Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 14 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:14-CV-02819 |
| Parties | MICHAEL NALL, et al, Plaintiffs, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Pending before the Court in the above-referenced cause are Plaintiff Michael Nall's ("Nall") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doc. 38, Defendant BNSF Railway Company's ("BNSF") Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 39, and Nall's Objections to Evidence in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike Such Evidence ("Motion to Strike"), Doc. 40. After considering the motions, responses, relevant law, and for the reasons outlined below, the Court overrules both parties' objections to the other's evidence, denies Nall's Motion to Strike, denies Nall's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, and grants BNSF's Motion for Summary Judgment.
This case arises from Nall's allegations that his employer, BNSF, (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his age and disability when the company placed him on medical leave and refused to reinstate him despite receiving numerous medical releases from his doctor, and (2) retaliated against him after he filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Nall brings these claims of discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213, Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621-634, and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), Tex. Lab. Code § 21.001- 21.556. Doc. 15 at ¶¶ 60, 66, 75.
Nall began his employment with BNSF in 1973. Doc. 38 at 12. During his tenure with the railroad, he performed a number of jobs that fell under the umbrella of "train service work," including the positions of conductor and switchman in the company's Galveston yard. Docs. 38 at 12, 39 at 5. In September 2010, Nall was diagnosed with Parkinson's disease and went on medical leave. Doc. 38 at 13. After receiving a number of materials from Nall's doctors and confirmation that he could perform his job duties without restrictions, BNSF allowed Nall to return to work. Id. Despite his diagnosis, he continued to work without complaint for the next year and a half. Id. at 14.
In the spring of 2012, Jeremiah Strong ("Strong"), one of the trainmasters who Nall reported to, shared his and Nall's coworkers' concerns about Nall's ability to safely perform his duties with the Galveston yard terminal manager, Jonathan Gomez ("Gomez"). Doc. 39-6. On April 11, 2012, Gomez told Nall that he was being placed on medical leave because he was "observed having difficulty getting on and off engines as a result of stumbling as well as displaying a lack of concentration when receiving mandatory directives from dispatchers." Docs. 38 at 14, 17, 38-23. Gomez memorialized this conversation in a letter that instructed Nall to contact Dana Dickey ("Dickey"), the field medical manager, so that her department could determine whether a medical evaluation would be necessary to assess his ability to work safely. Doc. 38-23. The following day, Carol Wilks ("Wilks"), BNSF's manager of clinical services, issued another letter to Nall, which stated that Nall's supervisor had contacted the medical department to request a fitness-for-duty review because he had concerns that Nall's Parkinson's was not controlled and posed a threat to his safety. Doc. 38-12. This letter requested a number of medical documents from Nall in order to "begin [the] fitness for duty evaluation." Id.
Over the next several months, Nall submitted a number of medical evaluations in compliance with the company's requests. Docs. 38-13, 38-15, 38-16, 38-30, 38-18. After reviewing the submitted reports, BNSF often requested further information. Docs. 38-14, 38-17. On August, 27, 2012, after reviewing all of these materials, BNSF's field medical officer, Dr. Sharon Clark ("Clark") sent an internal email suggesting that "[t]he most reliable way to determine whether [Nall's] condition has improved to the point that he would be safe to perform his job duties would be for him to demonstrate that he can perform the job duties, e.g., an onsite evaluation." Doc. 38-2.
On September 21, 2012, BNSF conducted the recommended onsite evaluation, known as a field test. See Doc. 38-3. Dickey; Kyle James ("James"), BNSF's then-superintendent of operations; Nall's union representative; and a third-party physical therapist were among those in attendance. Docs. 38-35 at 21, 38-36 at 9, 39-1 at 96, 39-7 at 6. Nall asserts he completed the test successfully because he displayed no concentration or stumbling issues, which were BNSF's original reasons for removing him from duty. Doc. 38 at 19-20. However, BNSF concluded that Nall "put his safety at risk during the field test" because he committed a number of safety violations known as "Deadly Decisions." Docs. 39-4 at 31-42, 39-7 at 33-34, 38-8 at 3. As a result, the company concluded that he should not be returned to active duty and informed Nall of its decision. Doc. 38-8 at 3.
On December 20, 2012, Nall filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC. Doc. 39-1 at 215. On the same day, he sent in an updated BNSF Medical Status Form ("MSF") from his primary treating physician, Dr. Jankovich ("Jankovich"), which stated that after evaluating Nall on August 15, 2012, and December 17, 2012, his work-status recommendation was "Full Duty (No Restrictions)." Doc. 38-19. On June 26, 2013, Nall sent inanother MSF, which again stated that Jankovich recommended full duty after a follow-up visit on April 15, 2013. Doc. 38-20. BNSF uploaded these documents to its employee case management system (OPUS), Doc. 38-7, but the parties sharply dispute whether they were meaningfully reviewed and acted upon by the BNSF medical team, Docs. 38 at 21, 42 at 5.
In June of 2013, Dr. Laura Gillis ("Gillis") replaced Clark as BNSF's field medical officer. Doc. 38-38 at 3-4. A month later, after reviewing Nall's file, Gillis determined that he should be "medically disqualified." Doc. 39-9 at 89. Nevertheless, Gillis and Dickey continued to discuss Nall's condition long after Gillis's initial disqualification decision. See Doc. 38-24. Nall also continued to send in medical information, including an October 2014 medical evaluation from Jankovich indicating that he believed Nall could return to work as well as a December 2014 evaluation. Docs. 43-1, 43-2. On December 9, 2014, BNSF offered Nall another field test because Jankovich's December 2014 evaluation "indicat[ed] a possible change in [his] clinical status." Doc. 39-1 at 212. On the basis of Nall's performance during this subsequent field test, however, BNSF again concluded that Nall was unsafe to return to work. Doc. 39-1 at 213-14.
As these events were unfolding, on October 3, 2014, Nall filed this case. Doc. 1. On November 11, 2014, he amended his complaint to remove two causes of action. Doc. 15. On September 16, 2015, this Court dismissed a number of Nall's remaining claims, leaving him with the three that are the subject of the pending cross motions for summary judgement: (1) disability discrimination under the ADA and TCHRA, (2) age discrimination under the ADEA and TCHRA, and (3) retaliation under the ADA, ADEA, and TCHRA. See Docs. 36, 38, 39. The parties have fully briefed the issues and the motions are now ripe for consideration.
The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is appropriate when, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the court determines that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1996). A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248.
The movant initially bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery in the record that it finds demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990) (citations omitted). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. When the moving party makes an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact concerning every element of its cause of action in order to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998); Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Emps. v. City Pub. Serv. Board, 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994); Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998). There is no genuine issue for trial if a rational trier could not find for the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented. City Pub. Serv.Bd., 40 F.3d at 712-13 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584-88 (1986)).
Allegations in a plaintiff's complaint are not evidence. Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) ("[P]leadings are not summary judgment evidence."); Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Solo Serve Corp. v. Westtown Assoc., 929 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1991) (...
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