Narleski v. Gomes

Decision Date17 September 2020
Docket NumberA-9/10 September Term 2019,083169
Citation237 A.3d 933,244 N.J. 199
Parties ESTATE OF Brandon Tyler NARLESKI, deceased by Administrator ad Prosequendum, John A. Narleski and Lori Anniello-Narleski, and John A. Narleski, individually, Plaintiffs, v. Nicholas GOMES, Orquivanes Gomes, and Sergio Gomes, Defendants, and Amboy Food Liquor and News Inc., a/k/a Krauszers, and Krauszers Food and Liquor, Inc., a/k/a Krauszers Food & Liquor, Inc., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs/Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. Mercedes Apraez and Zdzislaw Zwierzynski, Third-Party Defendants, and Mark Zwierzynski, Third-Party Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Respondent.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Russell Macnow argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Russell Macnow, Colts Neck, on the briefs).

Mark R. Scirocco argued the cause for respondents/cross-appellants (Law Offices of Robert A. Scirocco, attorneys; Mark R. Scirocco and Robert A. Scirocco, Budd Lake, on the briefs).

Jeffrey S. Jacobson argued the cause for amici curiae New Jersey Civil Justice Institute and American Property Casualty Insurance Association (Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath, attorneys; Jeffrey S. Jacobson, Florham Park, on the brief).

JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The deterrence of drunk driving has been a preeminent policy goal of legislative enactments and our common law for many decades. Nonetheless, drunk driving remains one of the major causes of carnage on our highways and roadways. To address this seemingly intractable societal problem, statutory schemes and the common law generally impose civil liability on taverns and social hosts who serve or facilitate the service of alcohol to visibly intoxicated customers and guests who then get into their vehicles and maim or kill others.

Under our statutes and case law, a social host over the age of twenty-one has a duty not to serve alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest, either an adult or a minor, if it is reasonably foreseeable the guest is about to drive. This case presents a variation on that theme. Does a young adult, over the age of eighteen but under the age of twenty-one -- an adult under the lawful drinking age -- have a duty not to facilitate the service of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated underage guest in his home if the guest is expected to operate a motor vehicle?

In this wrongful death case, nineteen-year-old Mark Zwierzynski -- a third-party defendant -- permitted underage adult friends to bring into his home alcoholic beverages, which they consumed while his parents were not there. Based on the summary judgment record before us, two of Zwierzynski's friends, nineteen-year-old Brandon Tyler Narleski and twenty-year-old Nicholas Gomes, left the home severely intoxicated and got into Gomes's car. Gomes drove away and, shortly afterwards, lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a concrete road divider. Narleski was ejected from the vehicle and died at the scene.

The trial court determined that Zwierzynski -- despite providing his home as a drinking venue and arguably facilitating the excessive use of alcohol -- owed no legal duty to Narleski because of Gomes's intoxication. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the third-party action against Zwierzynski.

The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the complaint against Zwierzynski. Estate of Narleski v. Gomes, 459 N.J. Super. 377, 399, 211 A.3d 737 (App. Div. 2019). It nevertheless declared that, going forward, an underage adult "shall owe a common law duty to injured parties to desist from facilitating the drinking of alcohol by underage adults in his place of residence, regardless of whether he owns, rents, or manages the premises." Id. at 398, 211 A.3d 737.

We now hold that an underage adult defendant may be held civilly liable to a third-party drunk driving victim if the defendant facilitated the use of alcohol by making his home available as a venue for underage drinking, regardless of whether he is a leaseholder or titleholder of the property; if the guest causing the crash became visibly intoxicated in the defendant's home; and if it was reasonably foreseeable that the visibly intoxicated guest would leave the residence to operate a motor vehicle and cause injury to another. An underage adult, by law, may sue and be sued, may drive a motor vehicle, and has the same civil obligations as any other citizen. He too is bound by the social compact. His age does not make him immune from legal responsibility for the violation of an established duty that is intended to protect others from foreseeable harm.

The duty we recognize today was foreshadowed by our precedents and therefore will apply in the case of Zwierzynski. Applying the duty here is also consistent with the usual rule that the prevailing party who brings a claim that advances the common law should receive the benefit of his efforts.

We therefore reverse the Appellate Division, vacate the order of summary judgment dismissing the third-party claim against Zwierzynski, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.
A.

Narleski's parents, individually and on behalf of his estate, filed a wrongful death action in the Superior Court, Law Division. They named as defendants Nicholas Gomes, Gomes's parents, and Amboy Food Liquor and News (Amboy), also known as Krauszers Food & Liquor Store, where the underage Narleski purchased the alcohol consumed in Zwierzynski's home. In turn, Amboy filed a third-party complaint against Zwierzynski and his parents seeking contribution pursuant to the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Act. The third-party complaint alleged that Zwierzynski and his parents, as social hosts, negligently supervised their guests, particularly Narleski and Gomes.

Narleski's parents settled their claims against Gomes, his parents, and Amboy. Third-party defendants Zwierzynski and his parents moved for summary judgment against third-party plaintiff Amboy.

This appeal comes to us from a grant of summary judgment in favor of Zwierzynski and his parents. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the trial court: we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake, 234 N.J. 317, 329, 191 A.3d 547 (2018). In reviewing the summary judgment record, we must give Amboy "the benefit of the most favorable evidence and most favorable inferences drawn from that evidence." Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 86, 93 A.3d 344 (2014) ; see also R. 4:46-2(c).

In that light, we present the relevant portions of the summary judgment record -- deposition testimony and police reports generated during the criminal investigation of the crash.

B.

In the late afternoon of November 9, 2014, Zwierzynski, Narleski, nineteen-year-old Xavier Pinto, and twenty-year-old Zachary Johnson drove in Johnson's car to Krauszers Food & Liquor Store in South Amboy to purchase alcoholic beverages. Zwierzynski and Narleski left the car and entered the store, where Narleski -- who sported a beard and looked older than his friends -- paid for three twenty-four-ounce cans of beer, a 1.75-liter bottle of vodka, and a two-liter bottle of Sprite. The store clerk did not ask Narleski for identification.1 The sale of alcohol to underage adults is prohibited by law, N.J.S.A. 33:1-77 ; N.J.A.C. 13:2-23.1(a), and the consumption of alcohol by underage adults is prohibited as well, N.J.S.A. 9:17B-1(b) ; N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15.

The four underage friends then travelled to Zwierzynski's house in Sayreville, arriving at approximately 7:00 p.m. Zwierzynski lived there with his mother, but she was not home at the time, and his father lived elsewhere. The home was jointly owned by Zwierzynski's father and mother, who were separated.

Zwierzynski brought his friends to his upstairs bedroom, where they began drinking, playing video games, and watching television. Pinto and Narleski each drank two to three cups of vodka. Pinto became tired, went downstairs, and fell asleep on a couch. That evening, Narleski texted his friend Gomes and told him to come over to Zwierzynski's house, where they were drinking. Gomes arrived in his 1997 Mercedes-Benz at approximately 9:00 p.m. Pinto was already laid out on the downstairs couch when Gomes entered the house.

In the upstairs bedroom, Zwierzynski handed Gomes a cup. Gomes poured himself approximately two inches of vodka and orange juice and downed the cup. Then, Gomes poured himself another two inches of vodka and orange juice and downed that cup.2 The drinking occurred in the presence of Zwierzynski.3 At some point, Narleski and Gomes decided to leave and go to the home of a mutual friend. By the time they left, Gomes had spent about fifty minutes at Zwierzynski's home. According to Gomes's testimony, at that point, he had a "buzz" and Narleski was "fairly drunk" and "slurring his words."4

Narleski got into the passenger seat of Gomes's Mercedes without strapping on his seat belt, and Gomes drove away. En route to their friend's home, Gomes sped past a vehicle on U.S. Route 9 and lost control of his Mercedes. The car crossed multiple lanes of traffic, crashed into the roadway's concrete center divider, and went airborne. Narleski was ejected from the vehicle, which flipped over several times and landed on top of him. Paramedics pronounced Narleski dead at the scene.

A responding police officer detected the odor of alcohol emanating from Gomes. A blood sample was taken from Gomes pursuant to a search warrant.

The records of the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office indicate that Gomes's blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was approximately .16% at the time of the crash -- a point that Gomes conceded. That BAC is twice the permissible legal limit for an adult of legal drinking age. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) (making it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle "with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more"). According to the report of John Brick, PhD, an expert in neuropharmacology, at a .15%...

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