Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, No. 105096.

CourtSupreme Court of Illinois
Writing for the CourtFreeman
Citation229 Ill.2d 296,891 N.E.2d 839
Decision Date05 June 2008
Docket NumberNo. 105096.
PartiesKatherine R. NAPLETON, as Trustee Under the Katherine R. Napleton Revocable Self-Declaration of Trust Dated October 1, 1992, Appellant, v. The VILLAGE OF HINSDALE, Appellee.
891 N.E.2d 839
229 Ill.2d 296
Katherine R. NAPLETON, as Trustee Under the Katherine R. Napleton Revocable Self-Declaration of Trust Dated October 1, 1992, Appellant,
v.
The VILLAGE OF HINSDALE, Appellee.
No. 105096.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
June 5, 2008.

[891 N.E.2d 842]

Thomas J. Ramsdell, Carl E. Myers and Anthony S. Hind, Chicago, for appellant.

Kenneth M. Florey, Nanci N. Rogers, of Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, Ltd., Chicago, for appellee.

Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, Chicago (Benna Ruth Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper and Christopher S. Norborg, of counsel), for amicus curiae City of Chicago.

Roger Huebner, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:


Plaintiff, Katherine Napleton, filed a complaint against defendant, the Village of Hinsdale (Hinsdale), requesting that the circuit court of Du Page County declare certain textual amendments made by Hinsdale to its zoning code facially unconstitutional as violative of substantive due process and to enjoin their enforcement. The circuit court dismissed plaintiff's complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004)), and the appellate court affirmed (374 Ill.App.3d 1098, 313 Ill.Dec. 263, 872 N.E.2d 23). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally filed a "Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief," wherein she raised both a facial and an as-applied substantive due process challenge to certain amendments made by Hinsdale to its zoning code pursuant to its January 2005 adoption of Ordinance 2005-02. Hinsdale filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004)), alleging that plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action. In response, plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint, wherein she proposed to withdraw her as-applied challenge—agreeing with Hinsdale that it was premature—and proceed solely on her facial challenge to the zoning amendments. Hinsdale did not oppose this motion, which was subsequently granted by the circuit court.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed her "First Amended Verified Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief," which is at issue in this appeal. In her amended pleading, plaintiff exclusively raises a facial substantive due process challenge to the amendments made to Hinsdale's zoning code as a result of the adoption of Ordinance 2005-02. We summarize the pertinent allegations in plaintiff's complaint as follows.

Plaintiff owns several contiguous parcels of property on Ogden Avenue in Hinsdale (the subject property). The subject property is improved with a structure that is currently leased to General Motors as a training facility, and which has had the same use for approximately 50 years. Hinsdale's zoning code provides for three business zoning districts—B-1, B-2 and B-3—and the subject property is located within a B-3 zoning district, commonly known as the "Ogden/York Corridor."

Section 5-101 of Hinsdale's zoning code describes each type of business district

891 N.E.2d 843

and the permitted uses of property contained in each district. In a "B-1 Community Business District," the zoning classification is "intended to serve the everyday shopping needs of village residents as well as to provide opportunities for speciality shops attractive to [the] wider suburban residential community around the village." Hinsdale Zoning Code § 5-101 (2007). The "B-2 Central Business District" is "intended to serve the entire Hinsdale suburban community with a wide variety of retail and service uses. It is intended to serve as the primary shopping area of the village." Hinsdale Zoning Code § 5-101 (2007).1 Finally, the "B-3 General Business District" zoning classification "is intended to serve the Hinsdale suburban community with a full range of locally oriented business uses commonly located along established traffic routes." Hinsdale Zoning Code § 5-101 (2007).

Prior to the enactment of the amendments to the zoning code resulting from passage of Ordinance 2005-02, depository and nondepository credit institutions were permitted uses for properties located within the B-1 and B-3 zoning districts.2 In March 2004, the Hinsdale board of trustees enacted a temporary moratorium preventing the use of ground-floor space in properties zoned B-1 and B-3 as beauty salons and financial institutions. Plaintiff alleged that the board instituted the moratorium even though the Hinsdale planning commission had unanimously opposed it.

While the temporary moratorium was in effect, Hinsdale commissioned Gruen Gruen + Associates (Gruen) to conduct a study to assess the impact of beauty salons and financial institutions on taxable retail sales in the B-1 and B-3 zoning districts. Plaintiff alleged that Gruen's study concluded that beauty salons and barber shops did not have a negative impact on Hinsdale's business districts. In addition, although additional credit institutions would likely impose an opportunity cost in the core downtown area (which was zoned primarily B-1 and B-2), no similar finding was made with respect to the Ogden/York corridor, where the subject property is located. Plaintiff alleged that, based upon its study, Gruen recommended that no additional credit institutions be allowed to locate on the ground floors of properties in the "B-2 Central Business District," but did not make a similar recommendation for properties located in the B-1 and B-3 zoning districts.

On January 18, 2005, Hinsdale amended its zoning code by enacting Ordinance 2005-02, making permanent the March 2004 temporary moratorium regarding depository and nondepository credit institutions. Specifically, Hinsdale's zoning code was amended to remove depository and nondepository credit institutions as permitted uses in the B-1 and B-3 zoning districts, and, instead, made them special uses for these districts. Hinsdale Zoning Code §§ 5-102D, 5-105B (amended January 18, 2005). The zoning code was further amended to bar any new depository or nondepository credit institutions from being located on the first floor of any building in the B-1 or B-3 zoning district. Hinsdale Zoning Code § 5-109G (amended January 18, 2005). Finally, depository and nondepository credit institutions were limited to two drive-through lanes. Hinsdale Zoning Code § 5-109H (amended January 18, 2005).

891 N.E.2d 844

Plaintiff alleged that the amendments to the zoning code accomplished through enacting Ordinance 2005-02 effectively prevented all properties located in the B-1 and B-3 zoning districts from having financial institutions located on their ground floors. Plaintiff further alleged that this prohibition would prevent her from ever selling or leasing the subject property to a depository or nondepository financial institution. In addition, plaintiff alleged that the amendments caused seven structures containing financial institutions in the B-1 and B-3 zoning districts to become nonconforming and that Hinsdale did not pass the amendments pursuant to a comprehensive plan.

Plaintiff's amended complaint also alleged that the changes to Hinsdale's zoning code caused her immediate and irreparable economic harm by "diminishing the value" of the subject property "by at least hundreds of thousands of dollars" as a result of limiting the future permissible use of that property. Plaintiff further alleged that the amendments were "passed to satisfy the individual desires of a few individuals" and would "not actually benefit the public in any real or tangible sense," as the gain to the public is "non-existent." Plaintiff additionally alleged that there "was no community need for the amendments," and that Hinsdale "took no, or insufficient, care in planning for the amendments." Plaintiff concluded by alleging that the amendments were "arbitrary, irrational and capricious" and "not substantially related to the public welfare," thereby violating her substantive due process rights guaranteed under article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2).3

Hinsdale once again moved to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004)) on the basis that it failed to state a cause of action. Hinsdale argued that because plaintiff raised an exclusively facial challenge in her amended complaint, Hinsdale's amendments to its zoning code should be reviewed under a rational basis standard. Hinsdale further asserted that plaintiff's amended complaint consisted of unsupported conclusory allegations that did not state a valid facial challenge to the amendments. In response, plaintiff took the position that Hinsdale incorrectly contended that rational basis scrutiny was applicable to her facial challenge and, citing to Hanna v. City of Chicago, 331 Ill. App.3d 295, 264 Ill.Dec. 609, 771 N.E.2d 13 (2002), maintained that "heightened scrutiny" of Hinsdale's zoning amendments under the "substantial relationship" test was appropriate. Plaintiff concluded that, under this test, she had properly pled a facial challenge to withstand Hinsdale's motion to dismiss. The circuit court disagreed with plaintiff and granted Hinsdale's dismissal motion without prejudice, allowing plaintiff the opportunity to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff, however, chose to file a "Motion for Entry of Order of Dismissal," wherein she declined the opportunity to amend her complaint, specifically disagreed with the circuit court's application of rational basis scrutiny to her action, and requested the court to enter a final order of dismissal allowing her to appeal the ruling. An agreed order of dismissal was subsequently entered by the circuit court which dismissed plaintiff's case with prejudice and...

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193 practice notes
  • People v. One 1998 GMC, 110236
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • December 30, 2011
    ...enactment is invalid on its face only if no set of circumstances exists under which it would be valid. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 305-06 (2008). The validity of a statute is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. People v. Madrigal, 241 Ill. 2d 463, 466 ......
  • Kaull v. Kaull, No. 2–13–0175.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 22, 2014
    ...IL 112754, ¶ 13, 361 Ill.Dec. 402, 971 N.E.2d 504. A facial challenge is the most difficult to make. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill.2d 296, 305, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 (2008). In a facial challenge, the party must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which......
  • Passalino v. The City Of Zion, No. 107429.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • April 22, 2010
    ...order to promote and protect the public health, safety, comfort, morals and welfare of the people. See Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill.2d 296, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 (2008). It is against these vital interests that we must weigh the interest possessed by the plaintiffs. G......
  • Hayashi v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation, Nos. 116023
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • October 17, 2014
    ...A statute is facially invalid only if no set of circumstances exists under which it would be valid. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill.2d 296, 305–06, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 (2008).¶ 39 The Act expressly states that no hearing is allowed prior to the mandatory license revoca......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
191 cases
  • People v. One 1998 GMC, 110236
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • December 30, 2011
    ...enactment is invalid on its face only if no set of circumstances exists under which it would be valid. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 305-06 (2008). The validity of a statute is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. People v. Madrigal, 241 Ill. 2d 463, 466 ......
  • Kaull v. Kaull, No. 2–13–0175.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 22, 2014
    ...IL 112754, ¶ 13, 361 Ill.Dec. 402, 971 N.E.2d 504. A facial challenge is the most difficult to make. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill.2d 296, 305, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 (2008). In a facial challenge, the party must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which......
  • Passalino v. The City Of Zion, No. 107429.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • April 22, 2010
    ...order to promote and protect the public health, safety, comfort, morals and welfare of the people. See Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill.2d 296, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 (2008). It is against these vital interests that we must weigh the interest possessed by the plaintiffs. G......
  • Hayashi v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Regulation, Nos. 116023
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • October 17, 2014
    ...A statute is facially invalid only if no set of circumstances exists under which it would be valid. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill.2d 296, 305–06, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 (2008).¶ 39 The Act expressly states that no hearing is allowed prior to the mandatory license revoca......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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