NALCO CHEMICAL CORPORATION v. Shea
| Decision Date | 17 December 1968 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 68-972. |
| Citation | 294 F. Supp. 479 |
| Parties | NALCO CHEMICAL CORPORATION and the Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, Plaintiff, v. R. J. SHEA, Deputy Commissioner, Seventh Compensation District, Bureau of Employees Compensation, United States Department of Labor, and Mrs. Joyce Quave, Individually and on behalf of her five minor children, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Lawrence J. Ernst of Christovich & Kearney, New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.
Robert Homes, Asst. U. S. Atty., New Orleans, La., for defendant R. J. Shea, Deputy Commissioner.
Gerald P. Fedoroff, David S. Cressy, New Orleans, La., for defendant Mrs. Joyce Quave.
This is a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order awarding longshoremen's compensation to the widow of a deceased pilot salesman employed by the plaintiff Nalco Chemical Corporation. The plaintiff's husband was killed in a plane crash while acting within the scope of his employment. Suit was brought by Nalco and its insurer the Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York against R. J. Shea, the Deputy Commissioner for the Department of Labor, Bureau of Employees' Compensation, Seventh Compensation District, and against Mrs. Joyce Quave, the widow of the deceased pilot.
There are several motions before the Court. The plaintiffs have filed a motion for a trial de novo on the question of jurisdiction; the defendant Deputy Commissioner has brought a motion to remand the case back to his tribunal for further findings; and the defendant widow has moved for a summary judgment affirming the granting of the compensation award.
Plaintiffs rely on Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932), in which suit was brought for an injunction against the enforcement of a workmen's compensation award under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. An award of compensation had been made by the deputy commissioner in favor of the claimant based upon the finding that the claimant had been injured while in the employ of petitioner and while performing services on the navigable waters of the United States. It was contended that at the time of his injury the claimant was not employed by the petitioner, and therefore, his claim was not within the jurisdiction of the deputy commissioner. The district court held a hearing de novo on the jurisdictional issue, held that the claimant was not in the employ of the petitioner at the time of the accident, and restrained the enforcement of the award. The decree was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the two lower courts and approved of the district court's holding of a de novo hearing on the jurisdictional issue. Although the deputy commissioner's findings of fact are to be given considerable weight by a reviewing court, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between ordinary facts and "fundamental" or "jurisdictional" facts, without which the deputy commissioner would have no power to hear the case:
The Supreme Court therefore concluded that a court reviewing jurisdictional facts need give no weight to the deputy commissioner's findings on such facts. The Court said, "We think that the essential independence of the exercise of the judicial power of the United States, in the enforcement of constitutional rights requires that the federal court should determine such an issue upon its own record and the facts elicited before it." Id. at 285 U.S. 64, 52 S.Ct. 297. The court therefore held that "the District Court did not err in permitting a trial de novo on the issue of employment." Id. at 285 U.S. 65, 52 S.Ct. 298.
But Crowell v. Benson has not really been followed in the 36 years since that decision was rendered. Although it has never been expressly overruled by the Supreme Court, most courts have virtually ignored it, as is evidenced by the numerous twilight zone cases which all dealt with jurisdictional problems under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. These courts could have held de novo review in these cases under the Crowell doctrine, but in almost every case the Crowell decision was not even mentioned.
The Fifth Circuit has not expressly passed on this question. The closest it has come to commenting on the current viability of the Crowell doctrine was in Riley v. Henderson, 218 F.2d 752 (5th Cir., 1955). However, the court determined that the question in that case was substantial rather than jurisdictional, and consequently, it was "unnecessary to consider appellees' contention that the rule of that case Crowell v. Benson is of doubtful validity in the light of more recent Supreme Court cases." Id. at 218 F.2d 754.
The Ninth Circuit has held that it is not mandatory for a district court to hold a de novo trial on jurisdictional issues in Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act cases, but rather this matter is within the district court's discretion. In Western Boat Building Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir., 1952), the Ninth Circuit said:
(Emphasis by the court.)
More recently, the Ninth Circuit has upheld the Western Boat case in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. O'Leary, 288 F.2d 542, 543 (9th Cir., 1961), in which the court said:
The Supreme Court recently cited the very pages of the Morrison-Knudsen case on which the court rejected the Crowell doctrine for the proposition that "in the absence of specific statutory authorization, a de novo review is generally not to be presumed." Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 619, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026 at footnote 17, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).
The Ninth Circuit's decisions on this matter were followed in Dixon v. Oosting, 238 F.Supp. 25 (E.D.Va.,1965); East v. Oosting, 245 F.Supp. 51 (E.D. Va.,1965); and Puget Sound Bridge & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Leary, 260 F.Supp. 260 (W.D.Wash.,1966). A de novo trial in jurisdictional fact situations was also held to be discretionary with the district court in Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Lowe, 96 F.Supp. 918 (E.D.Pa.1951).
This Court agrees with the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and holds that the granting of a de novo trial in Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act cases is a matter of discretion. If this were not so, the losing party in every longshoremen's compensation proceeding could gain a new trial of part of the case by coming into federal court and getting a trial de novo on the jurisdictional facts. This would be true in every case because the commissioner always has to find that he has jurisdiction before he can determine the case on its merits. This would thwart the purpose for which administrative agencies were created. "In a complex society whose legislators have seen fit to create a host of administrative agencies functioning throughout the economy, the administrative-judicial system would defeat its own purpose and break down of its own weight if every decision were reviewed de novo." Watson v. Gulf Stevedore Corporation, 400 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir., 1968).
Invoking this discretion, it is our conclusion that the record of these proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner is quite sufficient on the jurisdictional question, and we therefore can decide this question without the necessity of hearing the same witnesses who testified in the administrative proceeding. For this reason the motion of the plaintiffs for a trial de novo on the question of jurisdiction is denied.
The defendant Deputy Commissioner asserts that the official record of proceedings before him establishes that the death...
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