Napert v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co.
Citation | 36 F.Supp.3d 237 |
Decision Date | 22 July 2014 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 13–10530–FDS. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Parties | Michael R. NAPERT, Plaintiff, v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants. |
36 F.Supp.3d 237
Michael R. NAPERT, Plaintiff
v.
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants.
Civil No. 13–10530–FDS.
United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.
Signed July 22, 2014.
Sonja L. Deyoe, Law Offices of Sonja L. Deyoe, Providence, RI, for Plaintiff.
Andrea L. Martin, Lawrence P. Murray, Burns & Levinson LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SAYLOR, District Judge.
This is a claim under the Massachusetts wage and hour laws. Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff Michael Napert worked as an adjuster for defendant Government Employees Insurance Company (“GEICO”). He alleges that GEICO intentionally failed to pay him his earned hourly wages as required by the Massachusetts Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148, and intentionally failed to pay him overtime wages as required by the Massachusetts Fair Minimum Wage Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1A.
GEICO has moved for summary judgment, contending that Napert's position is exempt from the requirements of the Massachusetts wage and overtime laws. For the following reasons, that motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are undisputed or construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
In the summer of 2004, Michael Napert began working for GEICO as an auto-damage adjuster. (Def. SMF ¶ 1). According to a compensation memorandum, GEICO agreed to pay Napert an annual salary of $58,000 and a premium wage for every hour he worked over 38.75 hours per week. (Compensation Mem., Pl. SMF, Ex. B). He was required to obtain approval for any overtime compensation. (Id. ). However, GEICO was obligated to compensate him for any overtime hours that he reported, regardless of whether he received prior approval. (Id. ).
As an auto-damage adjuster, Napert settled automobile damage claims through negotiations with GEICO policyholders, claimants, and repair facilities. (Def. SMF ¶ 11). He also negotiated prices for repairs and replacement parts. (Id. ).
When settling claims, Napert traveled to automobile repair shops in New England to assess the damage to vehicles allegedly damaged by an accident. (Id. ¶ 13). After examining the vehicle and speaking to the claimant, he would determine how much damage the vehicle suffered, whether the damage was actually caused by an accident, how much of the vehicle's damage existed before the accident, and whether the vehicle should be considered a total loss. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 9, 15).1 He did so using his judgment, training, and experience. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 23). He did not speak to any witnesses to the accident other than the claimant. (Pl. SMF ¶ 13).
GEICO issued Napert a laptop with a database and software to assist him in appraising the damage to a vehicle. (Def. SMF ¶ 7). After making an assessment, he would input the figures into the database. (Pl. SMF ¶ 8). The software would then aggregate the cost of the damage. (Id. ). Napert would then tell the claimant the amount the database said the claim was worth. (Napert Dep. at 83). If the claimant had proof that any of his figures were incorrect, he could fix those errors. (Id. at 82–87). Each appraisal took, on average, an hour to complete. (Id. at 120).
Napert also sometimes adjusted the figures to increase the settlement amount if a claimant complained. (Id. at 124–25). On at least one occasion, his supervisor reprimanded him for doing so and told him that he could not arbitrarily change the figures in the database. (Id. ).
Napert was authorized to settle insurance claims without approval for any amount up to $15,000. (Def. SMF ¶ 22, 29). He was able to print checks from GEICO to claimants up to that limit. (Id. ¶¶ 29–30). He was also authorized to declare a vehicle a total loss without approval. (Id. ¶ 24). If he did declare that a vehicle was a total loss, he was authorized to take possession of and have the vehicle towed, and reimburse the claimant. (Id. ¶ 25). He was responsible for negotiating and paying towing and storage charges on GEICO's behalf for total-loss vehicles. (Id. ¶ 26). He was also responsible for negotiating the reimbursement price for total-loss vehicles. (Id. ¶ 31).
Napert's supervisor at GEICO was Justin Koestler. (Id. ¶¶ 12). Koestler oversaw Napert's overall performance, but was not typically involved in his day-to-day decisions. (Def. SMF ¶ 35). Koestler traveled with Napert on his trips to examine vehicles about once a month. (Id. ¶ 14). Koestler also required him to keep a log of all the work that he had performed and send him an e-mail every time he finished a claim. (Napert Dep. at 104, 115).
Napert's job also involved keeping track of rental cars insured with GEICO through the company's Automated Rental Management System, printing out claim-related documents and mailing them to GEICO customers, making phone calls to set up appointments, and planning travel to and from appointments. (Pl. SMF ¶¶ 5, 6, 14, 16). He drove between fifteen to eighteen hours a week for his job. (Id. ¶ 4).
According to Napert, he worked overtime due to those various obligations. (Id.
¶ 19). He repeatedly clashed with his supervisor when he worked overtime without prior approval. (Id., Ex. C).
Napert left GEICO in 2011. (Def. SMF ¶ 4). According to several of Napert's time sheets, GEICO fully compensated him for hours that he reported he worked, including overtime hours. (Pl. SMF, Ex. A).2
B. Procedural Background
On January 22, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint in Bristol Superior Court. Defendant removed the case to this Court on March 8, 2013.
The complaint alleges that plaintiff was “not an exempt employee” of defendant “as defined under the Massachusetts General Laws.” (Compl. ¶ 14). It alleges that defendant failed to pay him for time he worked more than 38.75 hours per week in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149 §§ 148, 150. It also alleges that defendant failed to pay him overtime wages for working more than 40 hours per week in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1A.3 The complaint seeks damages (including treble damages where applicable), prejudgment interest, attorney's fees, and expenses.
On March 31, 2014, defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that the Massachusetts wage and overtime laws do not apply. Plaintiff contends (1) that defendant is required to pay him the wages he earned, (2) that defendant is estopped from contending that he is exempt from being paid overtime, and (3) that he is not exempt from the Massachusetts wage and overtime laws.
II. Standard of Review
The role of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.” Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991) (internal quotations omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue is “one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most flattering to the nonmovant ... would permit a rational fact finder to resolve the issue in favor of either party.” Medina–Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).
In evaluating a summary judgment motion, the court must indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir.1993). When “a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). The non-moving party may not simply “rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading,” but instead must “present affirmative evidence.” Id. at 256–57, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
III. Analysis
A. Wage Act Claim
The Massachusetts Wage Act provides that “[e]very person having employees in his service shall pay weekly or bi-
weekly each such employee the wages earned by him....” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148. To establish a claim for weekly wages under the statute, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was an employee under the statute, (2) his form of compensation constitutes a wage under the statute, and (3) the defendants violated the Act by not paying him his wages in a timely manner. Stanton v. Lighthouse Fin. Servs., Inc., 621 F.Supp.2d 5, 10 (D.Mass.2009) (citing Allen v. Intralearn Software Corp., 2006 Mass.App. Div. 71, 2006 WL 1277813 at *1 (2006) ). It is undisputed that plaintiff qualified as an employee under the statute and that his compensation...
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Napert v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co.
...36 F.Supp.3d 237Michael R. NAPERT, Plaintiff,v.GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants.Civil No. 13–10530–FDS.United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.Signed July 22, Motion granted in part and denied in part. [36 F.Supp.3d 239] Sonja L. Deyoe, Law Offices of Sonja L. Deyoe......