Nalley v. First Nat. Bank
Decision Date | 03 March 1931 |
Parties | NALLEY v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF MEDFORD ET AL. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; H. D. Norton, Judge.
On petition for rehearing.
Petition denied.
For former opinion, see 293 P. 721.
Charles W. Reames, of Medford, and E. M. Page, of Salem, for appellant P. K. Nalley.
Harry C. Skyrman, of Medford, for appellant Anna C. Nalley.
Porter J. Neff, of Medford, for respondents.
The petition for rehearing, as we construe it, presents the contention that in our original consideration of this case we did not bear in mind the events occurring after the execution of the instrument dated February 11, 1928, and conveying the property in controversy to P. K. and Anna C. Malley. For convenience, we will refer to this instrument as Exhibit A.
The suggestion is also made that we should have referred to the conversation between Mr. Pointer and Mr. Phipps just before the delivery of Exhibit A.
We cannot believe that the petitioners challenge the truth of the statement that the instrument dated December, 1927 purporting to convey the property in controversy to Anna C Nalley, was not delivered. As we construe petitioners' position in that regard, it is that, because this instrument was not delivered, we should have held that Exhibit A was not delivered.
We find no protest by petitioners against our holding with respect to the validity of the instrument executed in March, 1928, by Anna C. Nalley conveying her interest in said property to Mr Pointer. As to the property in controversy, this instrument was entirely unnecessary and futile if there had been no delivery of Exhibit A. To the extent of its validity as a transfer of an interest in the property described in Exhibit A, it is a practical construction by Pointer of Exhibit A to the effect that Exhibit A had been delivered and title in the property had passed to the Nalleys.
The events to which the petition calls our attention are:
(1) Nalley's failure to take action, after knowledge of the execution of a will by Pointer, to prevent the provisions of the will from becoming effective.
(2) Nally's relation to the proceedings instituted for the appointment of a guardian for Pointer and Nalley's testimony therein.
(3) The possession by Pointer at his death of a receipt, bearing date of December 14, 1927, for an escrow package placed in the bank.
(4) The refusal of defendant, Harder, also an officer in the bank, to deliver to Pointer the papers in escrow.
We will first present the testimony of Mr. Phipps as to what occurred just before and when Exhibit A was prepared by him (Transcript of Testimony, pp. 105 and 106):
Taken in its entirety, this testimony is corroborative of Mr. Nalley's claim that Exhibit A was delivered by Pointer to Nalley.
We have stated above that we cannot believe that petitioners challenge the truth of the statement as to the nondelivery of the instrument dated December, 1927, purporting to transfer the property in controversy to Anna C. Nalley. Our reason for this is that in plaintiff's first brief, at page 7, we find this statement:
In the first brief of defendant Anna C. Nalley, at page 4 thereof, we find this statement:
The excerpts from the briefs just quoted disclose a formal admission of nondelivery by the grantee named therein. Another reason for so holding is that the only testimony in the record on the subject discloses that there was no delivery thereof.
We are, however, utterly unable to adopt petitioners' reasoning to the effect that, inasmuch as there was no delivery of this instrument, we must hold that there was no delivery of Exhibit A.
Four months and nineteen days after the execution of Exhibit A, Pointer made a will containing a bequest of one-third of his estate to plaintiff, one-third to Anna C. Nalley, and one-third to defendants Cass.
In the meantime, divorce proceedings had been instituted and a divorce granted between the Nalleys, and Pointer had taken up his abode with the defendants Cass. Petitioners criticize plaintiff for saying that he was named in that will and not taking steps to prevent the provisions of the will from becoming effective. Usually a will is not contested until the testator's death. Mr. Nalley, in explaining the reason for his attitude about the matter, said:
Transcript of Testimony, p. 242 (misnumbered 342).
Petitioners call attention to plaintiff's testimony as to the value of the Pointer property. As we read it, plaintiff stated its value. He was not called upon to state whether or not he had or claimed an interest in it. The testimony referred to is as follows:
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