Naples v. Acer America Corp., Civil Action No. 95-592L.

• Decision Date: 10 July 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-592L.
• Citation: 970 F.Supp. 89
• Parties: Joseph P. NAPLES and Janice C. Naples, Plaintiffs, v. ACER AMERICA CORPORATION, Altos Computer Systems, Inc., now known as Acer America Corporation, and Altos Computer Systems, Unisys Corporation, International Business Machines Corporation, and Tandy Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

970 F.Supp. 89

Joseph P. NAPLES and Janice C. Naples, Plaintiffs, v. ACER AMERICA CORPORATION, Altos Computer Systems, Inc., now known as Acer America Corporation, and Altos Computer Systems, Unisys Corporation, International Business Machines Corporation, and Tandy Corporation, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 95-592L.

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

July 10, 1997.

Robert C. Corrente, Jeffrey S. Brenner, Corrente, Brill & Kusinitz, Providence, RI, Steven J. Philips, Levy, Phillips & Konigsberg, New York City, for Joseph P. Naples, Janice C. Naples.

Benjamin V. White, III, Kimberly A. Simpson, Vetter & White, Providence, RI, Robert J. Kashtan, Baker & McKenzie, New York City, Bruce H. Jackson, Valerie H. Diamond, Baker & McKenzie, San Francisco, CA, for Acer America, Altos Computer Systems.

Mark O. Denehy, Adler, Pollock & Sheehan, Providence, RI, Jeffrey L. Chase, Herzfeld & Rubin, P.C., New York City, Garineh S. Dovletian, Pozio, Bromberg & Newman, Morristown, NJ, for Unisys Corp.

Matthew F. Medeiros, Robert Karmen, Fausto C. Anguilla, Medeiros, Karmen & Sanford Inc., Providence, RI, Joseph A. D'Avanzo, Cerussi & Spring, White Plains, NY, for Intern. Business Machines.

Mark P. Dolan, Rice, Dolan & Kershaw, Providence, RI, Mark A. Fay, Providence RI, Robert E. Quirk, Quirk & Bakalor, New York City, for Tandy Corp.

OPINION AND ORDER

LAGUEUX, Chief Judge.

In this product liability action, plaintiffs Joseph Naples and Janice Naples seek to recover for injuries sustained from Mr. Naples' long-term use of allegedly defective computer keyboards manufactured by defendants Acer America Corporation ("Acer"), Altos Computer Systems ("Altos"), Unisys Corporation ("Unisys") International Business Machines Corporation ("IBM"), and Tandy Corporation ("Tandy") The matter is presently before the Court on the motion of each defendant for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. For the reasons that follow, each defendant's motion is granted.

I. Background

For the purposes of these motions, the parties have stipulated to the following facts. Prom 1980 to 1991, in the course of his employment as a controller for various Massachusetts and Rhode Island corporations, Joseph Naples worked on computer keyboard equipment manufactured by defendants. Specifically: (1) from 1980 to 1984, Naples used a Tandy keyboard while at National Hydro Corporation in Boston, Massachusetts; (2) from 1984 to 1986, he used an IBM keyboard while employed at Clean Industry, Inc. in East Boston, Massachusetts; (3) from 1986 to 1990, he used a Unisys keyboard while employed at MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., Inc. in Johnston, Rhode Island; and (4) from 1990 to 1991, he used an Acer and/or Altos keyboard while employed at Dennison Oil, Inc. in Hanson, Massachusetts.

Naples began experiencing numbness, tingling, pain, and/or sensory motor impairments of the upper extremities, neck, and torso in or about June 1990. In November 1990, he was diagnosed as suffering from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, bilateral nerve entrapment, and ulnar nerve transfer of the upper left extremity. Naples had surgery for right and left carpal tunnel syndromes in November 1992 and January 1993, respectively.

On or about April 19, 1994, plaintiffs filed this four-count Complaint in the Eastern District of New York, one of over six hundred similar cases filed in that district seeking to recover from various manufacturers for repetitive stress injuries ("RSI") such as those suffered by Naples, allegedly traceable to the use of computer keyboards, stenographic machines, typewriters, and the like. Joseph Naples premises his claim on theories of negligence and strict products liability, alleging that the keyboards were defective in design and that defendants failed to adequately warn users of the dangers inherent in the repeated use of their products. In addition, Janice Naples asserts a claim for loss of consortium, and the couple seeks punitive damages against the manufacturers of the challenged keyboard equipment.

On October 23, 1995, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, the action was transferred to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In re Eastern Dist. Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., (E.D.N.Y. October 23, 1995) (Memorandum addressing motions to transfer).¹ Soon thereafter, each defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that plaintiffs' action is barred under both the New York and Rhode Island statutes of limitations, which provide three-year limitations periods for personal injury claims. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney 1990); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-14(b) (1985 Reenactment). Plaintiffs reply that a "discovery rule" tolls the statute of limitations in this case under both New York and Rhode Island law, so that this cause of action did not accrue until May 1.993, when an attorney advised plaintiffs that they might be able to assert a products liability claim against the various manufacturers of the equipment Naples had used. After hearing the arguments of counsel the Court took the matter under advisement. It is now in order for decision.

II. Standard for Decision

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the standard for ruling on a motion for summary judgment:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

The Court must view all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir.1991). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no dispute as to any material fact and only questions of law remain. See Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 721 (1st Cir.1996).

III. Discussion

Generally, choice of law in a diversity case is governed by the conflict of laws provisions of the forum state, See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021-22, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941); Spurlin v. Merchants Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 9, 10 (1st Cir.1995). However, when a district court grants a venue change pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the receiving court must apply the conflicts rule of the state in which the transferror court sits, in other words, "the state law that would have been applied if there had been no change of venue." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639, 84 S.Ct. 805, 821, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964). This rule applies regardless of whether the plaintiff or the defendant initiated the change in venue. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523, 110 S.Ct. 1274, 1279-80, 108 L.Ed.2d 443 (1990). Therefore, to resolve the present dispute, the Court must first determine which statute of limitations the district court would have applied had the action remained in the Eastern District of New York.

It is well settled that New York limitations law governs diversity actions filed in the federal courts in New York state. See, e.g., Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir.1981); Smith v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 898 F.Supp. 140, 143-44 (E.D.N.Y.1995). For injuries occurring outside the state, courts must refer to New York's "borrowing statute" to determine the applicable limitations rule:

§ 202 — Cause of action accruing without the state

An action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state cannot be commenced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of either the state or the place without the state where the cause of action accrued, except that where the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the state the time limited by the laws of the state shall apply.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202 (McKinney 1990). The parties agree that this cause of action accrued in Rhode Island; plaintiffs were Rhode Island residents during the entire period in question, and Joseph Naples was working in Rhode Island both when he first experienced symptoms and when his injuries were Later diagnosed by a doctor. See Martin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 403 N.Y.S.2d 185, 374 N.E.2d 97, 100-01 (1978) (discussing place where cause of action accrues for purposes of borrowing statute).² Therefore, to survive these motions for summary judgment, this action must be timely under both New York and Rhode Island limitations law.

A. New York's Statute of Limitations

Under New York law, actions to recover damages for personal injuries, including product liability: actions, must be commenced within three years from the date the cause of action accrues. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney 1990). Generally, a cause of action accrues, and the limitations period commences, on the date of injury. See Snyder v. Town Insulation, Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 429, 599 N.Y.S.2d 515, 516, 615 N.E.2d 999, 1000 (1993). Therefore, it is the injury itself, and not the negligent act of the defendant or the discovery of the wrong by the plaintiff, that triggers the running of the statute of limitations. See Kronos, Inc. v. AVX, 81 N.Y.2d 90, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d 289 (1993). "Stated another way, accrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint." Id.; see also Dorsey v. Apple Computers, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 89, 91-92 (E.D.N.Y.1996).

The New York Court of Appeals has not yet ruled on when the statute of limitations begins to run in RSI cases. See Dorsey, 936 F.Supp. at 90. However, New York's intermediate courts of appeals have recently held that the general rule applies to RSI actions — the limitations period begins to run on the date of injury. See id. at 90-92 (reviewing state decisions); Coughlin v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 225 A.D.2d 256, 650 N.Y.S.2d 477, 479 (3d Dep't 1996)...