Nagel v. Avon Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. H-78-557 (PCD).

Decision Date27 October 1983
Docket NumberCiv. No. H-78-557 (PCD).
PartiesMiriam C. NAGEL, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated v. AVON BOARD OF EDUCATION, John Shine, individually and as principal of Avon High School, G. Ernest Temple III, individually and as Chairman of the Avon Board of Education, Dr. Herbert Pandiscio, individually and as Superintendent of the Avon School System.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

Ruth H. Mantak, Barbara J. Ruhe, Hartford, Conn., for plaintiff.

Paul Orth, Hoppin, Carey & Powell, Hartford, Conn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

DORSEY, District Judge.

Jurisdiction

Plaintiff's complaint, as amended, states claims under Title IX of the National Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), and under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is found. 28 U.S.C. § 1343. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Question Presented

Plaintiff alleges that her failure of appointment as Chairperson of the Science Department of the combined High and Middle Schools in the Avon School System was discriminatory as based on her sex. The court bifurcated the issues and tried only the issue of gender discrimination under both Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To establish a prima facie case plaintiff need prove only that (1) she is a member of the class subject to discrimination; (2) she was qualified for the appointment; (3) she was rejected; and (4) after her rejection the job remained open and available to others of her qualification. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A prima facie case of discrimination is found.

Defendants, however, have offered ample and credible evidence of a gender neutral appointment procedure and that the nonselection of the plaintiff was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory grounds, thus rebutting the presumption of discrimination. Accordingly, the plaintiff was left with the burden of proving the ultimate question of discrimination vel non. United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra. This process has been established as an orderly way to evaluate evidence in a case of claimed discrimination. Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978).

Plaintiff has not met her burden of proof of discrimination and accordingly, judgment should enter for all defendants.

Factual Background

Plaintiff, a teacher since 1962, came to the Avon School System in 1972. In 1976 a vacancy arose for the position of Chairperson of the Science Department for the High and Middle Schools in Avon. Defendant Pandiscio, the Superintendent of Schools, appointed a committee to make recommendations from among the candidates to the Board of Education. Seven candidates were interviewed by the committee consisting of all of the applicants from within the system, four in number, and three applicants from outside the system who had been prescreened from a larger group. Plaintiff was one of the inside applicants. She was the only female interviewed. The screening committee consisted of the High School Principal, the Middle School Principal, two science teachers, one from each school, the Assistant Superintendent for Business and the Chairman of the Special Services Department of the school system. The Middle School Science teacher was the only female member of the committee. The committee recommended two names for consideration by the Board of Education, Mr. Malcolm Cheney, an outside applicant, and Mr. Eugene Bourquin, then a teacher in the Science Department at Avon High School. The Board of Education appointed Eugene Bourquin. Defendants have conceded plaintiff's high qualifications as a teacher and neither argued nor presented evidence to suggest her disqualification for the position of Department Chairperson.

In 1976, there was one female in a supervisory position within the Avon School System and, until shortly prior thereto, there had been a female Elementary School Principal whose position was terminated when the school in question was closed. Of the five High School Department Chairmenships, in 1976 none was held by a female nor had any of them been held by a female for at least eight years, during which three vacancies had occurred. There was no evidence of applications for any chairmenship vacancies by women other than the plaintiff and one other whose qualifications were not the subject of evidence. There was no evidence to suggest any continuity or relationship between the committee in this case and any of the procedures or personnel involved in the selection procedures for department chairmenships prior to 1976. Nonselection of women absent evidence of their having applied is not, of itself, sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Marsh v. Eaton Corp., 639 F.2d 328 (6th Cir.1981). The ratio of women to men teaching in the Avon School System was approximately 2 to 1 and, in 1976, within the Science Department, was 4 to 3.

The screening process established by Dr. Pandiscio was less than optimally calculated to obtain a full presentation of the qualifications of each candidate in the following respects:

(a) Application forms tailored to the specific position were not used.
(b) Job specifications were not published for the candidates nor for the screening committee though a previously adopted school board policy described the position and was generally known to most of the committee, all of whom had personal knowledge of the specific job.
(c) No specific presentation in writing, in the form of resumes, recommendations or references, writings and the like, was requested.
(d) Candidates were not informed, in advance, that they were to undergo a panel interview.
(e) Criteria on which to judge a candidate's ability to meet the job requirements, including subjective concepts, were not articulated until after selection was completed.1
(f) The interviews were abbreviated, probably taking in the range of thirty minutes.
(g) One of the committee was present for only a minor portion of the plaintiff's interview.
(h) No committee member was void of advance knowledge of all the candidates. None was insulated from relationships within the school system.

None of the deficiencies pertained solely nor more particularly to the plaintiff nor were they likely to produce any different evaluation of the plaintiff than of any other candidate. Thus, the selection process, though faulty, did not operate any differently in relation to the plaintiff than to the other candidates. She was not precluded from putting forth her full qualifications as there was no restriction on either her oral or written presentation. While the plaintiff might have been obliged to extend herself to make a better case, she was not restricted from doing so and was in no different posture before the screening committee than other candidate.

One of the committee, Mrs. Laurie-Ann Salva, was a Middle School Science Department teacher for two years as of 1976. She was untenured. The plaintiff claims that as the only female member of the selection committee, she was unable to insure a nondiscriminatory deliberative process. Mrs. Salva impressed the court as an intelligent, alert woman who seemingly was and would have been sensitive to the potential for discrimination. She described the procedure as being without any aspect or suggestion of discrimination against the plaintiff, both in interviews and in the committee's deliberation. None of the committee had any knowledge of Mr. Cheney other than from his application, written submission, the interview and the committee's deliberations. Four members of the committee had greater knowledge of Mr. Bourquin outside the interview process than they had of Mrs. Nagel. One member of the committee, the High School Principal, supervised both Mr. Bourquin and Mrs. Nagel, the latter for a longer time.

The committee members testified with the exception of Mr. Shack whose written evaluation was in evidence. Exhibit 71. The committee members testified that their decision was based on their knowledge of the candidates from personal experience, where applicable, from the material supplied by each candidate, and from the interview process, except that Mr. Penna was largely absent from Mrs. Nagel's interview. Each member of the committee considered the insight of the other members as expressed in the deliberation.

The plaintiff had fourteen years in teaching. She had some experience supervising student teachers. She had developed curriculum in at least three projects. Her evaluations within the Avon School System were extremely good. She had acted as a Teacher Representative. She was described as having excellent rapport with her students. She had both bachelors and masters degrees and had done advance work. She had participated in an Appointment Advisory Committee within the Avon System. She was teacher-qualified in four subjects. She offered credible evidence of her qualification under the subjective criteria used by the committee.

Mr. Bourquin had been a teacher for five years as of 1976. He had developed curriculum in at least two projects. His teacher evaluations were extremely good. He undertook substantial extracurricular supervision of and participation in student activities and appeared to have excellent rapport with his students. He acted as a Teacher Representative both on a voluntary and elected basis. He had bachelors and masters degrees. He was teacher qualified in three subjects. He had supervised student teachers. He had served on a School Appointment Advisory Committee. His bachelors degree was obtained cum laude.

Malcolm Cheney had been a teacher for ten years. He had bachelors...

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