Naidu v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 06 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 98-5344.,CIV.A. 98-5344.
• Citation: 93 F.Supp.2d 577
• Parties: Denise NAIDU, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

93 F.Supp.2d 577

Denise NAIDU, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

No. CIV.A. 98-5344.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

April 6, 2000.

George A. Mauro, Jr., Mauro, Savo, Camerino & Grant, Somerville, NJ, for Denise Naidu.

Robert A. Kirsch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Newark, NJ, for U.S.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WOLIN, District Judge.

Plaintiff, Denise Naidu, filed suit to recover damages for injuries allegedly suffered when she slipped and fell while descending a staircase at a building within Fort Hancock, a National Historic Landmark. This case is now before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss. Defendant, the United States, moves to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, defendant moves for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff opposes the motion. The Court has considered this matter, on the papers, pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss the Complaint, in its entirety, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was injured at Building 18 of Fort Hancock, located at the Sandy Hook Unit of the Gateway National Recreational Area, in Highlands, New Jersey. Plaintiff sustained her injuries as she fell down the last two stairs of the main stairway at Building 18. Plaintiff claims that she fell because (1) the stairs were coated with a slippery surface; (2) she was misled by the handrail bannister which terminated at the second step, not at the bottom step; and (3) the lighting was inadequate. Plaintiff admitted, however, that while descending the stairs, she was holding a "large" computer box which obstructed her view of her feet. In addition, plaintiff testified in her deposition that she placed no hand on the handrail but, instead, used it as a visual marker. She also admitted she fell because "[she] thought [she] was all the way down and there was one step to go."

Fort Hancock

Fort Hancock, named for General Winfield Scott Hancock, has been an important historic and military site throughout American history.¹ (Kirsch exhs. 4-5).² At the time of the Revolutionary War, Sandy Hook (which encompasses Fort Hancock) was occupied by British and Loyalist Troops. (Id.) During the War of 1812, the United States Army built a temporary fort and, in 1859, construction began on a permanent masonry fort. (Id.) For close to a hundred years, Fort Hancock served as an active coastal defense fortification designed and armed to defend New York Harbor and the vicinity from sea and air attacks. (Id.) The Army occupied the fort in both World War I and II, when its population rose to 18,000. (Id.) While the military was active at the fort, Building 18 (the location of plaintiff's accident) served as the officer's quarters for military personnel. (Baerlin Decl. ¶ 7).

Building 18 (the "Officer's Quarters") and the other buildings on "Officer's Row" not only possess historic significance, they also reflect the architectural mood of the times. Of note, the buildings on Officer's Row, which have been described as "the most impressive" buildings at the Fort, were constructed in the Colonial Revival architectural style. (Kirsch exh. 5). This architectural style constituted a rejection of the Victorian style and a rebirth of the Georgian and Federal designs which typified the Revolutionary War era. (Id.)

Due to its historical significance, Fort Hancock, inclusive of the Officer's Quarters, was designated as a National Historic Landmark. See National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6; Baerlin Decl. ¶ 6. Of significance to this motion, the Officer's Quarters' staircase and handrail bannister — which plaintiff claims defendant negligently maintained — are part of the original construction of the quarters and have been determined to be a "character defining" feature of this historic site. (Baerlin Decl. ¶ 9).

In 1974, the Fort Hancock was deactivated and transferred to the National Park Service ("NPS") of the Department of the Interior. As part of its statutory mission and mandate, the NPS must "conserve ... historic objects .. [and] provide for them in such a manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." 16 U.S.C. § 1; Baerlin Decl. ¶ 3.

In 1989, the NPS authorized the American Littoral Society (the "ALS"), a nonprofit organization devoted to the study and conservation of aquatic life, full use of the Officer's Quarters. In April 1997, plaintiff, then an employee of the ALS, sustained her injuries on the stairs of the Officer's Quarters during the course of her employment.

Plaintiff's Claim

Plaintiff brings a one-count complaint against defendant, sounding in negligence, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80. According to plaintiff, defendant was negligent because (1) the stairs of the Officer's Quarters were coated with a slippery surface; (2) the handrail banister terminated at the second step — not the bottom step; and (3) the lighting was inadequate.

Defendant now moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.³ Defendant contends that the acts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint fall within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). As such, defendant asserts the Court is without jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

Upon enacting the FTCA, Congress abrogated the federal government's sovereign immunity with regard to tort claims for money damages. Congress, however, created certain statutory exceptions to this waiver of sovereign immunity. Defendant's motion centers around one of these exceptions — the discretionary function exception.

Claims which fall within the discretionary function exception are outside the Court's jurisdiction. Indeed, under this exception, the waiver of the government's immunity

shall not apply to ... [a]ny claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).

While the statute does not define "discretionary function," the Third Circuit has explained that

[t]he discretionary function exception is designed to protect policy making by the politically accountable branches of government from interference in the form of "second-guessing" by the judiciary-second guessing the result of which burdens the public fisc and the prospect of which skews the decision making process of the executive and legislative policymakers.

Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 284 (3d Cir.1995) (en banc) (citing United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984)); see also Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The reason for `fashioning an exception for discretionary governmental functions' was to `protect the government from liability that would seriously handicap efficient government operations.'" (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755)).

The Supreme Court has adopted a two-stage inquiry in determining the applicability of the exception. "First, a court must consider if `a federal statute, regulation or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.'" Gotha, 115 F.3d at 179 (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 537, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988)). If such a directive applies, the "employee has no rightful option but to adhere" to it. Id. As a result, no discretion exists, thus, rendering the exception inapplicable.

If, however, no directive applies, a court must consider a second step. Under this step, a court must determine "whether the challenged action or inaction `is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.'" Id. (citing Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954). "Under this second prong, the court must determine whether the challenged discretionary actions or decisions were `based on considerations of public policy.'" Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc., 46 F.3d at 284. "Public policy" may be social, economic, or political. See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 808, 104 S.Ct. 2755. "Public Policy" also includes decisions which further the aims of a governmental agency or institution. See Chantal v. United States, 104 F.3d 207, 212-13 (8th Cir.1997); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of Army, 835 F.Supp. 803, 808-09 (M.D.Pa. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 55 F.3d 827 (3d Cir.1995); Cassagnol-Figueroa v. United States, 755 F.Supp. 514, 519 (D.P.R.1991).

Notably, for the exception to apply under this second prong, the governmental agent need not have subjectively intended to exercise such discretion. Rather, "the focus of the inquiry is ... on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis." United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (emphasis added). In other words, the Court should "ask only if the nature of the action taken, or not taken, is susceptible to policy analysis" — not whether the agency actually contemplated a decision. Gotha, 115 F.3d at 180 (citing Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 284) (emphasis added); see also Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp., 795 F.2d 301, 308-09 (3d Cir.1986) ("The test is not whether the government actually considered each possible alternative in the universe of options, but whether the conduct was of the type associated with the exercise of official discretion.").

Pursuant to this two-step inquiry, the Court must determine whether plaintiff's claim falls within the discretionary function exception. If it does, the Court must dismiss the case for lack of...