Nash v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Catron Cnty.

• Decision Date: 19 October 2020
• Docket Number: NO. S-1-SC-37692,NO. S-1-SC-37778,S-1-SC-37692,S-1-SC-37778
• Citation: 480 P.3d 842
• Parties: Gregory A. NASH and Susie K. Nash, Plaintiffs-Petitioners, v. Group I: BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CATRON COUNTY, New Mexico, a Political Subdivision of the State of New Mexico, and Elena Gellert, and Group II: All Unknown Claimants of Interest in the Premises Adverse to the Plaintiffs, Defendants-Respondents. and Belen Consolidated School District, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. The County of Valencia, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

480 P.3d 842

Gregory A. NASH and Susie K. Nash, Plaintiffs-Petitioners,

v.Group I: BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CATRON COUNTY, New Mexico, a Political Subdivision of the State of New Mexico, and Elena Gellert,andGroup II: All Unknown Claimants of Interest in the Premises Adverse to the Plaintiffs, Defendants-Respondents.

and

Belen Consolidated School District, Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.The County of Valencia, Defendant-Respondent.

NO. S-1-SC-37692

NO. S-1-SC-37778

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: October 19, 2020

Turner Law Firm, LLC, Scott E. Turner, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiffs-Petitioners Gregory A. Nash and Susie K. Nash.

Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., Arthur D. Melendres, Zachary L. McCormick, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff-Petitioner Belen Consolidated School District.

Nance, Pato & Stout, LLC, Adren Robert Nance, David Matthew Pato, Socorro, NM, for Defendants-Respondents Board of County Commissioners of the County of Catron and Board of County Commissioners of the County of Valencia.

THOMSON, Justice

{1} In a consolidated opinion, the Court of Appeals determined that New Mexico counties generally have statutory immunity from suits to quiet title and held that "there is no [applicable] statutory exception" to that immunity. Belen Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Cnty. of Valencia , 2019-NMCA-044, ¶ 1, 447 P.3d 1154 (consolidating Belen Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Cnty. of Valencia , A-1-CA-35474, and Nash v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Catron Cnty. , A-1-CA-37081). The parties who were plaintiffs in the two district court cases separately petitioned this Court to issue its writ of certiorari. We granted both petitions pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-5-14 (1972), and Rule 12-502 NMRA. The parties in both cases participated in an oral argument before this Court. We now address whether statutory immunity protects counties from being named in quiet title actions or whether a valid waiver to that immunity exists. We exercise our discretionary authority under Rule 12-317(B) NMRA to issue a consolidated opinion, and we affirm the Court of Appeals.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} The issue addressed in this opinion arises from the evolution, abolition, and resurrection of governmental immunity in New Mexico. In 1958, this Court recognized that common law sovereign immunity protects the state and its political subdivisions from being named in an action to quiet title "to extinguish the state's fee simple title in the property." Maes v. Old Lincoln Cnty. Mem'l Comm'n , 1958-NMSC-115, ¶¶ 9-12, 64 N.M. 475, 330 P.2d 556. The Maes Court's holding was based on its construction of the limited waiver of common law sovereign immunity that the Legislature enacted in 1947, which is now codified as NMSA 1978, § 42-6-12 (1947).¹ The Maes Court construed Section 42-6-12 to waive common law sovereign immunity "for the limited purpose of aiding a mortgagee who discovers that the State has acquired an interest in the mortgaged property and [who] is unable to pass a marketable title to the purchaser at a foreclosure sale unless the state can be joined in the foreclosure suit." See 1958-NMSC-115, ¶ 10, 64 N.M. 475, 330 P.2d 556.

{3} The judicially-created doctrine of common law sovereign immunity that the Maes Court applied in actions to quiet title existed until 1978, when this Court explicitly acknowledged the abolition of the doctrine's application in New Mexico. Brosseau v. N.M. State Highway Dep't , 1978-NMSC-098, ¶¶ 10-12, 92 N.M. 328, 587 P.2d 1339. Despite the abolition of the doctrine of common law sovereign immunity, the limited waiver of immunity now codified as Section 42-6-12 was not repealed, nor was Maes overruled.

{4} In the following year, the Legislature statutorily resurrected governmental immunity in actions concerning real property. See 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 110, § 1 (codified as NMSA 1978, § 42-11-1 (1979) ). That enactment prohibited naming the State as "a defendant in any suit, action, case or legal proceeding involving a claim of title to or interest in real property except as specifically authorized by law." Id.

{5} Regardless of the Brosseau Court's abolition of common law sovereign immunity and the Legislature's imposition of statutory governmental immunity, Section 42-6-12 was not repealed or amended. Although application of sovereign immunity can produce inequitable results, we will not judicially repeal an immunity that the Legislature lawfully created unless such immunity violates the United States or the New Mexico Constitution.

{6} With this context in mind, we turn to the factual and procedural background for each case, which we present separately.

A. The Valencia County Case

{7} Belen Consolidated School District (Belen) decided to sell real property, in which it holds the title, in order to "fund school activities" and initiated an action to quiet title in order to obtain marketable title. Belen initiated a quiet title action to remove the cloud on the title to the property and named the Board of County Commissioners of Valencia County (Valencia) along with other persons, governmental entities, and nongovernmental entities as defendants. In its complaint, Belen described the property and alleged that Valencia "claimed an interest in the property and sought conveyance of the property to [Valencia]" in 2010.

{8} Instead of answering and asserting it had superior title to the property, Valencia moved the district court to dismiss the complaint. Although it avoided directly claiming any title to the subject property, Valencia's motion asserted an interest in the property.

Notwithstanding [Belen's] vague reference to [Valencia] County's interest, the County has for decades and continues to maintain the real property as a park and sports facility for the benefit of the youth of the County. The County has continuously expended funds and man-hours to provide for improvements, fencing and maintenance. [Valencia] desires that the real property continue to be utilized as a park for the County's youth.²

Regardless of who claims or has superior title, Valencia argued that Section 42-11-1 prohibited naming Valencia as a defendant in an action to quiet title because it was a political subdivision of the State.³

{9} Belen responded that Section 42-6-12 waives statutory immunity created by Section 42-11-1. Belen argued that because Brosseau abolished common law sovereign immunity, the limited waiver established by Section 42-6-12 should be broadened to permit quiet title suits against the State and its political subdivisions. Belen also requested that, if the district court was inclined to dismiss its claim based on immunity, Belen be allowed to amend its complaint to "assert a claim for inverse condemnation."

{10} At the hearing on its motion to dismiss, Valencia argued that Section 42-11-1 granted Valencia broad immunity and that the limited waiver of immunity in Section 42-6-12 did not apply in this case. Valencia also argued that allowing Belen to amend the complaint to assert a claim for inverse condemnation would be futile because Belen was now barred from bringing any claim by the three-year statute of limitations. See NMSA 1978, § 42A-1-31(B) (1981) (establishing a three-year statute of limitations "from the date of the taking or damaging"). Regardless of whether it had title to the property, Valencia's position was that it has the right to use the property without initiating a condemnation action and without providing compensation. This position clearly frustrated the district court. As a result, in denying Valencia's motion to dismiss, the district court colorfully, but perhaps not entirely inaccurately, opined that Valencia's position amounted to "tyranny[,] for the government to say we're the government, you have no rights and you can't even challenge us in court."⁴

{11} Valencia petitioned the Court of Appeals for a Writ of Error pursuant to Rule 12-503 NMRA. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, determined that the governmental immunity created by Section 42-11-1 barred quieting title against Valencia and that there was no applicable statutory waiver, and remanded the Valencia case "for entry of an order dismissing the action against Valencia." Belen , 2019-NMCA-044, ¶¶ 1, 14, 447 P.3d 1154. Belen petitioned this Court for certiorari.

B. The Catron County Case

{12} Gregory A. Nash and Susie K. Nash (collectively "Nash") filed a complaint to quiet title to real property and named the Board of County Commissioners of Catron County (Catron) as one of a number of defendants, who "may claim an [adverse] interest in the Property." The complaint alleged that Catron "may claim an interest in the Property pursuant to that certain Warranty Deed recorded in the Office of the County Clerk for Catron County, on October 9, 1968, in Book #2, at Page 52," and that Catron "may not agree with the location of the boundary line" between their respective properties. In response, Catron filed a motion to dismiss "pursuant to Rule 1-012 NMRA" based on the immunity created by Section 42-11-1 and stated, "Notwithstanding [Nash's] vague reference to [Catron's] interest, [Catron] has for decades and continues to maintain the real property as part of its courthouse complex."⁵

{13} Catron acknowledged that this Court abolished the practice of applying the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in actions to quiet title. Nevertheless, like Valencia, Catron argued that Section 42-11-1 reestablished a broad grant of governmental immunity in response to the Brosseau Court's abolition of common law sovereign immunity. Catron consequently concluded that Section 42-11-1 prohibited naming it as a defendant in this case.

{14} Nash responded, as Belen had, that following Brosseau , Section 42-6-12 should be construed as a broad waiver of immunity that permits quieting title against Catron. Nash argued alternatively that even if Section 42-6-12 remains as a limited waiver of immunity, due process prohibits applying immunity to bar naming...