Nara v. Frank
| Decision Date | 08 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-4779.,05-4779. |
| Citation | 488 F.3d 187 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
| Parties | Joseph NARA v. Frederick FRANK, Appellant. |
Christopher D. Carusone (Argued), Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania Appeals and Legal Services, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellant.
Lisa B. Freeland (Argued), Office of the Federal Public Defender, Pittsburgh, PA, for Appellee.
Before: SMITH, WEIS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
In Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310 (3d Cir.2001), we held that the equitable tolling doctrine might allow the District Court to consider Joseph Nara's otherwise untimely habeas corpus petition. Upon remand, the District Court found equitable tolling applicable, and granted Nara's petition based upon his claim that he was mentally incompetent when he pleaded guilty to murdering his wife and mother-in-law. The Commonwealth appealed. We will affirm.
Joe Nara's wife, DeLorean Churby, left him. Over the next few weeks, Nara grew despondent and visited the Fayette Community Mental Health Center on an outpatient "crisis" basis. Nara attempted suicide by taking an overdose of sleeping tablets and remained unconscious for two days in the hospital. He was then involuntarily committed to the Connellsville State General Hospital and treated with anti-depressants and an anti-psychotic tranquilizer.
After four days at Connellsville, Nara was released. Soon thereafter, Nara discovered love letters between Churby and Pennsylvania State Trooper Leonard Maharowski. Nara argued with his wife over the telephone, and she taunted him with details of her affair. Enraged, Nara drove to confront her at her mother's trailer.
When he arrived and knocked on the trailer's door, Churby's mother aimed a shotgun in his face and told him to leave. Infuriated, Nara went to his car and got his pistol. He returned to the house, shot the door's lock and burst in. Again, Churby's mother aimed the shotgun at him, and his wife repeatedly struck him with a telephone. Amid the struggle, Nara shot and killed both women.
Nara fled to North Carolina. Within a day, however, he made several calls to the Pennsylvania State Police and to his father, and admitted he killed the Churbys. He turned himself in and was returned to Pennsylvania to face two charges of first-degree murder. He was then confined at the Fayette County prison.
Nara's family retained attorney Charles Gentile as counsel. His family grew fearful that he would harm himself in prison, and John Walton of the Fayette County Mental Health Center advised Gentile that Nara was in need of immediate evaluation and help. Gentile filed a petition under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Act, 50 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4407-4411, requesting that the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas transfer Nara to Mayview State Hospital for psychiatric evaluation and commitment because he was a risk of harm to himself or others. Gentile did not seek an evaluation to establish Nara's competency to stand trial or to assess his sanity at the time of the killings. Fayette County Common Pleas Judge Richard Cicchetti granted Gentile's motion and transferred Nara to Mayview.
At Mayview, Duncan Campbell, M.D., decided that Nara should be observed, but did not place him on any routine medication. Later that day, staff psychologist James T. Nelson and an associate, David Bert, evaluated Nara more closely. They recommended suicide precautions and treatment for depression.
Just four days later, staff psychologist Lilian Meyers, Ph.D., reported that Nara was neither mentally ill nor in need of treatment. She did not comment on Nara's competency to stand trial or his sanity at the time of the killings. However, she noted the "seriousness" of the accusations against him and allegations that he planned to escape, and recommended Nara be transferred back to the county prison. He was transferred back to the prison, where he remained untreated for the next four months.
On June 20, 1984, Nara appeared before Fayette County Court of Common Pleas Judge William J. Franks and pleaded guilty to two counts of murder in the first degree. During an exhaustive 85-minute colloquy, Nara admitted he "really did intentionally kill" his wife, denied having been treated for any mental or emotional illnesses, and repeatedly affirmed his understanding of the proceedings. On July 13, 1984, Judge Franks sentenced Nara to two concurrent life sentences. Nara did not file a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court.
The court transferred Nara to the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh (SCIP). SCIP officials immediately placed Nara at the facility's medical unit "for psychiatric reasons," placed a leg restraint on him to reduce the risk of suicide, and treated him with anti-depressants and anti-psychotic medications. An attending physician noted Nara had "intense suicidal ideation of severe proportions," and Nara told him he attempted to hang himself at the county prison following his arrest. Within three weeks, SCIP officials initiated involuntary commitment proceedings. On September 10, 1984—eighty-two days after the plea colloquy—Nara was committed to Farview State Hospital as a suicide risk. Nara spent 90 days at Farview, and then returned to SCIP's medical facility.
On February 19, 1985, Nara again attempted suicide and was recommitted to Farview. He remained there for about a year and a half, and was then returned to prison.
On April 25, 1988, Nara filed a pro se petition and brief for post-conviction relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA).1 In his brief, Nara claimed (1) the court violated his constitutional rights by accepting his pleas while he was mentally incompetent; and (2) his trial counsel, Gentile, was ineffective for failing to have his competency evaluated. Judge Franks appointed Fayette County Public Defender Richard E. Bower to represent Nara and held evidentiary hearings at which Nara, his father, his two brothers, and Attorney Gentile testified. After the hearings, Judge Franks, treating the petition as alleging only ineffective assistance of counsel, concluded that Gentile was not ineffective, and denied the petition.2 Bower filed an appeal on Nara's behalf to the Superior Court raising only his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Superior Court denied Nara's appeal for failing to conform to the newly-enacted PCRA, 42 PA.CON. STAT. STAT. ANN. § 9543.3 Bower ended his representation of Nara, and Nara filed a pro se petition for allowance of appeal in which he re-asserted his incompetency claim and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his pro se petition for allocatur.
On May 15, 1990, Nara filed a pro se PCRA petition in which he alleged his guilty plea was "unlawfully induced," and that his first PCRA counsel was ineffective because he failed to amend his petition to comply with the PCRA, failed to seek allocatur, and failed to preserve state and federal constitutional claims for federal habeas review. Judge Franks appointed Mark Morrison, Esq.,4 to represent Nara and allowed Nara to amend his petition to specifically claim that he was mentally incompetent when he pleaded guilty. Judge Franks held hearings on Nara's incompetency claim and heard testimony from him and Dr. Jobindar Harika,5 a forensic psychiatrist who met with Nara and thoroughly reviewed his medical records. Harika opined that Nara was probably "psychotic" and incapable of entering a plea. The Commonwealth did not present rebuttal testimony. Judge Franks, in a memorandum opinion, concluded Nara was incompetent when he pleaded guilty, based on "the totality of the circumstances," and Harika's "quite convincing" and "unrebutted testimony."6 Judge Franks issued an order allowing Nara to withdraw his guilty pleas, and the Commonwealth appealed.
On April 30, 1992, the Superior Court reversed, vacated Judge Franks' order, and reinstated Nara's guilty pleas. The Superior Court held that Nara (1) waived his incompetency claim by failing to raise it in his first post-conviction petition pursuant to PCRA § 9544(b);7 (2) failed to show his claim was not previously litigated and not waived pursuant to PCRA § 9543(a)(3); and (3) waived his right to withdraw his guilty pleas by failing to challenge their validity within ten days, according to PA. R.CRIM. P. 321 (now PA. R.CRIM. P. 720). Nara appealed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.8
On December 21, 1995, Nara filed a third pro se petition, alleging, inter alia, that he was incompetent when he entered his guilty plea. Judge Franks appointed Phyllis Jin, Esq., to represent Nara. Franks permitted Nara to withdraw his third PCRA petition in favor of a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas nunc pro tunc. Judge Franks, following the Superior Court's previous ruling, found Nara waived his incompetency claim because he failed to challenge his guilty plea within ten days of making it, and denied the motion. Nara appealed, claiming he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas nunc pro tunc because Judge Franks had previously found him incompetent.9 Appendix at 664. The Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur.
On December 12, 1998, Nara filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The District Court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Francis X. Caiazza, who issued a report and recommendation (R & R) recommending that the District Court dismiss Nara's petition because...
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