Nagle v. Hooks
Decision Date | 31 May 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 122,122 |
Citation | 460 A.2d 49,296 Md. 123 |
Parties | John Stephen NAGLE v. Beth Ann Nagle HOOKS. |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Barbara Mello, Baltimore (Francis X. Gaegler and Gaegler & Hopewell, Landover, on brief), for appellant.
Allen J. Kruger, Laurel (Goldman, Nichols, Kovelant, Pedersen, Hurtt & Kruger, Laurel, on brief), for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ.
In this case we are called upon to determine who may waive the statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege provided for in Section 9-109(b), 1 Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol.), in a child custody proceeding.
Little need be said concerning the background of the continuing battle over the custody of the minor child of John Stephen Nagle and his former wife, Beth Ann Nagle Hooks. Suffice it to say that the parties were divorced a vinculo matrimonii on January 4, 1980, and permanent custody of the child was awarded to its mother, Mrs. Hooks. An appeal to the Court of Special Appeals by Mr. Nagle resulted in a remand of the matter for further factual proceedings. Thereafter, on June 12, 1981, the chancellor issued detailed findings of fact to support a continuation of permanent custody with Mrs. Hooks. Following a second appeal by Mr. Nagle, the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the decree of the chancellor. Nagle v. Nagle, CSA, Sept. Term 1981, No. 888 (March 10, 1982) (per curiam). Before this decision was handed down, Mr. Nagle filed a petition to modify custody upon which a hearing was held in November, 1981, resulting in a dismissal. That decision precipitated yet another appeal by Mr. Nagle to the Court of Special Appeals. That court again affirmed the chancellor in an unreported opinion. Nagle v. Hooks, CSA, Sept. Term 1981, No. 1644 (August 10, 1982) (per curiam). We thereafter granted certiorari to determine a question of public importance, i.e., whether a custodial parent may refuse to waive, on behalf of a minor child, in a custody action, the statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege regarding communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of a minor's mental or emotional disorder.
Specifically, what gave rise to the question before us is quite straightforward. At the hearing on Mr. Nagle's last petition, he attempted to have a psychiatrist, who had been seeing the child, testify. On the basis that Mrs. Hooks had not given her consent to waive the privilege, and reasoning that each parent would have to so consent, the chancellor refused to allow the witness to testify regarding matters within the privilege. The chancellor stated in pertinent part:
"So the patient may assert the privilege. 9-109(b) privilege generally provides that unless otherwise provided in all judicial, legislative or administrative proceedings, a patient or his authorized representative has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent a witness from disclosing communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of the patient's mental or emotional disorder, and it would seem to me that both Mr. and Mrs.--no, Mr. Nagle and Mrs. Hooks would be the ones that would have to waive it in behalf of their child.
MR. GAEGLER [Attorney for Mr. Nagle]: Could either/or do it?
The Court of Special Appeals, in affirming the chancellor, did so without deciding whether both parents had to consent to a waiver. Rather, it held "that the parent having custody under a court order ha[d] authority to assert the privilege." Nagle v. Hooks, supra, Sept. Term 1981, No. 1644, slip op. at 3. In our view, the chancellor erred, as did the Court of Special Appeals.
Prior to 1966, there was no privilege of nondisclosure of communications between patient and psychiatrist relating to diagnosis or treatment of the patient's mental or emotional disorder. By Ch. 503, Laws of 1966, the legislature enacted what was to become Section 13A of Article 35 of the Annotated Code providing for the privileged communications. In substantially the same terms, this section has now become section 9-109 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, with one notable exception. In the original 1966 legislation, it was specifically provided that disclosure could be compelled by a judge "in cases involving the custody of children if, in [the judge's] opinion, such disclosure [wa]s necessary to a proper determination of the issue of custody." That provision was eliminated by the legislature in 1977 (Ch. 685, Laws of 1977) for some unexplained reason, and is thus not the law today.
In pertinent part, section 9-109 makes specific the procedure to be followed under facts similar to the instant case. There appears to be no question as to how the privilege of nondisclosure is to be exercised. Section 9-109(c) provides:
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