Nash v. Boise City Fire Dept.
Decision Date | 26 May 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 13746,13746 |
Citation | 663 P.2d 1105,104 Idaho 803 |
Parties | Donald E. NASH, Claimant-Respondent, v. BOISE CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, Employer, and Fireman's Retirement Fund, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Blaine Evans, Paul S. Boyd and Hugh Mossman, Boise, for defendant-appellant.
Gardner W. Skinner and Berry Newal Squyres, Boise, for claimant-respondent.
In 1978 the legislature amended I.C. § 72-1432B governing retirement benefits to firemen. From 1963 to 1976 the statute had provided that the monthly retirement checks would be adjusted upward or downward by a percentage equal to the percentage the average paid firefighters salary or wages varied each year.
In 1976 the statute was amended to peg the adjustment annually according to the determination of the "cost of living adjustment" as set forth in I.C. § 72-1432B. The 1978 amendment provided that this increase or decrease would not exceed 3%. The issue presented is whether this 3% "cap" applies to firefighters retiring after the July 1, 1978 effective date of the amendment, who earned benefits by virtue of service prior to that date.
Nash was a full time paid firefighter of Boise City from October 11, 1953, through October 17, 1978, a period of twenty-five years and five days. On August 31, 1978, Nash filed his Fireman's Retirement Benefit Fund application, which was approved by the manager of the State Insurance Fund and the Industrial Commission.
Following the approval of the Industrial Commission an "agreement for voluntary retirement" was prepared and submitted to Nash for approval and signature. Nash interposed objection only to the part of the agreement which provided that the benefits received would not increase or decrease by more than 3% per annum.
Nash filed a claim with the Industrial Commission for benefits and requested a hearing seeking an order from the Commission authorizing and requiring benefit payments pending determination of the applicability of the 3% cap. The Fund responded by answer, alleging that the cap applied to Nash; that as of that date Nash had not suffered a diminution in benefits; and that the Commission was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the constitutionality of the statute.
The Commission ordered the Fund to make payments to Nash and reserved for determination the applicability of I.C. § 72-1432B.
Subsequently, Nash filed an application for review and modification of the award contending that with the passage of a year the average annual salary had increased.
The Fund answered, raising the jurisdiction of the Commission to pass on the constitutionality of the section, and denying that the section violates the United States and Idaho Constitutions.
Following hearing the referee entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, which were confirmed, approved and adopted by the Commission. The order held that the benefits should be paid without regard to the 3% limitation. The evidence established the cost of living increases for 1979 and 1980 at 6.76% and 6.98% respectively.
In Dullea, supra, in a thoughtful and well-reasoned analysis, the court reviewed the two approaches the courts had historically taken in approaching the issue:
Mass.App., 421 N.E.2d at 1233.
Dullea, supra, next presents a cogent analysis of the reasons why both the gratuity theory and the contract theory suffer from infirmities which undercut their utility in solving problems caused by today's complex public pension systems:
Mass.App. 421 N.E.2d 1228, n. 9, at 1233-34.
Earlier, in Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass. 847, 303 N.E.2d 320 (Mass.1973), the Massachusetts court sought to channel the reasoning process away from strict "gratuity" or strict "contract" analysis toward a more meaningful basis for analysis:
" 'The label "gratuity" could never have been taken with sober literalness, and so also for "contract." It is not really feasible--nor would it be desirable--to fit so complex and dynamic a set of arrangements as a statutory retirement scheme into ordinary contract law which posits as its model a joining of the wills of mutually assenting individuals to form a specific bargain. As the commentators show, a retirement plan for public employees does not readily submit itself to analysis according to Professor Williston's canons.... When, therefore, the characterization "contract" is used, it is best understood as meaning that the retirement scheme has generated material expectations on the part of employees and those expectations should in substance be respected. Such is the content of "contract."
It is true that a few cases that adopt the label of "contract" have approached the terms of a retirement plan as they would a bond indenture, but closer to the realities is the view that "contract" protects the member of a retirement plan in the core of his reasonable expectations, but not against subtractions which, although possibly exceeding the trivial, can claim certain practical justifications. Attention should then center on the nature of these justifications in the light of the problems of financing and administering these massive plans under changing conditions.' (citations and footnotes omitted.)" Dullea, supra, quoting Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass. at 861-862, 303 N.E.2d 320. In Hanson v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 512, 514, 446 P.2d 634 (1968), this court placed Idaho squarely in line with Massachusetts and other jurisdictions which reject both the gratuity and the strict contract theory, holding further that reasonable modification can be made to keep the plan flexible:
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