Namet v. United States

• Decision Date: 13 May 1963
• Docket Number: No. 134,134
• Citation: Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963)
• Parties: David NAMET, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

373 U.S. 179

83 S.Ct. 1151

10 L.Ed.2d 278

David NAMET, Petitioner,

v UNITED STATES.

No. 134.

Argued March 18, 1963.

Decided May 13, 1963.

John H. Fitzgerald, Chelsea, Mass., for petitioner.

Stephen J. Pollak, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice STEWARTdelivered the opinion of the Court.

The petitioner was convicted by a jury on two counts of violating the federal wagering tax law, §§ 4411and4412 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,26 U.S.C. §§ 4411,4412.His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 301 F.2d 314.The petitioner contends that his conviction should have been reversed because at his trial the prosecutor was permitted to ask two witnesses incriminating questions concerning their relationship with the petitioner, with the knowledge that the witnesses would invoke their privilege against self-incrimination.We granted certiorari to resolve an asserted conflict with decisions in other circuits.371 U.S. 858, 83 S.Ct. 115, 9 L.Ed.2d 97.

The theory of the prosecution's case was that the petitioner had operated a small gambling ring in Chelsea, Massachusetts.His method of operation, according to the Government's theory, was to visit several neighborhood stores at regular times each day for the purpose of collecting betting receipts and paying off winning bets.One of the shops he visited was a variety store owned by Irving and Annette Kahn.

Informations charging violations of the federal wagering tax laws were filed against the petitioner and the Kahns on the same day.All three were represented by the same lawyer, John H. Fitzgerald, and all three pleaded not guilty.On the day of the petitioner's trial, the Kahns changed their pleas to guilty.Because they had previously told government investigators that the petitioner had collected the wagers made in their store and had personally settled accounts with them, the Kahns were subpoenaed to appear at the petitioner's trial.

In his opening statement to the jury, the prosecuting attorney stated that he had reason to believe 'a husband and wife' would testify against the petitioner.Upon the completion of the opening statement, Mr. Fitzgerald approached the bench, and the following colloquy took place:

'Mr. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, it is my understanding that the United States Attorney is going to attempt to use the Kahns as witnesses.

'Now, keeping in mind that they are defendants, that they are entitled not to testify in their own case—

'The COURT: They have pleaded guilty.

'MR. FITZGERALD: I know that, your Honor, but still I didn't waive any Constitutional privileges in their behalf.

'The COURT: I think the law is that they have no Constitutional privileges after they have pleaded.

'MR. FITZGERALD: Your Honor, further that they are under investigation by the Internal Revenue Department as far as their income taxes are concerned, and everything else.

'The COURT: Well, I haven't seen them take the stand yet, and if they claim the Fifth, I will rule on it then.'

After brief testimony by the first government witness, the United States called Annette Kahn.Mr. Fitzgerald repeated his objection for the record, but made no further arguments.¹Mrs. Kahn then testified to her name, her address, the ownership of the store, and her acquaintance with the petitioner.She refused to answer whether she and her husband had 'some type of business relationship' with the petitioner.An extended colloquy at the bench ensued.The court eventually concluded that Mrs. Kahn's plea of guilty to the charge of engaging in the business of accepting wagers deprived her of the right to refuse to testify about her own gambling activity.But the court also ruled that she did not have to testify about any dealings with third persons since she was still, at least theoretically, subject to prosecution for conspiracy, or possibly bribery.Mr. Fitzgerald made no new objections or arguments during this colloquy.To the contrary, he appeared to acquiesce in the questioning of Mrs. Kahn in open court once he had managed to work out a convenient means for advising her when to assert her privilege against self-incrimination.²

The questioning of Mrs. Kahn was resumed after a brief recess.The prosecuting attorney began a line of questioning designed to determine whether Mrs. Kahn had known of the gambling tax requirement before the date of her arrest.Mr. Fitzgerald objected, on the ground that the questions were not material.Another conference at the bench was held, in which the prosecuting attorney explained that his purpose was to show that Mrs. Kahn was not in danger of a conspiracy charge.The court sustained Mr. Fitzgerald's objection to the materiality of the questions.The interrogation was then discontinued.

After another recess, the Government resumed the presentation of its case by calling its other witnesses.Their testimony established the following case for the prosecution: The petitioner had been under surveillance by the government agents for one month.They had observed him following the same route twice a day, stopping for a few minutes in each of several variety and cigar stores.During the petitioner's afternoon round, the pockets in his coat became progressively more bulging, inferentially with material gathered in each of the stores.Petitioner returned home with the material.No persons were seen to enter his home between his arrival after the afternoon round and his departure the next morning for the morning round.Expert testimony was introduced showing that the petitioner's activities were consistent with those of a principal in a gambling operation.The afternoon visits during which his pockets became filled, it was testified, indicated a pick-up of the day's betting slips, and the morning visits would fit a pattern of 'setting-up' the store owners to pay off the previous day's winning bets.The absence of any apparent contact with other persons after the petitioner's afternoon round would indicate that he himself was acting as banker for the enterprise, and was not passing the money on to another principal.The final ingredient of the Government's case was certain material found during a search of the petitioner's home.This consisted of 'slips of number pool wagers,''daily double horse bet slips,' and over $1,000 cash in bills of small denominations.The gambling slips were identified by experts as those normally held by the 'bookie' rather than by the bettor.

One of the key issues which developed during this part of the case was the question of whether the places regularly visited by the petitioner were, in fact, known gambling establishments.The court sustained objections by Mr. Fitzgerald to such testimony by government agents, on the ground that the agents coudl not testify to events observed when the petitioner was not present.

The Government then called Irving Kahn to the stand.No objection was made.Mr. Kahn testified voluntarily that he owned the store in question, and that he was acquainted with the petitioner.After being directed to answer by the court, he testified that he had had dealings with the petitioner.And, when a second claim of privilege was overruled, he also testified that he had accepted wagers in his store.In the questioning which followed, the witness testified that the petitioner did come to his store 'a couple of times a week,' but denied that the petitioner came every day in the morning and afternoon.

In the course of this interrogation the witness was asked a total of only four questions to which his refusal to answer was sustained.³At no time during this questioning did Mr. Fitzgerald object to the questions on behalf of the petitioner, nor did he request any instructions regarding the inferences the jury might draw from these refusals to answer.Indeed, counsel attempted in his closing argument to utilize that part of Irving Kahn's testimony which had contradicted the Government's evidence about the regularity of the petitioner's visits.The closing arguments for the Government contained no references to the Kahns' refusal to answer, and the jury was not told that the Kahns had been arrested or charged together with the petitioner.

The court's instructions to the jury contained the following statement with regard to the Kahns' testimony:

'Nor should any inference be drawn against him because the Kahns refused to testify, unless it would be a logical inference that would appeal to you as having a direct bearing upon the defendant's guilt.'

Mr. Fitzgerald made no objection whatever to this part of the instructions.

In turning to the petitioner's argument that his conviction must be set aside because of the circumstances described, we emphasize at the outset what this case does not involve.No constitutional issues of any kind are presented.The petitioner does not claim any infringement of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.⁴He does not contend that the Kahns were in any way prejudiced by their assertion of this constitutional privilege.⁵All that this case involves, in short, is a claim of evidentiary trial error.

The petitioner's principal contention is that reversible error was committed in permitting the Government to question the Kahns after it was known that they were going to claim their privilege not to incriminate themselves.It is said that when a witness is asked whether he participated in criminal activity with the defendant, a refusal to answer based on the privilege against self-incrimination tends to imply to the jury that a truthful answer would be in the affirmative.This inference, the petitioner argues, cannot properly be used as evidence against a criminal defendant.To support this argument, the petitioner relies on dicta in several federal cases and upon the decision in United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535, in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said, 'Such refusals (to testify) have been...