Nash v. Beckett

• Decision Date: 23 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. 06–11–00025–CV.,06–11–00025–CV.
• Citation: Nash v. Beckett, 365 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. App. 2012)
• Parties: Texie Beckett Carson NASH, Executrix of the C.M. Beckett, Jr. Estate and Successor Trustee of the C.M. Beckett, Jr. Testamentary Trusts, Appellant, v. Beverly BECKETT, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

365 S.W.3d 131

Texie Beckett Carson NASH, Executrix of the C.M. Beckett, Jr. Estate and Successor Trustee of the C.M. Beckett, Jr. Testamentary Trusts, Appellant,

v.Beverly BECKETT, Appellee.

No. 06–11–00025–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Submitted: Feb. 15, 2012.

Decided: March 23, 2012.

Jeff B. Wolff, Larry A. Flournoy Jr., Jordan, Houser & Flournoy, LLP, Dallas, John R. Mercy, Mercy * Carter * Tidwell, LLP, Texarkana, Dean A. Searle, Marshall, for appellant.

David R. Toups, Bennett, Weston, LaJone & Turner, PC, Dallas, for appellee.

Before MORRISS, C.J., CARTER and MOSELEY, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice CARTER.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment in a declaratory judgment action which sought construction of the wills of C.M. Beckett, Sr., and Jo B. Beckett. The central issue is the distribution of assets of two separate terminated trusts. We find the wills require that each surviving heir is entitled to receive an equal share of the two trusts. We reverse and render the judgment of the trial court.

I. Background

In 1957, C.M. Beckett, Sr., and his wife, Jo B. Beckett, each made wills establishing trusts for their two sons, C.M. Beckett, Jr., and Jerry B. Beckett. Each will provided for the equal division of estate assets between C.M., Jr. and Jerry, in trust, with income to each for life. Both wills directed the trustee to “divide the residue of my estate into two equal parts,” each of which “shall be administered as a separate and distinct trust.” Accordingly, two trusts were established—one in the name of C.M. Beckett, Jr., and the other in the name of Jerry B. Beckett. The principal and remainder of each trust were bequeathed to C.M., Jr.'s and Jerry's descendants.

The trusts were to continue for the life of C.M. Beckett, Sr., Jo B. Beckett, and their two sons. Upon the death of C.M. Beckett, Sr., and Jo B. Beckett and

my two sons, all of the assets and properties of the trusts herein created shall be divided into as many equal shares as there are children of my two sons surviving together with an equal share per stirpes for the surviving child or children of any deceased grandchild, and such shares shall be immediately distributed to said grandchildren or great-grandchildren....

After C.M., Sr. and Jo passed away in 1962,¹ C.M., Jr. and Jerry jointly administered the trusts, acting as co-trustees of each trust. When the brothers decided they could no longer work together in 1983, C.M., Jr. filed a partition lawsuit. As a part of the lawsuit's settlement, Jerry voluntarily resigned as co-trustee of the C.M. Beckett, Jr. Trust, leaving C.M., Jr. as the sole successor trustee of that trust. Likewise, C.M., Jr. voluntarily resigned as co-trustee of Jerry's trust. Jointly held trust assets were sold and equally divided between the two trusts.²

Thereafter, C.M., Jr. distributed certain assets of the C.M. Beckett, Jr. Trust to himself.³

Beverly Beckett was Jerry's sole surviving child when he passed away in 1986. Beverly's son, Brian Beckett, and Regions Morgan Keegan Bank are the successor co-trustees of the Jerry B. Beckett Trust.

When C.M., Jr. passed away on April 25, 2007, he had one surviving child—Clint Murl Beckett, III, and one grandchild—Texie Beckett Carson Nash (the daughter of Jo Lynne Beckett Dyke, who predeceased her father, C.M., Jr.). Texie was appointed independent executrix of C.M., Jr.'s will, and she qualified to serve in that capacity in 2007. Texie became the successor trustee of the C.M. Beckett, Jr. Trust.

The trusts terminated as of April 25, 2007, the date of the last to die of Jerry and C.M., Jr. Thereafter, Texie filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that all of the trusts' assets should be distributed equally to Texie, Clint, III, and Beverly.⁴

In his competing declaratory judgment action to construe the C.M. Beckett, Jr. and Jerry B. Beckett Trusts, Brian maintained that Beverly is the sole beneficiary of the Jerry B. Beckett Trust and Texie and Clint, III, are the sole beneficiaries of the C.M. Beckett, Jr. Trust.⁵ Additionally, Brian asserted claims against Texie related to the administration of the C.M. Beckett, Jr. Trust.⁶

The competing declaratory judgment actions were consolidated in 2008. Thereafter, Texie and Beverly filed competing motions for partial summary judgment, each of which was denied by the trial court.⁷ In 2010, Texie and Beverly submitted additional summary judgment briefing regarding the appropriate division of the trusts' assets, and more specifically, who should be entitled to share in the assets of the Jerry B. Beckett Trust. The trial court issued its order granting Beverly's motion for summary judgment and denying Texie's motion for summary judgment.⁸ The trial court concluded Beverly was entitled to 100 percent of the assets of the Jerry B. Beckett Trust.⁹

II. Appellate Issues

On appeal, Texie asserts three points of error. Her first and third appellate points complain of the summary judgment in Beverly's favor and the trial court's failure to grant summary judgment in her favor, or alternatively, its failure to find genuine fact issues regarding interpretation of the will. Texie's second appellate point complains of the denial of her summary judgment motion on Beverly's affirmative defenses.

III. Standard of Review

We review declaratory judgments under the same standards as other judgments and decrees. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.010 (West 2008); Armstrong v. Hixon, 206 S.W.3d 175, 179 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied). We look to the procedure used to resolve the issue at trial to determine the standard of review on appeal. Armstrong, 206 S.W.3d at 179;Guthery v. Taylor, 112 S.W.3d 715, 720 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Here, the trial court determined the declaratory judgment issue through summary judgment proceedings.

A traditional motion for summary judgment is granted only when the movant establishes there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.2009). An appellate court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment. Id. Where, as here, both parties file dispositive cross motions for summary judgment, and the court grants one and overrules the other, the appellate court has jurisdiction to review both the grant and the denial. Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex.2007). In such a case, the appellate court is to review the summary judgment evidence presented by each party, determine all questions presented, and render judgment as the trial court should have rendered. Id.;Comm'rs Court v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex.1997); Harris v. Hines, 137 S.W.3d 898, 902–03 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.).

IV. Applicable Law and Discussion

Our chief concern in construing a will is to ascertain the true intent of the testator as expressed in the instrument. San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang, 35 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex.2000); Hines, 137 S.W.3d at 903. In doing so, “[t]he intent must be drawn from the will, not the will from the intent.” Lang, 35 S.W.3d at 640. This intent must be ascertained from the language found within the four corners of the will. Odeneal v. Van Horn, 678 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex.1984). Therefore, when the intent of the testator is apparent on the face of the will, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to contradict the intent. Id. In determining the testator's intent, the court focuses not on what the testator intended to write, but the meaning of the words actually used. Lang, 35 S.W.3d at 639.

“If the will is unambiguous, [we will] not go beyond specific terms in search of the [testator's] intent.” Id. If the instrument “can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and the court will construe [it] as a matter of law.” Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex.1983); Doggett v. Robinson, 345 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

If, on the other hand, the meaning of the instrument is uncertain or reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence should be considered to ascertain the testator's intent. See Davis v. Shanks, 898 S.W.2d 285, 286 (Tex.1995); Harris, 137 S.W.3d at 902–03. A will is ambiguous only when the established rules of construction leave its terms susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning. Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., 134 S.W.3d 359, 373 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).

A. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to Beverly

The core issue we must decide is whether the will provides that the corpus of each separate trust—for C.M., Jr. and for Jerry—is to be divided into three equal shares for Beverly, Texie, and Clint, III, or whether the will directs the respective trust assets to pass directly to the descendants of the son in whose name each trust was established.

The testators' last wills ¹⁰ establish two separate and distinct trusts—for C.M. Beckett, Jr. and for Jerry B. Beckett. Beverly maintains she is the sole beneficiary of Jerry's trust and alone is entitled to distribution of the remaining assets of that trust. Likewise, Beverly alleges that Texie and Clint, III are the sole beneficiaries of C.M., Jr.'s trust, and they alone are entitled to distribution of the remaining assets of that trust.

Indeed, the will establishes two separate trusts:

The trustees shall divide the residue of my estate into two equal parts. Each such part shall be administered as a separate and distinct trust. One of said parts shall be designated in the name of my son, C.M. Beckett, Jr., and the other part in the name of my son, Jerry B. Beckett. For so long as my wife [husband] lives.... After provision has been made for my wife [husband] out of the income of the trusts, there shall be distributed to my son, C.H. Beckett, Jr., all of the...