Nall v. Piper

• Decision Date: 26 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-2479,90-2479
• Citation: Nall v. Piper, 948 F.2d 1282 (4th Cir. 1991)
• Parties: NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit. Kenneth L. NALL, Floyd B. Littleton, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Paul P. PIPER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 1282

948 F.2d 1282

NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.

Kenneth L. NALL, Floyd B. Littleton, Jr., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Paul P. PIPER, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 90-2479.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 9, 1991.

Decided Sept. 26, 1991.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District Judge. (CA-90-215-6-3)

Argued: Gregory D. May, Decker, Hardt, Kopf, Harr, Munsch & Dinan, P.C., Dallas, Tex., for appellant.

Daniel Denby Davenport, Jr., Davenport & Yacobi, P.A., Greenville, S.C., for appellees.

On Brief: M. Kevin Queenan, Decker, Hardt, Kopf, Harr, Munsch & Dinan, P.C., Dallas, Tex., James H. Cassidy, Love, Thornton, Arnold & Thomason, Greenville, S.C., for appellant.

D.S.C., [941 F.2d 1207, superseded]

AFFIRMED.

Before WIDENER and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and MURRAY, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, Sitting by Designation.

OPINION

MURRAY, Senior District Judge:

Appellant Piper seeks review of two orders by the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Greenville Division, denying his motions to dismiss or alternatively to stay litigation in the abovecaptioned case. ¹ Unless this Court concludes that the district judge abused his discretion in issuing the orders, the district court's orders must be affirmed. United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 920 F.2d 487, 489 n. 6 (8th Cir.1990); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. University of Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 969, 976 (3d Cir.1988), amended on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1015, (1989). Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in this instance, we affirm the two orders.

I.

The two instant cases originally went before the district court pursuant to the complaints of appellees Nall and Littleton, respectively. Nall's complaint, filed on February 2, 1990, set forth two causes of action: first, he sought a judgment for principal, interest and attorney's fees relating to a promissory note delivered by Piper to Nall in partial payment for stock in Nall's company purchased pursuant to a stock purchase agreement; second, Nall sought a judgment against Piper for certain damages under an agreement of indemnification flowing from Piper to Nall. Littleton's only cause of action against Piper in his complaint, also filed on February 2, 1990, was identical in substance to the first cause of action asserted by Nall.

Prior to the filing of Nall's and Littleton's respective complaints in South Carolina, however, Piper had sued both Nall and Littleton in a single action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, on January 3, 1990. Piper sought, among other relief, "a declaratory judgment as to the rights of the parties hereto with respect to the Nall and Littleton [promissory] Notes." Joint appendix at 38. On January 29, 1990, Nall and Littleton filed motions with the Texas court to dismiss the action, or in the alternative to transfer the case to South Carolina. ²

On March 7, 1990, Piper filed motions with the South Carolina court, seeking either a dismissal or a stay of litigation in each of the instant cases. The South Carolina court denied Piper's motions, stating that the action of the Plaintiff herein against the Defendant herein based on the aforementioned promissory note dated June 27, 1988, is sufficiently separate and distinct from the transaction including [sic] involving the Stock Purchase Agreement dated June 15, 1987, [and] this claim of the Plaintiff would not in any event be a compulsory counter claim to the action instituted by the Defendant herein in the Texas case even if the Texas Court were determined to have jurisdiction over the Plaintiff herein in that case.

Joint appendix at 132-133 and 319-320. The district court also gave great weight to the fact that the cases' contacts with South Carolina were more numerous and significant than their contacts with Texas. Among the important contacts with South Carolina listed by the district court were the following: the place of execution of the Stock Purchase Agreement; the residence of all the parties except Piper; the situs of the corporation in the underlying transaction, as well as of its assets; and the site of most of the negotiations for the Stock Purchase Agreement. Joint appendix at 131 and 318. From its consideration of all these factors, the district court concluded that it is apparent that the convenience of the parties and the interest of justice would be properly served by the Plaintiff being allowed to proceed with his case in this Court.

Joint appendix at 133 and 320.

II.

Piper now urges that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motions. He argues, first, that the claims raised by Nall and Littleton in their South Carolina actions are compulsory counterclaims to the...