Nail v. Brazoria County Drainage Dist. No. 4
| Decision Date | 29 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. G-97-334. |
| Citation | 992 F.Supp. 921 |
| Parties | J.R. NAIL v. BRAZORIA COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT NO. 4, Dan Keller, Jeffrey Brennan, and Roger Davis |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Matt Evan Rubin, Williams Birnberg & Andersen, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.
Richard A Morris, Feldman and Rogers, Houston, TX, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In this action, Plaintiff J.R. Nail brings claims against Brazoria County Drainage District No. 4 and its Commissioners, asserting a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of his due process rights, and a state law breach of contract claim. Now before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 15, 1997. For the reasons stated below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
At the outset, the Court notes that as of the date of this Order, Plaintiff has failed to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to Local Rule 6(D), a response was due January 5, 1998. Therefore, in accordance with Local Rule 6(E), the Court treats the Motion for Summary Judgment as unopposed. In an abundance of caution, however, the Court will nevertheless address the Motion for Summary Judgment on its merits.
On July 11, 1994, Plaintiff J.R. Nail was appointed as General Manager of Brazoria County Drainage District No. 4 (the "District"). In applying for the position, Nail signed a form stating that he understood the position to be for no fixed time, and that he could be removed with cause or notice by the District. Nail served as General Manager of the District for eleven months. During that time, the Commissioners became increasingly displeased with his performance, and set goals for him which he failed to achieve. On June 12, 1995, the Commissioners met and decided to replace Nail as General Manager, and to offer him severance pay in exchange for his resignation.
Also on that day, Nail accepted an offer from the Commissioners whereby the District would pay him $5,000 for the month of July as a "consultant," and would retain the right to renew the agreement for August and September at $5,000 per month. In affidavits, the Commissioners aver that all parties involved understood that Nail's acceptance of the "consulting" position was a voluntary resignation, and that Nail would not actually be required to provide any consulting services to the District.
This arrangement was memorialized in a "Settlement Agreement and Release" (the "Release") which Nail signed on August 28, 1995. In the Release, Nail agreed "to release the District from any and all claims, demands, and causes of action, of whatsoever nature or character, which may have been or may hereafter be asserted by any person, firm, or corporation whomsoever." Notwithstanding this Release, Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 10, 1997.
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56. Rule 56(e) requires that when a motion for summary judgment is made, the nonmoving party must set forth set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. If the evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment should not be granted. Id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
As noted previously, Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Rule 6 of the Local Rules allows the Court to treat as unopposed motions without a timely response. See Local Rule 6(E) (). Moreover, although the Court normally views summary judgment evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, where there is no controverting evidence in the record, summary judgment is proper, provided the evidence submitted by the movant establishes one or more factual elements sufficient to negate the nonmovant's claims as a matter of law. See Nash v. Electrospace System, Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 402 (5th Cir.1993); Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843 F.2d 172, 173-74 (5th Cir.1988) (). Although it is per se reversible error to grant a summary judgment motion simply because the nonmovant fails to respond, see John v. Louisiana Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges & Universities, 757 F.2d 698, 707-08 (5th Cir.1985), the Court is entitled to decide the merits of this case solely on Defendants' Motion and competent supporting evidence because Plaintiff has proffered no controverting evidence.
In his Original Complaint, Nail claims that the actions of the District and the Commissioners deprived him of due process because he allegedly was not given any information regarding deficiencies in his performance, nor was he given notice "as required by the personnel policy and procedures manual." Plaintiff cites the employee personnel policies and procedures handbook which provides that employees may be dismissed only "for just cause, after careful and factual consideration," only for substandard performance or misconduct, and only after being given the reason(s) for dismissal and two weeks' notice. Defendant argues, however, that not only did Nail agree to terms separate from those applicable to the other District employees when he applied for the position of General Manager, but he also effectively surrendered any and all legal claims he might have had against the District when he executed the Release.
The Fifth Circuit adheres to the conviction that "[p]ublic policy favors voluntary settlement of claims and enforcement of releases." Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930, 935 (5th Cir.1994). The release of federal claims is governed by federal law. See id. (); (citing O'Hare v. Global Natural Resources, Inc., 898 F.2d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir.1990) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims); Rogers v. General Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir.1986) ()). Therefore, the alleged release of Plaintiff's due process claims is analyzed under federal law.
In federal court, once the movant produces sufficient evidence to establish that the action is barred by a release that addresses the claims at issue and that there was adequate consideration, the nonmovant has the burden of demonstrating that the release was invalid because of fraud, duress, material mistake, or some other defense. Williams, 23 F.3d at 935. Here, Defendants have provided the Court with a copy of the Release which covers the claims at issue, signed by J.R. Nail and the individual Defendants, and executed on August 28, 1995. Furthermore, they have presented competent summary judgment evidence establishing that Nail received consideration for signing the release in the amount of at least $7,500. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to dispute the adequacy of consideration or validity of the Release. Therefore, Plaintiff has effectively released any and all federal claims he has against Defendants.1 Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's due process claims is GRANTED, and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants.
The Release also effectively bars any state law claims Plaintiff has alleged against Defendants. In Texas, a release "operates to extinguish the claim or cause of action as effectively as would a prior judgment between the parties and is an absolute bar to any right of action on the released matter." Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex.1993) (citation omitted). A release is effective only insofar as it "mentions" the claims to be released. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 955 S.W.2d 120, 128 (Tex.App. — Hous. 14th Dist.1997). Here, Plaintiff has released "any and all claims or demands of any kind, whatsoever, which Nail now has or might have had, now existing, arising out of any matter or event occurring contemporaneously with or subsequent to Nail's inception of employment with the District." The claims Nail asserts in this action clearly arise out of events related to his employment as General Manager of the District, and the Release clearly covers his claims. Therefore, under Texas law, Nail has also released any state law claims he might have against Defendants. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's state law breach of contract claims is hereby GRANTED, and those claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants.2
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and each and all of Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. All parties are ORDERED to bear their own costs and attorney's fees incurred herein to date.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
For the reasons set forth in the Court's Order entered this date, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, and each and all...
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