Nance v. Crockett Cnty.

• Decision Date: 15 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14-1264,14-1264
• Citation: 150 F.Supp.3d 881
• Parties: Jerry A. Nance, Plaintiff, v. Crockett County, Tennessee, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

150 F.Supp.3d 881

Jerry A. Nance, Plaintiff,

v.Crockett County, Tennessee, Defendant.

No. 14-1264

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division.

Signed December 15, 2015

Jessica Farris Salonus, Gilbert Russell McWherter PLC, Brentwood, TN, Emily S. Emmons, Kara Beth Huffstutter, Michael L. Russell, Gilbert Russell McWherter Scott Bobbitt PLC, Franklin, TN, for Plaintiff.

John D. Schwalb, Williams & Schwalb, PLLC, Franklin, TN, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

J. DANIEL BREEN

, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

On October 7, 2014, the Plaintiff, Jerry A. Nance, brought this action against the Defendant, Crockett County, Tennessee (the “County”), alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.

(the “FLSA”). (Docket Entry “D.E.” 1.) Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment. (D.E. 23, 25.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides in pertinent part that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 603 (6th Cir.2015). “There is a genuine issue of material fact only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The test is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). The moving party must initially show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). It is then incumbent upon the nonmoving party to “present significant probative evidence to do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts to defeat the motion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court may not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence as these are functions of the jury rather than the judge. Yazdian v. ConMed Endoscopic Tech., Inc., 793 F.3d 634, 644 (6th Cir.2015). Cross-motions for summary judgment are analyzed under the same standard, with each motion being evaluated on its own merits.. La Quinta Corp. v. Heartland Props. LLC, 603 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir.2010). A party may move for partial summary judgment identifying a claim or part of a claim on which summary judgment is sought. Crook v. Rabbit River Enter., Inc., No. 1:14–cv–118, 2015 WL 3626695, at *1 (W.D.Mich. June 10, 2015) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

“[I]f the moving party also bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party's initial summary judgment burden is higher in that it must show that the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.”

Cockrel v. Shelby Cty. Sch. Dist. , 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir.2001)

(internal quotation marks omitted); accord

Hantz Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Penn., 130 F.Supp.3d 1089, 1091–92, 2015 WL 5460632, at *2 (E.D.Mich. Sept. 17, 2015). “[S]ummary judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion is inappropriate when the evidence is susceptible to different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.” Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1056 (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) ); see also

Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir.2002). “Plaintiff['s] showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for plaintiffs.” Hantz Fin. Servs

.

, 130 F.Supp.3d at 1091–92, 2015 WL 5460632, at *2 (quoting Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir.1986) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the defendant[ ] respond[s] to the motion with controverting evidence which demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact, [the plaintiff's] motion must be denied.” Kassouf v. U.S. Liab. Co., No. 1:14CV2656, 2015 WL 5542530, at *3 (N.D.Ohio Sept. 18, 2015).

FACTS

The material facts of this case, which are undisputed unless otherwise noted, are as follows. Plaintiff was employed by the County from 1997 through 2014, during which he worked for the Emergency Management Agency (“EMA”) and Ambulance Services (“EMS”). At EMS, he worked as a paramedic, responding to 911 emergency calls such as motor vehicle accidents and fires, and performing emergency rescue work alongside other ambulance units. His EMA duties, which were essentially clerical, included reaching out to other departments and involving them in developing and updating protocols; touring schools, nursing homes and other facilities for storm readiness and preparedness plan evaluation; and teaching various classes. Nance did not have a set schedule for performing EMA work.

Pursuant to an agreement, because of his full-time job with EMS, the work he performed for EMA was overtime under the FLSA for which he was paid at an overtime rate. In a declaration provided to the Court, Nance averred that, when he began working for EMA in 2004, he was paid for 32.25 hours per month regardless of how many hours he actually worked. He was instructed by his then supervisor, Jerrell Reasons,¹ to keep track of and record all hours worked above 32.25 per month as compensatory “comp” time.

A contract signed April 19, 2004, stated:

I, Jay² Nance, agree to the hourly rate of $15.50 per hour for the performance of work related to grant administration and Assistant Emergency Management Director responsibilities for Crockett County. It is understood and agreed that since I am a full time employee of the Crockett County Ambulance Service, that all work in regard to grant administration and Assistant Emergency Management Director will be paid at time and a half the agreed rate, listed above, in order to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act. It is also understood and agreed that the compensation for this position ... is in addition to and separate from my compensation from the Crockett County Ambulance Service.

(D.E. 24-2 at 1.) He executed similar agreements on August 30, 2012, and September 1, 2014, reflecting hourly rates of $16.60 and $17.42 per hour, respectively. The persons identified by the parties as those responsible for FLSA compliance were the County mayor, Gary M. Reasons, who served in that position beginning September 1, 2010, and Michelle Spraggins, who worked in the mayor's office.

According to the Defendant, a memorandum from the then County mayor Larry Griffin was circulated to all County officials and directors on August 5, 2004, advising that “[c]omp time is no longer used and has been replaced with [overtime] pay.” (D.E. 24-4 at 315.) The missive directed employees to “document and turn in all hours owed to you at the end of each fiscal year from this point forward.” (Id. ) In his declaration, Nance insisted that he never received the memorandum or was otherwise notified of a change in policy with respect to comp time.

In a budget committee hearing on May 19, 2008, the Plaintiff's monthly hours with EMA were increased from 32.25 to 64.5 hours per month. Nance related in his deposition that the increase occurred because he went before the budget committee and advised its members that he was working more hours that he was being paid for.

Plaintiff appeared before the committee on July 16, 2012, at which the following notes were taken by Spraggins.³

The budget hearing was called back into session by Chairman Gary Williams. The first item of business was a request by Assistant EMA Director [ (Nance) ] to address the committee. Mr. Nance is concerned that he will not be compensated appropriately for the amount of time is he [sic] being required to spend on EMA. Mr. Nance has been paid occasionally in the past from his fulltime employer Crockett EMS when he had to attend training for EMA. When this was brought to the attention of the Mayor and County audit it had to be addressed. An employee can not be paid from one department while working for another and due to Mr. Nance being full time as a paramedic all time spent with EMA is considered [overtime] and must be paid a salary that would be time and a half. He is salaried at EMA in the amount of $12,851 per year and must be figured at $16.60 per [hour] to assure it hits [overtime] rates. He must keep a timesheet even though he is salaried and he must show that he is not working EMS and EMA at the same time. Mr. Nance wanted to be sure that the committee understood how valuable he feels that his services are and that the county might loose [sic] some funding if he leaves. He stated that he had brought in not only funding for EMA, but also for the rescue squad and fire departments. He is currently missing shifts at the ambulance service to attend EMA meetings. He says that his salaried amount comes out to 64.5 hours when he really works about 80 to 130 hours. He has a meeting that someone in the county needs to attend to ensure that the county has someone to teach [National Incident Management System (“NIMS”) ]⁴ so that all departments can be certified. He has upcoming training for this and feels that he should be compensated extra for it. He says since he is on duty during this meeting, he is having to pay someone to work for him. Using vacation time is not an option for him in his opinion. He

...