Nalley Northside Chevrolet, Inc. v. Herring

• Decision Date: 10 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. A94A1526,A94A1526
• Citation: Nalley Northside Chevrolet, Inc. v. Herring, 450 S.E.2d 452, 215 Ga.App. 185 (Ga. App. 1994)
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: NALLEY NORTHSIDE CHEVROLET, INC. v. HERRING.

Page 452

450 S.E.2d 452

215 Ga.App. 185

NALLEY NORTHSIDE CHEVROLET, INC. v. HERRING.

No. A94A1526.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Nov. 10, 1994.

Certiorari Denied Feb. 23, 1995.

Richelo, Morrissey & Gould, Brian J. Morrissey, Atlanta, Brock & Clay, Richard W. Calhoun, Marietta, for appellant.

Glenville Haldi, Atlanta, for appellee.

JOHNSON, Judge.

Nalley Northside Chevrolet, Inc. appeals on numerous grounds from a jury verdict in favor of Betty Herring. Herring brought an action against Nalley alleging fraud, negligence, breach of contract and RICO violations in connection with repairs undertaken by Nalley on Herring's car after it was damaged in a collision. The RICO claim was eliminated prior to trial.

1. The first alleged error arises out of the trial court's denial of Nalley's motion to change venue from Gwinnett County to Cobb County. On appeal Nalley argues that no basis for venue existed in Gwinnett County because it did no business there and its registered office was in Cobb County. In support of its motion to transfer, Nalley presented an affidavit to the trial court in which it represented that the registered office was located in Cobb County. An evidentiary hearing followed this motion, but a transcript of this hearing is not a part of the record on appeal.

The record does include, however, the trial court's ruling on the motion to transfer which states it is "undisputed" that the registered office listed with the Secretary of State is in Gwinnett County. Nalley moved for reconsideration of this finding and argued that it never conceded that the registered office was located in Gwinnett County. The trial court's ruling on this motion specifically responds that the Secretary of State had listed the registered agent's address in Gwinnett County up until September 3, 1991, when Nalley changed it to Cobb County. Because a transcript would be necessary for a review of the claimed error and it is not before us, this court must assume that the trial court's decision was supported by the evidence. Barber v. H & H Muller Enterprises, 197 Ga.App. 126, 129(1), 397 S.E.2d 563 (1990).

2. Nalley also asserts that the trial court should have granted its motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to dismiss because Herring lacked standing to pursue the claims in issue. Nalley maintains that Herring's insurer became the real party in interest upon issuing a check to Herring for the damage done to her car in a collision with another vehicle.

Nalley correctly observes that an insurer is generally subrogated to the insured's right to collect damages from the party causing the damage or injury. Nalley does not assert, however, that Herring's insurer made any payments to her in compensation for damages resulting from Nalley's actions. Thus, Herring's insurer may have assumed certain subrogation rights in claims she may have had against the driver of the other vehicle, but they would not have included the claims against Nalley for its alleged misconduct. Nalley's motion was properly denied.

3. Nalley complains about the admission of certain evidence. First, it maintains that repair invoices generated by Nalley and its predecessor in interest were improperly admitted through an independent insurance appraiser named Robert West. These documents, none of which referred to Herring, attempted to establish a pattern of charging for parts which were not used in repairs, thereby defrauding insurance companies and/or consumers. The trial court rejected Nalley's relevance and hearsay objections. OCGA § 24-3-14, the Georgia Business Records Act, governs the admissibility of business records. Subsection (b) requires that a foundation be laid through the testimony of a witness "who is familiar with the method of keeping the records and who can testify thereto and to facts which show that the entry was made in the regular course of a business at the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter." Hertz Corp. v. McCray, 198 Ga.App. 484, 485(2), 402 S.E.2d 298 (1991). The Georgia Business Records Act does not require that the person laying the foundation be the custodian of the records, but the witness must be familiar with the method of recordkeeping. Id. at 486, 402 S.E.2d 298. West offered no testimony establishing his familiarity with Nalley's method of keeping records, when the records were made or to facts showing that the entries were made in the regular course of business. He also testified that he had no personal knowledge about any of the transactions or parties reflected on the records about which he was testifying. Thus, a proper foundation was not laid, and the records should not have been admitted.

Nalley also argues the testimony of West and a prior Nalley employee named Lenny Brown concerning past fraudulent parts conversion was improperly admitted by the trial court because the testimony was irrelevant with respect to this case. The admission of evidence is a matter which rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of this discretion will not be disturbed on appellate review unless manifestly abused. Haynes v. State, 180 Ga.App. 202, 203(3), 349 S.E.2d 208 (1986). Three specific allegations of fraud are made in this case: 1) that Nalley misrepresented the length of time it would take to repair the car; 2) that certain repairs had been made to the car which had not been made; and 3) that the car had been completely repaired, when it had not. None of these allegations pertains to parts conversion or defrauding customers and/or insurance companies with respect to charges for parts and labor. Therefore not only were the documents and testimony regarding them improperly admitted into evidence as business records, the testimony was not relevant to Herring's claims and the trial court erred in admitting it. The admission of the documents and the testimony concerning them constitutes harmful error and the judgment must be reversed.

4. Four of the remaining errors asserted involve jury instructions. Nalley complains that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the plaintiff's burden to prove damages with reasonable certainty; in refusing to charge the jury on the elements of misrepresentation sufficient to justify fraud, reasonable reliance by the plaintiff, and promises as to future acts; in instructing the jury that innocent misrepresentations could constitute fraud absent a confidential or special relationship, and that...