Naphtali v. Lafazan

• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
• Writing for the Court: WENZEL; BELDOCK, MURPHY and KLEINFELD, JJ., concur with WENZEL; NOLAN
• Citation: 186 N.Y.S.2d 1010,8 A.D.2d 22
• Decision Date: 04 May 1959
• Parties: Bella NAPHTALI, Appellant, and Mathias Naphtali, Appellant-Respondent, v. Irving LAFAZAN, Respondent-Appellant.

Page 1010

186 N.Y.S.2d 1010 8 A.D.2d 22 Bella NAPHTALI, Appellant, and Mathias Naphtali, Appellant-Respondent,
v.
Irving LAFAZAN, Respondent-Appellant. Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department. May 4, 1959.

Page 1013

[8 A.D.2d 23] Bernard Meyerson, Brooklyn (Harry H. Lipsig and Mathias Naphtali, New York City, of counsel), for appellant and appellant-respondent.

Richard J. Relyea, II, New York City (H. Starr Giddings, New York City, of counsel), for respondent-appellant.

Before NOLAN, P. J., and WENZEL, BELDOCK, MURPHY and KLEINFELD, JJ.

WENZEL, Justice.

The only questions raised on these appeals are legal, requiring interpretation of an Ohio statute which gives an owner and operator of a motor vehicle limited exemption from [8 A.D.2d 24] liability for loss or damage arising from injuries to a guest while being transported in the motor vehicle (Ohio General Code, § 6308-6 [see Ohio Revised Code, § 4515.02]).

The findings of the trial court, which are not attacked by any of the parties, are that the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Naphtali, residents of Brooklyn, New York, planned to take a trip in Mr. Naphtali's automobile and invited defendant and his wife to accompany them, that during the course of the ensuing trip, and on August 9, 1952, the vehicle overturned on a highway in Ohio, that all four persons were in the vehicle at the time, with the defendant driving, that both plaintiffs sustained personal injuries, that the vehicle was damaged, and that the expenses of the trip which were due to the operation of the vehicle were in the main borne by Mr. Naphtali.

The trial court further found that the accident happened because of negligent operation of the vehicle by defendant, but denied a recovery to Mrs. Naphtali for her injuries (1st cause of action) on the ground that her status at the time in question was that of a guest without payment for her transportation, within the meaning of the said Ohio statute, and that a recovery for a person in that status may not be granted under the statute unless the injuries were caused by willful or wanton misconduct. Mr. Naphtali was also denied a recovery for loss of Mrs. Naphtali's services and for medical expenses occasioned by her injuries (2d cause of action) on the theory that his right to recover therefor depended upon Mrs. Naphtali's right to recover general damage for her injuries. However, the trial court granted Mr. Naphtali a recovery for his own personal injuries (3d cause of action), holding that an owner of a motor vehicle may not be deemed a guest under the statute.

The Ohio statute is the governing law of the case because it was in Ohio that the accident occurred (see Poplar v. Bourjois, inc., 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334; Smith v. Clute, 277 N.Y. 407, 410, 14 N.E.2d 455, 456). The statute, as in effect at the time of the accident, was as follows:

'Sec. 6308-6. Liability of owners and operators of motor vehicles to guests.

Page 1014

'The owner, operator or person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest while being transported without payment therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, resulting from the operation thereof, unless such injuries or death are caused by the wilful or wanton misconduct of such operator, owner or person responsible for the operation of said motor vehicle.'

There appears to be no judicial decision in Ohio directly on the issue of whether, by virtue of the statute, an owner of the [8 A.D.2d 25] vehicle or his wife is precluded from recovery against the operator. We must look to decisions in that State on the subject generally for guidance, and also to decisions in other jurisdictions.

The Ohio rule of construction is that this statute, being in derogation of the common law, is to be construed 'strictly, albeit reasonably' against the one who invokes it (Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 216, 219, 141 N.E.2d 156, 160), and any exception in its provisions which would allow a claimant to escape application of the statute is to be construed liberally in favor of the claimant (Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 335, 48 N.E.2d 217). The statute 'should not be extended by construction beyond the correction of the evils and the attainment of the object sought, or be so restricted as to defeat or impair those purposes' (Voelkl v. Latin, 58 Ohio App. 245, 253, 16 N.E.2d 519, 523).

The purpose of the enactment of the statute was twofold, to activate the view that it is unfair for a guest to seek damages from one who has benefited or accommodated him and to furnish an antidote to fraudulent claims against insurance companies conceived by collusive host and guest (Kitchens v. Duffield, 149 Ohio St. 500, 79 N.E.2d 906; Duncan v. Hutchinson, 139 Ohio St. 185, 188, 39 N.E.2d 140; Birmelin v. Gist, 162 Ohio St. 98, 108, 120 N.E.2d 711; Hasbrook v. Wingate, 152 Ohio St. 50, 54, 55, 87 N.E.2d 87, 10 A.L.R.2d 1342).

Similar statutes have been enacted in other States, and for the same purposes (see 5A Am.Jur., Automobiles & Highway Traffic, § 511; 111 A.L.R. 1011-1012). In some States a similar limited exemption from liability for injuries to guests has been the rule as the common law (Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168, L.R.A.1918C, 264; Cody v. Venzie, 263 Pa. 541, 107 A. 383; Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160 S.E. 77; Jones v. Massie, 158 Va. 121, 163 S.E. 63; Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga.App. 399, 106 S.E. 297).

The Ohio statute does not define the word 'guest' as used therein (Lombardo v. De Shance, 167 Ohio St. 431, 434, 149 N.E.2d 914). Nor, for that matter, does it...