Nash v. Adkins, 57893
| Decision Date | 26 June 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 57893,57893 |
| Citation | 11 Kan.App.2d 326,720 P.2d 1129 |
| Parties | Hilda NASH, Plaintiff, v. Robert C. ADKINS, et al., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellee, v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, Third-Party Defendant/Appellant, and Selkerk Metalbestos Company, et al., Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The construction of an insurance contract is a matter of law to be determined by the court.
2. If the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous, the words are to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense and there is no need for judicial interpretation; the court's function is to enforce the contract according to its terms 3. Ambiguity is not to be derived from or created by the fragmentation of a contract and the contract must be considered as a whole.
Monti L. Belot of Hall, Levy, Lively, Viets, DeVore & Belot, Coffeyville, for third-party defendant/appellant.
Ronald P. Wood of Gates & Clyde, Chartered, Overland Park, for defendant and third-party plaintiff/appellee.
Before DAVIS, P.J., and MARION W. CHIPMAN and SAM K. BRUNER, District Judges, assigned.
This is an appeal by Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford) from a judgment interpreting the provisions of an insurance contract. Defendant Robert C. Adkins installed a wood-burning stove in the home of plaintiff Hilda Nash. Some time after completion of his work, Nash's home was damaged by fire. Nash initiated this lawsuit by filing a petition alleging defective workmanship by Adkins caused the fire. Hartford, Adkins' insurance carrier, denied coverage and refused to defend. Adkins joined Hartford claiming coverage for the loss. The trial court granted defendant Adkins' motion for summary judgment on the coverage issue. From this ruling Hartford appeals.
The sole question on appeal is whether "completed operations" coverage existed for the fire damage under the Hartford policy.
The Hartford policy, on its first page, provides that "Insurance is afforded by the Coverage Parts forming a part hereof, subject to such limits of liability as are stated therein and subject to all the terms of the policy having reference thereto." The schedules and forms which are part of the policy provide bodily injury and property damage coverage for two separate risk classifications corresponding to jobs performed by Adkins. Form L-3503-IT specifies both risk classifications and refers to extension schedule L-3125. This extension schedule spells out the two rating classifications: carpentry and building or premises. The building or premises classification specifically includes completed operations but no such wording appears under the carpentry classification.
Form L-3503-IT also refers to certain endorsements forming part of the policy. Endorsement L-3014-0, entitled Exclusion Completed Operations and Products Hazards, provides in part that:
"It is agreed that such insurance as is afforded by the Bodily Injury Liability Coverage and the Property Damage Liability Coverage does not apply to bodily injury ... included within the Completed Operations Hazard...."
The term "completed operations hazard" is specifically defined in the policy as follows:
"When used in this policy (including endorsements forming a part hereof):
....
'Completed operations hazard' includes bodily injury and property damage arising out of operations or reliance upon a representation or warranty made at any time with respect thereto, but only if the bodily injury or property damage occurs after such operations have been completed or abandoned and occurs away from premises owned by or rented to the named insured. 'Operations' include materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith. Operations shall be deemed completed at the earliest of the following times:
The forms and endorsements, read in conjunction with the definitions of completed operations hazard,...
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