Nam v. U.S. Xpress Inc
| Decision Date | 27 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:10-CV-3924-AT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
| Parties | WILLIAM & JIN NAM, individually, and WILLIAM NAM as the personal administrator of the ESTATE OF MATTHEW NAM, decedent, Plaintiffs, v. U.S. XPRESS, INC., a Nevada Corporation, U.S. XPRESS LEASING, INC., a Nevada Corporation, U.S. XPRESS ENTERPRISES, INC., a Nevada Corporation, SANDRA PATTERSON, individually and as an agent and employee of U.S. XPRESS, INC., U.S. XPRESS LEASING, INC., AND U.S. XPRESS ENTERPRISES, INC., and JOHN DOE ENTITIES & INDIVIDUALS, (1-3), Defendants. |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Patterson's motion to dismiss [Doc. 2], Plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court [Doc. 4], Defendants' motion to supplement and amend their notice of removal [Doc. 5], Plaintiffs' motion tostrike defendants' motion to supplement and amend their notice of removal [Doc. 7], Defendants' motion to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 or 28 U.S.C. § 1406, and Defendants' motion for leave to file sur-reply in support of motion to transfer venue, [Doc. 23]. The Court's rulings and conclusions are set forth below.
This is a wrongful death action arising from a collision between a tractor-trailer and an automobile that occurred on Interstate 75 in Bradley County, Tennessee. (Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17.) Plaintiffs are the surviving parents of the decedent, Matthew Nam. Id. at ¶ 2. According to Plaintiffs, although Matthew Nam was a citizen and resident of Georgia, he lived in Tennessee while serving as a volunteer youth chaplain at the University of Tennessee and taking courses at Southern Adventist University. Id. at ¶¶ 11-14. Matthew Nam collided with the rear of a tractor-trailer driven by Defendant Sandra Patterson, an employee of U.S. Xpress. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23, 28. Matthew Nam died from his injuries "due to the force and severity of the collision" at Erlanger Medical Center in Tennessee. Id. at ¶ 25.
Plaintiffs William and Jin Nam are citizens and residents of the State of Georgia.1 Defendants U.S. Xpress, Inc. and U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc. are Nevada corporations that maintain their principal place of business in Tennessee. Defendant U.S. Xpress Leasing, Inc. is a Tennessee corporation that maintains its principal place of business in Tennessee. Id. at ¶¶ 3-5. Defendant Sandra Patterson is a citizen and resident of the State of Tennessee. Id. at ¶ 7.
Plaintiffs allege that, during the time period relevant to this action, Sandra Patterson operated a tractor-trailer on behalf of Defendants U.S. Xpress. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 63. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant Patterson works at the U.S. Xpress facility in Tunnel Hill, Georgia where she regularly reports to work and picks up her tractor-trailer owned by the U.S. Xpress Defendants. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that on April 15, 2010, Matthew Nam was driving his vehicle within the posted speed limit in the right lane on Interstate 75 in Bradley County, Tennessee. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. According to Plaintiffs, as Defendant Patterson approached a temporary weigh station near mile marker 23, she attempted to move into the emergency lane area at the end of a line of other tractor-trailers that were backed into oncoming traffic on Interstate 75. Id. at ¶ 19.Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Patterson's tractor-trailer was partially in the right lane in violation of signs posted by the Tennessee Department of Transportation directing trucks to bypass the weigh station when full. Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. According to Plaintiffs, Matthew Nam attempted to move into the left lane to avoid Defendant Patterson's tractor-trailer, but could not due to traffic, and was unable to avoid the collision because Defendant Patterson's tractor trailer was obstructing his lane of travel. Id. at ¶¶ 22-24.
Prior to the collision, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Patterson failed to conduct a proper pre-trip inspection of her tractor-trailer the morning of April 15, 2010. Id. at ¶ 31. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Patterson should have seen Matthew Nam's vehicle approaching in her on-board rearview camera system and attempted to move out of his lane of travel. Id. at ¶ 36. Plaintiffs allege that visibility was clear and that no other weather conditions were present that would have obstructed Defendant Patterson's ability to safely maneuver and operate her vehicle or her ability to see the posted signs in advance of the weigh station. Id. at ¶¶ 37-38. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants were negligent in inspecting Patterson's tractor-trailer on the day of the collision and that it should not have been on the road that day and that "but for" Defendants' tractor-trailer obstructing the right lane of Interstate 75, the collision would have never occurred. Id. at ¶¶56, 60. Matthew Nam died as a result of the physical injuries sustained in the collision and was survived by his parents as his sole heirs. Id. at ¶¶ 62, 64.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the State Court of Gwinnett County on November 3, 2010.2 (Doc. 1-1.) Plaintiffs seek damages of $5,000,000 for the full value of the life of Decedent Matthew Nam. Further, the Estate of Matthew Nam seeks damages for pre-death pain and suffering, funeral and burial expenses, last medical expenses, and other related damages.
On December 1, 2010, Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a), and 1446(a) on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.) Defendant Sandra Patterson filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on December 8, 2010. (Doc. 2.) Defendant Patterson argued that, as a resident of Tennessee with nominal contacts with the State of Georgia, the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over her is improper under the Georgia long-arm statute and the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.
Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to state court on December 10, 2010, arguing that Defendants failed to follow the procedural requirements of 28U.S.C. § 1447 by filing with their notice of removal a copy of all process, pleadings and orders served upon them in the court below. (Doc. 4.)
Defendants also filed a motion to transfer venue on December 21, 2010. (Doc. 9.) Defendants contend that a transfer of venue to the Eastern District of Tennessee is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406 because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. Alternatively, Defendants assert that the court should transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404 because the Eastern District of Tennessee is a more convenient forum for resolution of this action.
A defendant may remove an action from state court to federal court so long as the federal court would have originally had federal question or diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, as such, the Eleventh Circuit requires remand of removed cases where federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear. See Burns v. Windsor Insurance Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (1994). "In deciding a motion to remand where the plaintiff and defendant disagree on issues of jurisdiction, questions or doubts are to be resolved in favor of returning the matter to state court." Id.
In order for a federal court to have jurisdiction over a case pursuant to the diversity statute, the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest, and the parties to the action must be diverse. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. There is no question that Plaintiffs could have filed suit in this Court originally on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' claims for damages and compensation in excess of $5,000,000 far exceed the amount in controversy. Further, Plaintiffs and Defendants are all citizens of different states. Accordingly, Defendants' removal of this case is permissible.
Plaintiffs do not seek remand on the grounds this Court lacks original federal jurisdiction. Rather, Plaintiffs argue Defendants' failure to strictly comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) renders Defendants' removal procedurally and fatally defective. This statutory provision prescribes the procedures for removing a case from state court:
A defendant or defendants... shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal... containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or defendants in such action.
The notice of removal must be filed by the defendant within thirty days of receiving, through service or otherwise, a copy of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
Plaintiffs filed their motion to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) which provides in relevant part:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). "[Section] 1447(c) implicitly recognizes two bases upon which a district court may-and in one case must-order a remand: when there is (1) a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect other than a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1252-1253 (11th Cir.1999). The "defect" noted in Section 1447(c) refers to the failure to follow statutory removal procedures, typically a lack of compliance with either the filing requirements set forth in Section 1446(a) or the timeliness requirements set forth in Section 1446(b). Id.
According to Plaintiffs, Defendants' failure to include with their notice of removal...
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