Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., A--34

• Decision Date: 12 February 1951
• Docket Number: No. A--34,A--34
• Citation: 6 N.J. 341,78 A.2d 709
• Parties: NAGY v. FORD MOTOR CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 341

6 N.J. 341

78 A.2d 709

NAGY v. FORD MOTOR CO.

No. A--34.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Nov. 6, 1950.

Reargued Jan. 2, 1951.

Decided Feb. 12, 1951.

Abraham L. Friedman, Newark, argued the cause for appellant (Samuel L. Rothbard, Newark, of counsel; Rothbard, Harris & Oxfeld, Newark, attorneys).

Verling C. Enteman, Newark, argued the cause for respondent (McCarter, English & Studer, Newark, attorneys).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

HEHER, J.

The question here is the meaning of section 9 of Ch. 74 of the Session Laws of 1945 (Phamph. L. pp. 378, 390), which amended R.S. 34:15--22, N.J.S.A. to read as follows: 'No agreement between an employee and his employer or insurance carrier for compensation shall operate as a bar to the formal determination of any controversy, unless such agreement has been approved by a deputy commissioner in open court; Provided, that after a petition has been filed and when the petitioner is represented by an attorney licensed in the State of New Jersey, and when it shall appear to the deputy commissioner that the only issue involved is the extent of disability, the deputy commissioner may, with the consent of the parties, after considering the sworn testimony of the petitioner and such other witnesses present, together with any stipulations of the parties, enter a determination and rule for judgment which shall include a finding of fact as to the amount of the then present disability. Such determination and rule for judgment may be reopened only in accordance with the provisions of section 34:15--27 of this Title.'

This is the case history: On January 5, 1945, while in the pursuit of his employment with the Ford Motor Company at its plant in Edgewater, New Jersey, Nagy suffered an injury to his left arm and shoulder; and on July 19th ensuing he filed a petition for compensation under R.S. 34:15--7, et seq., N.J.S.A., alleging that the injury was permanent. On May 27 1946, following a hearing held on the prior April 8th, there was entered in that proceeding what is denominated a 'stipulation of facts and order approving settlement,' signed by a deputy commissioner of compensation. Nagy was represented by an attorney licensed to practice law in New Jersey. He and his attorney consented to the entry of the order and 'the discontinuance of the petition upon the payment of the compensation' therein provided; and the attorneys for the employer gave like consent. The order recites an agreed settlement between the parties, 'subject to the court's approval;' also that 'under the terms' of the settlement, the employer 'does not admit the jurisdictional facts but reserves all of its defenses and makes the settlement solely for the purpose of buying peace.' The agreement provided for compensation for a 5% Permanent impairment of the use of the left arm, and for payment of counsel fees and the cost of expert medical opinion, in part by each of the parties. It was also set forth that the claimant 'was sworn and the terms of the proposed settlement * * * explained to him,' and he 'expressed an understanding of and satisfaction with the same;' that the medical expert called by the claimant diagnosed his 'condition as a sprain of the left shoulder joint, and estimated the permanent disability at 7 1/2% To 10% Of the left arm;' and that the medical expert summoned by the employer estimated the 'loss of the left arm' at 5%. The deputy commissioner 'approved' the 'proposed settlement' as 'fair;' and he ordered that upon payment of the moneys therein provided, 'the claim petition be discontinued.' On May 29, 1947, Nagy filed a 'formal' petition for compensation. The employer answered that at a 'formal hearing' held by the Compensation Bureau on April 8, 1946, 'it was found,' Inter alia, that the claimant 'was suffering from a permanent disability of 5% Of the left arm,' for which a 'formal award' was made and compensation paid accordingly; and that the claimant's 'incapacity or permanent disability has not increased since the formal award on April 8, 1946, as evidenced by a Determination of Facts and Rule for Judgment duly signed' by the Deputy Commissioner on May 27, 1946. On June 25 1948, following a hearing, there was entered a determination of facts and rule for judgment reciting a finding by the hearing deputy of a 12 1/2% Permanent loss of the physical function of the arm, and providing for compensation accordingly, less the amount theretofore paid under the settlement and order of May 27, 1946. It was found that there was 'no competent evidence' of an increase of disability subsequent to the approval of the agreed settlement; the award was made for the disability then existing. The hearing deputy regarded the proceeding as an original inquiry not barred by the order approving the settlement, either under the statute or the doctrine of Res judicata. At this hearing, there were varying opinions expressed by medical experts in respect of the Quantum of permanent disability of the arm, ranging from 2 1/2% To 25%.

The Bergen County Court, on the employer's appeal, reversed this award of compensation and dismissed the petition as not maintainable because under the Act of 1945 cited supra, the agreed settlement between the parties, approved by the Compensation Bureau, constituted a bar to the relitigation of the issue of disability on the merits. The judge conceived that while it was the duty of the hearing deputy 'to see that the rights of the employee are protected under such an agreement,' the agreement when so approved has 'the same effect as any judgment arrived at after a complete litigation of the issues.' He was also of the view that such a settlement is subject to modification under R.S. 34:15--27, N.J.S.A., if there be an increase or decrease of disability.

Until the amendment of 1945 cited supra, R.S. 34:15--22, N.J.S.A. provided in terms that no agreement between the parties 'for a sum other than that which may be determined to be due' by the Bureau, or the Court of Common Pleas on appeal, would suffice to bar the determination 'of a controversy upon its merits,' or the award 'of a different sum' if the Bureau found that the amount agreed upon was 'less or more than the injured employee or his dependents' were 'properly entitled to receive.' Under this and kindred provisions of the statute, such an agreement, even though approved by the Bureau, did not have the force of a judgment or arbitral award. The judgment of the Bureau was final and conclusive only in the event of a determination of the issues on the merits. A disposition that in essence was a mere agreement of compromise approved by the Bureau was lacking in the element of finality and so did not constitute a bar to a later action to recover the compensation which ought to have been paid under the statute. The policy of the statute would not be served by an irrevocable surrender of a right to compensation as therein fixed, either before or after the occurrence of a compensable accident if the statutory scheme had been accepted by the parties. The Bureau was utterly without jurisdiction to approve a...