Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission
| Citation | 19 L.Ed.2d 438,88 S.Ct. 362,389 U.S. 235 |
| Decision Date | 05 December 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 48,48 |
| Parties | Minnie E. NASH, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
Michael H. Gottesman, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Glenn L. Greene, Jr. for respondents.
Section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, as amended, lations Board to initiate unfair labor 29 U.S.C. § 160, authorizes the National Labor Relations Board to initiate unfair labor practice proceedings whenever some person charges that another person has committed such practices. The Board cannot start a proceeding without such a charge being filed with it. See e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. National Licorice Co., 104 F.2d 655 (C.A.2d Cir.) modified on other grounds 309 U.S. 350, 60 S.Ct. 569, 84 L.Ed. 799; Local 138, Operating Engineers (Skura), 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 681. The crucial question presented here is whether a State can refuse to pay its unemployment insurance to persons solely because they have preferred unfair labor practice charges against their former employer.
The facts are stipulated and need not be stated at length. The petitioner, Mrs. Nash, who previously had been out on strike against her employer, the Stanley Works and Stanley Building Specialties, was, pursuant to union-management agreement, reinstated to her former job on April 14, 1965. Approximately five weeks later, on May 16, 1965, she was laid off by the company because of alleged 'slow production,' meaning that the company had insufficient work to warrant her retention. Mrs. Nash was unemployed from this time until October 5, 1965, when the company voluntarily called her back to work. She has been allowed unemployment compensation, under Florida Statutes, chapter 443, F.S.A., from the time of her discharge on May 16, up to June 17, but denied any compensation from June 17 to October 5. The reason given for this denial was that on June 17 she filed an unfair labor practice charge against her employer seeking reinstatement and back pay on the ground that the employer had actually laid her off because of her union activities in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, and that this charge was still pending on October 5, when she resumed work. In making this ruling the Florida Industrial Commission relied on § 443.06 of the Florida Unemployment Compensation Law, F.S.A. which provides:
'An individual shall be disqualified for (unemployment) benefits * * * (4) For any week with respect to which the commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a labor dispute in active progress which exists at the factory, establishment or other premises at which he is or was last employed * * *.'
The Commission held that the filing of the unfair labor practice charge brought petitioner within the wording of the Act in that her 'unemployment' then became 'due to a labor dispute.' Thus the sole reason that petitioner was disqualified from compensation was that she filed an unfair labor practice charge. According to the Commission, the act of filing was the determinative factor under Florida law which rendered petitioner ineligible for unemployment compensation. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, denied per curiam petitioner's application for writ of certiorari to review the determinations of the Florida Industrial Commission Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Since such denial by the Florida District Court of Appeal apparently precludes further state review,1 we granted certiorari because of the important constitutional question involved, specifically whether the Commission's ruling violates the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Art. VI. cl. 2) because it allegedly 'frustrates' enforce- ment of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.2
The National Labor Relations Act is a comprehensive code passed by Congress to regulate labor relations in activities affecting interstate and foreign commerce. As such it is of course the law of the land which no state law can modify or repeal. Implementation of the Act is dependent upon the initiative of individual persons who must, as petitioner has done here, invoke its sanctions through filing an unfair labor practice charge.3 Congress has made it clear that it wishes all persons with information about such practices to be completely free from coercion against reporting them to the Board. This is shown by its adoption of § 8(a)(4) which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges. See John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 263—264, 191 F.2d 483, 485—486; National Labor Relations Board v. Lamar Creamery Co., 246 F.2d 8, 9—10 (C.A.5th Cir.); National Labor Relations Board v. Syracuse Stamping Co., 208 F.2d 77, 80 (C.A.2d Cir.). And it has been held that it is unlawful for an employer to seek to restrain an employee in the exercise of his right to file charges. National Labor Relations Board v. Clearfield Cheese Co., 213 F.2d 70 (C.A.3d Cir.); National Labor Relations Board v. Gibbs Corp., 308 F.2d 247 (C.A.5th Cir.); Roberts v. National Labor Relations Board, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 350 F.2d 427.
We have no doubt that coercive actions which the Act forbids employers and unions to take against persons making charges are likewise prohibited from being taken by the States. The action of Florida here, like the coercive actions which employers and unions are forbidden to engage in, has a direct tendency to frustrate the purpose of Congress to leave people free to make charges of unfair labor practices to the Board. Florida has applied its Unemployment Compensation Law so that an employee who believes he has been wrongly discharged has two choices: (1) he may keep quiet and receive unemployment compensation until he finds a new job or (2) he may file an unfair labor practice charge,...
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