatened to have Nadeau arrested if Zach's Recycling used him “as a wrecker driver on any towing calls ... through the Henry County Sheriff's Department....” (Doc. No. 1 at 4). As Nadeau describes the threat, Nye did not threaten to arrest Nadeau for driving by an accident site in his personal vehicle, or if he stopped to assist other motorists after witnessing an accident to which the Henry County Sheriff's Department ultimately responded. Rather, Nye threatened to arrest Nadeau if he responded to the scene of the accident as a tow truck driver—i.e. as an employee of Zach's Recycling.¹ The potential property or liberty interest the threat implicates involves employment, and not the right to travel.

Nye asserts Nadeau's procedural due process rights were not violated because (1) there is no constitutional property interest in continued employment in an at-will position and (2) a person's liberty interest in pursuing his occupation is infringed only when the actor “effectively precludes the...