Nardelli v. Stamberg

• Decision Date: 06 June 1978
• Citation: 44 N.Y.2d 500,377 N.E.2d 975,406 N.Y.S.2d 443
• Parties: , 377 N.E.2d 975 Adam NARDELLI, Appellant, v. Melvin STAMBERG et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 443

406 N.Y.S.2d 443

44 N.Y.2d 500, 377 N.E.2d 975

Adam NARDELLI, Appellant, v. Melvin STAMBERG et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 6, 1978.

Norman Bard, Brooklyn and Alfred F. Sica, P. C. (Atty. of record), New York City, for appellant.

Charles T. Matthews, Huntington, for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GABRIELLI, Judge.

Plaintiff commenced this action seeking to recover damages for malicious prosecution. He was successful at trial, and was awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. On defendants' appeal, the Appellate Division, inter alia, reversed the judgment on the law insofar as it awarded punitive damages, and dismissed that part of plaintiff's complaint requesting such damages. The Appellate Division did, however, affirm the findings of fact with respect to defendants' liability for malicious prosecution. In view of its determination as to the facts, the Appellate Division's conclusion of law with respect to punitive damages may not stand.

A necessary element of the cause of action for malicious prosecution is "actual malice" (Martin v. City of Albany, 42 N.Y.2d 13, 16, 396 N.Y.S.2d 612, 614, 364 N.E.2d 1304, 1306; Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 457, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 93, 335 N.E.2d 310, 314, cert. den. sub nom. Schanbarger v. Kellogg, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257) or "malice in fact" (Prosser, Torts (4th ed.), § 119, p. 847). While the requisite malice may be proven by circumstantial evidence (Martin v. City of Albany, supra, 42 N.Y.2d p. 17, 396 N.Y.S.2d p. 614, 364 N.E.2d p. 1307), and may thus in a sense be denominated "implied" or "inferred" in certain cases, it is far greater than the implied-by-law "malice" which is relevant to a defamation action (see Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 113, pp. 771-772; § 119, pp. 847-849). The "actual malice" element of a malicious prosecution action does not require a plaintiff to prove that the defendant was motivated by spite or hatred, although it will of course be satisfied by such proof. Rather, it means that the defendant must have commenced the prior criminal proceeding due to a wrong or improper motive, something other than a desire to see the ends of justice served (Restatement, Torts, § 668; Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 119, pp. 847-849).

It has long been recognized in New York that punitive damages may be awarded in an action for malicious prosecution if the defendant was motivated by actual malice or acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights (1 Clark, New York Law of Damages, § 70). While the latter phrase might at first seem to imply that something more than the "actual malice" essential to malicious prosecution is needed to support an award of exemplary damages, in fact this is so only in certain cases involving the imposition of vicarious liability (see Samieloff v. New York & Queens County Ry. Co., 122 App.Div. 770, 107 N.Y.S. 774; see, generally, 1 Clark, New York Law of Damages, §§ 47-50). In a case such as this, in which liability is to be imposed upon the wrongdoer himself, a finding of liability for malicious prosecution precludes a determination as a matter of law that punitive damages are improper, for the actual malice necessary to support an action for malicious prosecution also serves to justify an award of exemplary damages. "(I)n torts which, like malicious prosecution, require a particular anti-social state of mind, the improper motive of the tortfeasor is both a necessary element in the cause of action and a reason for awarding punitive damages" (Restatement, Torts, Comment c, § 908). Thus, the Appellate Division incorrectly held as a matter of law that plaintiff had no claim for exemplary damages.

This is not to say, of course, that exemplary damages must be awarded in every such action, for the trier of facts is not required to make such an award simply because it may do so (see 14 N.Y.Jur., Damages, § 177). Whether to award punitive damages in a particular case, as well as the amount...