Naglee v. Alexandria & F. Ry. Co

• Decision Date: 31 December 1887
• Citation: 63 S.E. 369,83 Va. 707
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Naglee v. Alexandria & F. Ry. Co.

63 S.E. 369

83 Va. 707

Naglee

v.Alexandria & F. Ry. Co.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Dec. 31, 1887.

Railroad Companies—Liabilities for Negligence—Cannot Shift Liability by Surrendering Road to Trustee.

A railroad company, chartered under the laws of Virginia, cannot, by the voluntary surrender of the possession, control, and operation of its road, by deed of trust, to trustees of its own selection, shilt the responsibilities imposed upon it by law, nor relieve itself from liability for wrongs or injuries subsequently done to persons or to property in the negligent operation of its road.¹

S. F. Beach and John M. Johnson, for appellant. Francis L. Smith, for appellees.

Fauntleroy, J. This is a writ of error to a judgment of the circuit court of Prince William county, rendered on the twelfth day of May, 1885, in an action at law pending in the said court in which the plaintiff in error is plaintiff, and the Alexandria & Fredericksburg Railway Company is defendant. The action is trespass on the case, to recover damages from the defendant for the destruction of the plaintiff's property by fire, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant company's agents and servants. There was a demurrer to the evidence; and damages to the amount of $1,800 were assessed by the jury for the plaintiff, subject to the judgment of the court on the demurrer to the evidence. Judgment on the demurrer was given for the defendants; the court holding that as the defendant's railroad, at the time of the burning, was operated by trustees under a deed of trust, the company itself was not responsible. This ruling of the court is assigned as error, and this is the only question in the case.

It is proved by the evidence in the record, and admitted by the demurrer to the evidence, that the plaintiff's property (his fencing, timber, and grass) was extensively and repeatedly, as alleged in the declaration, destroyed by fires caused by "the negligent operation of the locomotives running over the railroad of the defendant company; but the defense is set up by the company, and sustained by the court, that at the time of the injury inflicted, in 1880 and 1881, the railroad property of the defendant company was in the possession of, and being operated by, the trustees in a deed of trust executed by the defendant in June, 1866, —the said trustees having taken possession of the road and controlled and operated it since December, 1872. No evidence was offered to prove, nor was it pretended, that the surrender of the possession and control and operation of the road by the company to the said trustees was, in any way or form, involuntary or compulsory; nor was there any effort or. evidence to prove that the public at any time had notice, either actual or constructive, of such transfer or surrender. The proof simply was that the trustees, during the period named, had the possession and operation of the road. The defendant, the Alexandria & Fredericksburg Railway Company, was chartered by the general assembly of Virginia, February 3, 1864, and its charter was amended by an act approved June 4, 1870. By its charter, and by the presumption of law, it is bound to all its obligations and duties to the public, and it is the party prima facie responsible for injuries to persons or property caused by its negligence in the operation of its road; and being, a priori, so bound and liable, it remained so until, by its own burden of evidence, every basis for the presumption had been completely removed. The defendant company, claiming exemption from its presumptive legal liability for the provedand admitted injury caused by the operation of its road, under the plea of a previous surrender of the possession, control, and operation of its road to its own selected agents, it is bound to show its legal authority for the deed of trust or contract by which it could shift its legal liability, and transfer to its own trustees the performance of duties which it assumed by the acceptance of its charter, —the performance of which duties was the consideration for the grant of its charter; and having shown so much, if it were possible in the case, it remains for it further to show that the surrender or transfer, in time, manner, and circumstance, was such as to exonerate it from subsequent responsibility to the public for the manner and consequences of the discharge of its charter duties and obligations.

The decisions are numerous in which railroad companies have been held exempt from liability for injuries, torts, or breaches of contract, growing out of the operation of their road in the hands of mortgage trustees; but the cases were those in which the power to mortgage was conferred by charter, and where the possession of the trustees was adverse to the company, and the result of proceedings in invitum, —cases arising in those states where special statutes existed authorizing and regulating the surrender and transfer of a company's road and franchises to trustees for the benefit of creditors. In an elaborate note by the editor of the American Decisions (volume 75, p. 548) on "railroad corporation's power to transfer its franchises and property, " where the authorities on the subject are collected and compared, the cases of Hall v. Railroad, 21 Law Rep. 138, (quoted and relied on in brief of counsel for defendant in error,) and of Railroad v. Metcalfe, 4 Mete. (Ky.) 200, (also cited for defendant in error,) are specially noticed as conflicting with other decisions upon the subject, and preference is given to the other decisions as expressing the correct view of the law. In the case of Coe v. Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 375, (also quoted by the defendant in error,) the court held that the company could mortgage its franchise to take toll, and to maintain the railway, because of distinct legislative authority so to mortgage the franchise.

The question in this case under review is whether, in this state, where there is no statutory provision authorizing or regulating the transfer and surrender of its road, the company, defendant, can escape liability for a proved injury by showing a previous voluntary surrender to mortgage trustees, and indefinitely substitute those trustees for the company in the exercise of their corporate rights and franchises, and the...