Naramore v. Putnam
| Decision Date | 01 July 1954 |
| Citation | 99 N.H. 175,106 A.2d 568 |
| Parties | NARAMORE v. PUTNAM. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Bell & Bell, Keene (Ernest L. Bell, III, Keene, orally), for plaintiff.
Olson & Olson, Keene (Arthur Olson, Keene, orally), for defendant.
It is not uncommon in intersectional collisions to find 'the usual conflict of testimony' as a common denominator and this case is no exception. Dunsmore v. Ralston Purina Company, 90 N.H. 470, 471, 10 A.2d 665; Murphy v. Winter, 87 N.H. 481, 482, 173 A. 793. The defendant's exception to the denial of her motion for a directed verdict Curtis Mfg. & Asbestos Co. v. W. D. Bates Const. Co., 98 N.H. 48, 50, 94 A.2d 550, 551. Under familiar principles of law the evidence is to be considered most favorably to the party who received the verdict from the fact finder.
There was evidence that the plaintiff stopped at or just beyond the stop sign before he entered the favored highway, Route No. 10, when the defendant was observed at least 400 feet away proceeding at a reasonable speed. The defendant at no time applied her brakes and there is evidence from which the jury could find that immediately prior to the accident she took her hands from the steering wheel and lost control of her automobile. There was also evidence that although the defendant was proceeding in the westerly lane the accident occurred on the easterly lane of Route No. 10. The plaintiff was required to stop before entering Route No. 10 and whether he did involved an issue of fact which was resolved under proper instructions from the Court. Rogers v. Nelson, 97 N.H. 72, 73, 80 A.2d 391; Legere v. Buinicky, 93 N.H. 71, 35 A.2d 508. The plaintiff's conduct in this case is not comparable to the negligent conduct in Adams v. Landry, 93 N.H. 74, 35 A.2d 510, 512, where the driver of the vehicle at the stop sign proceeded 50 feet into the middle of the state highway 'without once looking in the direction from which' the other vehicle was approaching. The regulation relating to the stop sign in this case, however, was of the same typoe considered in the Adams case, and required that the plaintiff stop and 'yield the right of way to vehicles traveling on' Route No. 10. Consequently it 'rendered inapplicable the 'intersecting way' statute, [R.L. c. 90, part 20, subd. 3, as inserted by Laws 1945, c. 188]', Adams v. Landry, supra, 93 N.H. 771, 35 A.2d 512, under which the plaintiff would have had the rignt of way after stopping, in accordance with 'the usual rule', Legere v. Buinicky, supra, 93 N.H. 73, 35 A.2d 510, if the vehicles arrived at the intersection at approximately the same time. Gendron v. Glidden, 84 N.H. 162, 148 A. 461; Beaule v. Weeks, 95 N.H. 453, 457-458, 66 A.2d 148. Although he was approaching from the defendant's right, the regulation required that he yield precedence to the defendant's vehicle traveling upon the state highway.
Because the regulation and the statute authorizing it both provide that 'any person violating the * * * regulations * * * shall be liable for all damage occasioned thereby', R.L. c. 90, part 19, subd. 4, as inserted by Laws 1945, c. 188, the defendant contends that the plaintiff is barred from recovery as a matter of law. This contention cannot be accepted. The duty to yield the right of way is not absolute, see Copadis v. Haymond, 94 N.H. 103, 47 A.2d 120, and the operator of the less favored vehicle does not necessarily enter the intersection at his peril. 2 Blashfield Cyc. Cutomobile Law, § 1025. See Anno. 164 A.L.R. 8, 24, 127. As in the case of the less favored operator under the intersecting way statute, he is entitled after stopping to cross if 'a man of reasonable prudence in [his position] * * * would reasonably have concluded that he could pass the intersection without danger of collision.' Gendron v. Glidden, supra, 84 N.H. 168, 148 A. 465.
The statutory provision imposing liability for all damage occasioned by violation of the regulation is the same which has appeared in the law of the road for many years. R.L. c. 90, part 20, subd. 4, as inserted by Laws 1945, c. 188. As early as 1881 it was decided that violation of the law of the road imposed no liability for 'constructive fault', Lyons v. Child, 61 N.H. 72, 75, and in Brember v. Jones, 67 N.H. 374, 376, 30 A. 411, 412, 26 L.R.A. 408, it was laid down that such violation 'would not necessarily and as matter of law, defeat a recovery.' See, also, Bowdler v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Company, 88 N.H. 331, 333, 189 A. 353; Vassillion v. Sullivan, 94 N.H. 97, 101, 47 A.2d 115. The defendant's request for an instruction that the plaintiff was 'elgally liable for all damages resulting...
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