Naegele v. Albers

• Citation: 110 F.Supp.3d 126
• Decision Date: 23 June 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 03–2507(ABJ)
• Parties: Timothy D. Naegele, Plaintiff, v. Deanna J. Albers, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

110 F.Supp.3d 126

Timothy D. Naegele, Plaintiff,

v.Deanna J. Albers, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 03–2507(ABJ)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed June 23, 2015

Timothy D. Naegele, Mailbu, CA, pro se.

Deanna J. Albers, Thousand Oaks, CA, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AMY BERMAN JACKSON, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Timothy D. Naegele brought this diversity action against Deanna J. Albers and Raymond H. Albers ("the Albers defendants"), former defendant Lloyd J. Michaelson,¹ and unnamed individuals "Does 1–10" ("the Doe defendants"), asserting thirteen common law claims sounding in contract and tort.2d Am. Compl.

[Dkt. # 109]. The Albers defendants have moved to dismiss, contending that several of plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata in light of the decision of the California Court of Appeals in Albers v. Naegele, No. B240455, 2013 WL 5945676 (Cal.App. Nov. 6, 2013). Defs.' Mot. for an Order of Dismissal [Dkt. # 140] ("Defs.' 3d Mot. to Dismiss"); Defs.' Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.' 3d Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 140] ("Defs.' Mem.") at 2. The Albers defendants further argue that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims against them and that there is no basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over them in the District of Columbia. Defs.' Mem. at 3–7. Plaintiff opposed the motion, Pl.'s Resp. to Court's Order [Dkt. # 143] ("Pl.'s Opp."), and at the Court's direction, he also filed a supplemental pleading regarding the applicability of the res judicata doctrine to his claims. Pl.'s Resp. to Court's Order [Dkt. # 138].²

Upon review of the parties' pleadings, the prior decisions in this and related cases, and the relevant case law, the Court will grant the Albers defendants' motion and dismiss Counts I through VI against them as precluded by res judicata. Further, the Court finds no basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Albers defendants with regard to the remaining claims against them. And because the Court finds that Counts V and VII through XIII of the second amended complaint fail to state a plausible claim against the Doe defendants, it will dismiss those counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the case will be dismissed in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

This action, which began in 2003, has a long and complex factual and procedural history which has been discussed at length in prior opinions of this court and others. See, e.g., Naegele v. Albers (Naegele III ), 940 F.Supp.2d 1, 2–6 (D.D.C.2013) ; Naegele v. Albers (Naegele IV ), 958 F.Supp.2d 17, 19–22 (D.D.C.2013) ; Albers, 2013 WL 5945676, at *2–6. The Court takes judicial notice of its own docket and it also relies upon those prior opinions for the purpose of recounting the history of this action. See Covad Commc'ns Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407 F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C.Cir.2005) (stating that, in deciding a motion to dismiss, a court may take " ‘judicial notice of facts on the public record’ " by "consult[ing] the relevant opinions" in prior cases), quoting Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1228 (D.C.Cir.1993). The Court also provides the relevant statutory framework for background.

I. Statutory Framework

This case arises out of an attorney-client fee dispute between plaintiff and the Albers defendants related to a lawsuit filed by plaintiff on the Albers defendants' behalf in California federal court. Such fee disputes are governed by the California Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act ("MFAA"), Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 6200 et seq. , and the provisions of that statute form part of the backdrop of this case:

The MFAA was first proposed by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California in 1976 when, finding that disputes concerning legal fees were the most serious problem between members of the bar and the public, the board sought to create a mechanism for arbitrating disputes over legal fees and costs. Recognizing the disparity in bargaining power in attorney fee matters which favors the attorney in dealings with infrequent consumers of legal services, that many clients could not afford hiring additional counsel to litigate fee disputes in the civil courts, and that previous schemes that called for voluntary arbitration were ineffective, the Legislature enacted the MFAA.

Schatz v. Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP, 45 Cal.4th 557, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 700, 198 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Under the MFAA, "when there is a fee dispute between an attorney and a client, the client may choose to submit the matter to arbitration by a local bar association." Id. , 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 700, 198 P.3d at 1111. "[A] client may invoke the MFAA and proceed to arbitration despite the absence of any prior agreement to do so." Id. 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 700, 198 P.3d at 1114. Section 6200(c) of the MFAA provides that "arbitration under this article shall be voluntary for a client and shall be mandatory for an attorney if commenced by a client." Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 6200(c). "In other words, whereas a client cannot be forced under the MFAA to arbitrate a dispute concerning legal fees, at the client's election an unwilling attorney can be forced to do so." Schatz, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 700, 198 P.3d at 1114.

Pursuant to the MFAA, an "arbitration will be binding ... only if the attorney and client so agree in writing after the dispute has arisen." Id. 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 700, 198 P.3d at 1111 ; see also Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 6204(a). "Otherwise, either party may request a trial de novo within 30 days after the arbitration has concluded." Schatz, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 700, 198 P.3d at 1111 ; see also Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 6204(a). But the right to a trial de novo is subject to an important exception: a "party shall not be entitled to a trial after arbitration" if that party "willfully fails to appear at the arbitration hearing in the manner provided by the rules adopted by the board of trustees." Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 6204(a). "The determination of willfulness shall be made by the court," and "[t]he party who failed to appear at the arbitration shall have the burden of proving that the failure to appear was not willful." Id. In making its determination, the court may consider any findings made by the arbitrators on the subject of a party's failure to appear." Id.

II. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff Naegele is an attorney, litigating this case pro se, who formerly represented the Albers defendants in a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, and later, on appeal before the Ninth Circuit ("the California litigation").³ 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 7–9. The parties entered into a fee agreement, subject to three written addenda, with respect to the California litigation. Id. ¶ 8; see also Attach. A to Decl. of Timothy D. Naegele in Supp. of Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss [Dkt. # 42–1] ("Fee Agreement").⁴ The Fee Agreement and the addenda each state that the "venue for any disputes or litigation arising out of this agreement shall be in a court of the District of Columbia and/or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia," and that the Albers defendants "hereby consent to the jurisdiction of such court or courts with respect to any disputes or litigation arising out of this agreement." Fee Agreement at ECF 4, 8, 11, 16.⁵

A. The Albers defendants seek mandatory fee arbitration pursuant to the MFAA.

A dispute arose between the parties regarding the fees plaintiff charged for the California litigation, and the Albers defendants invoked their statutory right to mandatory fee arbitration under the MFAA. Naegele III, 940 F.Supp.2d at 2. The Albers defendants were represented by former defendant Michaelson in the fee arbitration, and he notified plaintiff by a letter dated August 28, 2003 of the Albers defendants' intention to arbitrate the fee dispute. Id. at 2–3. The Los Angeles County Bar Association Dispute Resolution Services ("DRS")—the entity tasked with administering fee arbitrations under the MFAA—forwarded a copy of arbitration petition to plaintiff on September 22, 2003. Id. at 3. Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of the Michaelson letter and the DRS notice via email on October 3, 2003. Naegele IV, 958 F.Supp.2d at 20.

B. Plaintiff files this federal action against the Albers defendants in the District of Columbia.

The initiation of fee arbitration pursuant to the MFAA precludes the concurrent prosecution of any court action surrounding the fee dispute, and any judicial action that was pending prior to the commencement of fee arbitration is "automatically stayed until the award of the arbitrators is issued or the arbitration is otherwise terminated." Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 6201(c). Despite this requirement and with the knowledge that the Albers defendants had initiated arbitration proceedings, plaintiff filed the complaint that launched the instant case in this court on December 8, 2003, on the grounds that the forum selection clause in the Fee Agreement provided that "any disputes or litigation arising out of this agreement shall be in a court of the District of Columbia and/or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia." Naegele III, 940 F.Supp.2d at 3 ; see also 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 8; Fee Agreement at ECF 4. In response, on January 5, 2004, the Albers defendants and former defendant Michaelson sought an automatic stay of the District of Columbia proceedings pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 6201(c). Notices of Automatic Stay Under Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 6201(c) [Dkt. # # 2–4].

Shortly thereafter, on April 20, 2004, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, Am. Compl. [Dkt. # 7], which caused the Albers defendants and Michaelson to file a second round of requests for an automatic stay on May 3, 2004. Notices of Automatic Stay Under Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 6201(c) [Dkt. # # 19–21].

On June 18, 2008, while those requests...