Naqvi v. Turkish Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 February 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Case No. 14–01066 RJL
• Citation: 80 F.Supp.3d 234
• Parties: Syed M. Arif Naqvi, Plaintiff, v. Turkish Airlines, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

80 F.Supp.3d 234

Syed M. Arif Naqvi, Plaintiff

v.Turkish Airlines, Inc., Defendant.

Civil Case No. 14–01066 RJL

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed February 22, 2015

Filed February 23, 2015

Syed M. Arif Naqvi, Fairfax, VA, pro se.

Gary L. Halbert, Holland & Knight LLP, Washington, DC, Sarah G. Passeri, Holland & Knight, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

[Dkt. # 10]

RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge

Pro se plaintiff Syed M. Arif Naqvi (“plaintiff”) commenced this action against defendant Turk Hava Yollari¹ (“defendant”) on June 4, 2014 in the District of Columbia Superior Court, seeking damages for breach of contract and discrimination. See Notice of Filing Am. Exh., Exh. A (Superior Court Compl.) (“Compl.”) [Dkt. # 4–1]. Defendant removed the action to this Court on June 25, 2014. See Notice of Removal [Dkt. # 1]. Now before the Court is defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. See Turk Hava Yollari A.O.'s Mot. to Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. (“Def.'s Mot.”) [Dkt. # 10]. Upon consideration of the parties' pleadings, relevant law, and the entire record herein, the Court GRANTS defendant's Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES this action.

BACKGROUND

On February 13, 2014, plaintiff and his wife traveled from Washington Dulles International Airport to Istanbul, Turkey on a flight operated by defendant. See Compl. ¶ 7. During check-in, plaintiff requested exit row seating. See Compl. ¶ 7. Mr. Oyat (“Oyat”)—a representative of defendant—informed plaintiff that all of the exit row seats, which were reserved for “Elite Class” passengers, had already been assigned. See Compl. ¶ 8. Oyat also allegedly explained that only passengers taller than six feet were assigned to exit rows, and that plaintiff, at six feet tall, was ineligible for such seating. See Compl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff initially responded by demanding the return of his luggage, however—after being offered a seat with “leg space”—plaintiff agreed to board the plane. See Compl. ¶ 9. When plaintiff boarded the plane, he noticed that all of the exit row seats were occupied by passengers who appeared to be of Turkish descent, six of whom were women under six feet. See Compl. ¶ 10. Once seated, plaintiff realized that his seat was not, as Oyat had allegedly promised, a “leg space seat,” causing plaintiff great distress. See Compl. ¶ 10. This distress was intensified when the crew allegedly violated airline “safety requirements,” by failing to both “provide any information regarding safety” and to “illuminate the seal belt signs before landing.” See Compl. ¶ 12.

Plaintiff claims that defendant's denial of an exit row and “leg space” seat, coupled with the flight staff's purported failure to follow safety protocols, caused him “extreme emotional” distress that manifest in physical malaise and a loss of appetite during the flight. See Compl. ¶¶ 11–12. Plaintiff commenced the instant action in D.C. Superior Court on June 4, 2014, alleging breach of contract and discrimination under a kaleidoscope of federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and sections 41310(a) and 40127(a) of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”). See Compl. ¶¶ 15–22. Defendant removed this action to federal court on June 25, 2014. See generally Notice of Removal. Now before the Court is defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “liberally” construe the complaint “in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C.Cir.1979) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). However, in considering the pleadings, the Court is not required to “accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations,” or to rely on inferences “unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994). Thus, to withstand dismissal, the allegations, when read in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The same holds true for pro se litigants. Although held to “less stringent” standards than licensed attorneys, pro se litigants must nonetheless articulate a cognizable claim for relief in order to avoid dismissal. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

ANALYSIS

I. Preemption Under The Montreal Convention

The touchstone of this Court's analysis must be, and is, the Montreal Convention, a multinational treaty governing the “international carriage” of passengers. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air Concluded at Montreal art. 1, opened for signature May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106–45 (“Montreal Convention” or “Convention”). The Montreal Convention, which entered into force in the United States on November 4, 2003, updated and replaced “the uniform system of liability for international air carriers previously established by the Warsaw Convention.”² In re Nigeria Charter Flights Contract Litig., 520 F.Supp.2d 447, 452 (E.D.N.Y.2007) (citing Ehrlich v. Am. Airlines Inc., 360 F.3d 366, 371 n. 4 (2d Cir.2004) ). Like its predecessor, the “cardinal purpose” of the Montreal Convention is to establish uniform “rules governing the claims arising from international air transportation.” See El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 169, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999) ; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 256, 104 S.Ct. 1776, 80 L.Ed.2d 273 (1984) (noting that the overriding purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to establish a “stable, predictable, and internationally uniform” system of carrier liability).³ Article 29 of the Montreal Convention facilitates this objective by requiring that “any action for damages, however founded ... can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convention.” Montreal Convention, art. 29. Courts applying the Montreal Convention hew to this dictate and routinely find that the Convention, where applicable, preempts state law remedies for claims within its “substantive scope.” See Tseng, 525 U.S. at 161, 119 S.Ct. 662 (“[R]ecovery for a personal injury suffered ‘on board [an] aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking,’ ... if not allowed under the Convention, is not available at all.”)⁴ ; In re Nigeria Charter Flights Contract Litig., 520 F.Supp.2d at 453 (“[T]he Montreal Convention preempts state law claims falling within its scope.”).⁵

The threshold question then, is whether the Montreal Convention applies here. It most assuredly does. The Convention applies to all claims arising from “international carriage,” broadly defined as “any carriage in which ... the place of departure and the place of destination ... are situated either within the territories of two State Parties, or within the territory of a single State Party if there is an agreed slopping place within the territory of another State.” Montreal Convention, art. 1 ¶ 2. Plaintiff s journey falls within this ambit. He purchased a ticket for a flight originating in the United States—a State Party to the Montreal Convention—with stops in other territories, including Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. See Decl. of Handan Corekci ¶ 5 [Dkt. # 10–2]. His was a journey marked by the prototypical features of “international carriage.” Having determined that the Montreal Convention applies, this Court next inquires whether plaintiff's specific claims are preempted by the Convention.

To determine whether a particular claim is preempted by the Montreal Convention's “substantive scope,” courts “are directed to look to the Convention's liability provisions.” See King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Tseng, 525 U.S. at 171–72, 119 S.Ct. 662 ). The Convention imposes three categories of strict liability, and where one of these categories applies, it “preempts the remedies of a signatory's domestic law.” See Best v. BWIA W. Indies Airways Ltd., 581 F.Supp.2d 359, 362 (E.D.N.Y.2008). Compensation for the type of personal injury alleged here is governed by Article 17, which imposes liability for “bodily injury” caused by an “accident” that transpired “on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”⁶ See Montreal Convention, art. 17 ¶ 1.

More specifically, numerous courts have held that Article 17 preempts federal discrimination claims. This Court, mindful of the Convention's “cardinal” dictate of uniformity, agrees. See Atia v. Delta Airlines, 692 F.Supp.2d 693, 702–03 (E.D.Ky.2010) (holding that plaintiffs discrimination claim was preempted by the Montreal Convention); Molefe v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 602 F.Supp.2d 485, 494–95 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (same); see also Kalantar v. Luft h ansa German Airlines, 276 F.Supp.2d 5, 9–10 (D.D.C.2003) (“While Article 17 does not mention federal statutory or civil rights claims ... when applicable, the Warsaw Convention preempts statutory discrimination claims.”); Gibbs v. Am. Airlines Inc., 191 F.Supp.2d 144, 148 (D.D.C.2002) (finding that the Warsaw Convention preempted plaintiff's federal discrimination claims). Plaintiff is thus foreclosed from the profusion of federal discrimination law invoked in his complaint and must seek redress for discrimination under Article 17.⁷

The same is true for plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Although some courts have held that the Montreal Convention does not preempt claims of contractual nonperformance,⁸ other courts, wary of attempts to circumvent the Convention through artful pleading, allow preemption...