Narayan v. Narayan

• Decision Date: 19 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 18673.,18673.
• Citation: 305 Conn. 394,46 A.3d 90
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Prachi NARAYAN, v. Lalit NARAYAN.

305 Conn. 394

46 A.3d 90

Prachi NARAYAN,

v.Lalit NARAYAN.

No. 18673.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 12, 2012.

Decided June 19, 2012.

Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, with whom was Wendy Dunne DiChristina, for the appellant (plaintiff).

John C. Heffernan, with whom was J. Colin Heffernan, for the appellee (defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

McLACHLAN, J.

In this certified appeal, we must decide whether the Appellate Court properly vacated the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Prachi Narayan, on the basis that there was no personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Lalit Narayan. The defendant, who has never been served with process in the present dissolution action, had filed an appearance with the caption “Prachi Narayan v. Lalit Narayan ” under a docket number that is shared with a related Title IV–D child support action,¹ brought by the commissioner of social services (commissioner). The trial court relied on the defendant's failure to file a motion to dismiss the dissolution action within thirty days of filing the appearance in the support action in concluding that the defendant had waived any challenge to personal jurisdiction in the dissolution action. We must determine whether the Appellate Court properly gave retroactive effect to Practice Book § 25a–3 (f), which provides that “[a]ll appearances entered on behalf of parties for matters involving Title IV–D child support matters shall be deemed to be for those matters only,” and concluded that the defendant's appearance in the Title IV–D support action did not function as an appearancein the dissolution action. Specifically, we consider whether the Appellate Court properly arrived at its conclusion without addressing whether considerations of good sense and justice bar retroactive application of § 25a–3 (f). We conclude that good sense and justice do bar retroactive application of that Practice Book provision. We also address the defendant's additional claim that, even if § 25a–3 (f) is not given retroactive effect, the Appellate Court properly vacated the judgment of the trial court because there was no authority allowing the trial court to conclude that an appearance filed in a Title IV–D support action constitutes an appearance in the related, but independent, dissolution action. We reject this claim and reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. “The parties were married on December 9, 1999, in India, and have two minor children of the marriage. On June 7, 2007, the plaintiff commenced a dissolution of marriage action, docket number FA–07–4011965–S (dissolution action). In addition to a dissolution of the marriage, she sought custody of the children, alimony, spousal support, transfer of assets and legal fees. Despite repeated attempts by state marshals, the defendant was never served process.

“The commissioner ... pursuant to General Statutes §§ 17b–745, 46b–215 and 46b–172, filed a support petition against the defendant in July, 2007 (support action), which was assigned the same docket number as the dissolution action.² The petition sought financial and medical support for the parties' children, as well as reimbursement to the state for disbursements made to the plaintiff. The defendant was served process for the support action on August 20, 2007, when the petition, order and summons were delivered to his employer, Tudor Investments.³

“On October 22, 2007, during a proceeding in the support action, counsel for the defendant filed an appearance with the court, and the family support magistrate, John P. McCarthy, continued the support action until a later date. The appearance lists the docket number for the case for which counsel was appearing as ‘FA–07–4011965–S.’

“The plaintiff filed motions for alimony and child support on December 3, 2007. At this time, the plaintiff also moved the court to enter an order finding that the defendant had waived service on the basis of the appearance filed by counsel in the support action. The court, on December 18, 2007, dismissed the dissolution action for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the dismissal on February 13, 2008. On March 14, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the dissolution action for lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to set aside the dismissal and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on June 6, 2008. The defendant thereafter filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied on August 27, 2008, reasoning that ‘the defendant failed to move for dismissal within thirty days of appearing as required by [Practice Book § 10–30]. An appearance cures any claimed defect of service.’

“Counsel for the defendant filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on September 4, 2008, arguing that he had appeared in the dissolution action only for the purpose of filing the motion to dismiss, which was denied, and ‘the [d]efendant's appearance prior to the filing of the motion to dismiss was filed in the [f]amily [s]upport [m]agistrate's [c]ourt in open court with no knowledge that both case[s] contain the same docket number.’ The court granted counsel's motion to withdraw on October 20, 2008. On October 17, 2008, the self-represented defendant filed a ‘special demurrer and motion to dismiss' on grounds of insufficient service of process and lack of jurisdiction. The motion was returned, unconsidered by the court, because the defendant had not filed an appearance in the case.

“A trial in the dissolution action occurred on November 21, 2008. The self-represented defendant was not present, and the plaintiff represented that the defendant had filed an appearance in the matter. The court found that the defendant ‘apparently has intentionally avoided appearing in this court either personally or through counsel....’ After the plaintiff testified and presented evidence regarding the defendant's income, the court found that the defendant was ‘mainly responsible’ for the breakdown of the marriage and granted the dissolution, awarding the plaintiff alimony and child support.” Narayan v. Narayan, 122 Conn.App. 206, 208–10, 3 A.3d 75 (2010).

The defendant appealed from the dissolution judgment to the Appellate Court, which vacated the trial court's judgment. The Appellate Court relied on Practice Book § 25a–3 (f),⁴ which provides that an appearance filed in a IV–D support matter is restricted to that matter only, to conclude that the defendant's appearance in the support action did not constitute a general appearance in the dissolution action, and, therefore, that his failure to file a motion to dismiss within thirty days of filing the appearance did not constitute a waiver of his claim of insufficient service of process in the dissolution action. Id., at 211, 3 A.3d 75.Section 25a–3 (f) was not in effect at the time that the defendant filed his October 22, 2007 appearance; it was adopted on an interim basis on March 26, 2010, effective April 15, 2010.⁵Id. Concluding that the rule is procedural rather than substantive in nature, however, the Appellate Court applied it retroactively, and, accordingly, vacated the judgment of the trial court for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id., at 213–14, 3 A.3d 75. We granted the plaintiff's subsequent petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: “Whether the Appellate Court properly applied [ § 25a–3 (f) ] retroactively without considering whether ‘considerations of good sense and justice’ bar retroactive application?” Narayan v. Narayan, 298 Conn. 914, 4 A.3d 833 (2010).⁶

I

We first consider whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that Practice Book § 25a–3 (f) should be applied retroactively under the facts of the present case. The plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that § 25a–3 (f) is procedural rather than substantive, and further claims that, even if § 25a–3 (f) is procedural, good sense and justice bar retroactive application of the new rule in the present case. The defendant responds that the Appellate Court properly gave retrospective effect to § 25a–3 because: (1) § 25a3 (f) merely clarifies an existing rule and is not a change in the law; (2) even if § 25a–3 (f) is a rule change rather than a clarification, it is procedural rather than substantive; and (3) good sense and justice do not prevent retroactive application.⁷ We agree with the plaintiff that good sense and justice bar retroactive application of § 25a–3 (f).

Preliminarily, we set forth the applicable standard of review. “A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.... [O]ur review of the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [denial] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695, 706, 987 A.2d 348 (2010).

It is also helpful, before we proceed to our consideration of whether Practice Book § 25a–3 (f) should be applied retroactively to the facts of the present case, to review the principles governing personal jurisdiction. “[T]he Superior Court ... may exercise jurisdiction over a person only if that person has been properly served with process, has consented to the jurisdiction of the court or has waived any objection to the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kim v. Magnotta, 249 Conn. 94, 101–102, 733 A.2d 809 (1999). “[W]hen a particular method of serving process is set forth by statute, that method must be followed.... Unless service of process is made as the statute prescribes, the court to which it is returnable does...