Nashid v. James, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:17-cv-102

• Decision Date: 26 February 2018
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:17-cv-102
• Parties: JOHN RENARD NASHID, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT JAMES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia

JOHN RENARD NASHID, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT JAMES, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:17-cv-102

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA WAYCROSS DIVISION

February 26, 2018

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Ware State Prison in Waycross, Georgia, filed this cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contesting the criminal proceedings against him. (Docs. 1, 9.) For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motions for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Docs. 2, 10.) Furthermore, I RECOMMEND the Court DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants, DIRECT the Clerk of Court to CLOSE this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.¹

PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS²

Plaintiff filed this cause of action on August 11, 2017, along with a Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Docs. 1, 2.) The Court then ordered Plaintiff to amend his complaint because it referred to non-existent "exhibits" in the fact section and was due to be dismissed in the original form. (Doc. 3.) In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff makes allegations against twelve different Defendants regarding their involvement in an allegedly unlawful criminal prosecution of him. (Doc. 9.) Plaintiff, a convicted state prisoner, asserts that "[g]overnment agents and employees of the State of Georgia, County of Douglas, County of Gwinnett, and City of Douglasville" breached their duty "to uphold, defend, and protect [his] inalienable rights" in their case against him. (Id. at pp. 4, 5.) Plaintiff avers that Defendants violated a laundry list of federal constitutional and statutory provisions in taking actions against him: Article I § 10; Article III §§ 1, 2; Article VI §§ 2, 3; the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Amendments; 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 1001, 1621, 1622, 2381, 2384, 1031, 1341, 1201, 2071, 912, and 994; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. (Doc. 9-3.)

On October 19, 2000, Plaintiff contends Defendants conspired to fraudulently execute an arrest warrant without probable cause and without having filed "lawful oath[s] of office with the Secretary of State of Georgia."³ (Doc. 9-5, pp. 1, 4, 5.) This alleged conspiracy continued into Plaintiff's January 2001 trial and though his appeals until May 2002. (Id. at pp. 3-4.) As best the Court can discern, Plaintiff asserts Defendant Judges Emerson, James, and Camp all violated Plaintiff's due process rights and committed fraud against him by signing arrest warrants thatlacked probable cause and by failing to inform Plaintiff of the charges against him. (Doc. 9-4, pp. 1, 2, 4; Doc. 9-5, pp. 1-4.) Plaintiff asserts Defendant District Attorney McDade falsely imprisoned Plaintiff and unlawfully prosecuted him without probable cause and due process. (Doc. 9-4, p. 3.) Plaintiff asserts Defendant Deputy Taylor falsely identified him as the perpetrator and provided false eye witness testimony, (doc. 9-4, p. 5; doc. 9-5, p. 5), and Defendant Officer Davidson failed to provide an affidavit and gave false information in establishing probable cause, (doc. 9-4, pp. 1-2; doc. 9-5, pp. 1-2.) Lastly, Plaintiff asserts Defendants the State of Georgia, Douglas County, Gwinnett County, Douglas County Superior Court, City of Douglasville, and City of Tucker, all entities within Georgia, were involved in the conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of his federal rights by arresting and prosecuting him without probable cause and due process. (Doc. 9-4, pp. 5-6; Doc. 9-5, pp. 4-5.)

Plaintiff states this alleged conspiracy against him has caused him "moral wrongs, slander of name and character," has hurt his family, and deprived him of medical care. (Doc. 9, p. 5.) As relief, Plaintiff requests $26,000,000.00, which he claims Defendants have already agreed to pay. (Id. at pp. 5, 7.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows an inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

When reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is guided by the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) "if it is 'without arguable merit either in law or fact.'" Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App'x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations anddismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys . . . .") (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.").

DISCUSSION

I. Dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Even if Plaintiff could plausibly allege claims absent the immunity principles, dearth of factual allegations, and statute of limitations discussed below, most devastating to his Section 1983 action as to all Defendants, is that it fundamentally concerns the criminal process by which he was adjudicated. Simply, Plaintiff's complaints about the alleged conspiracy that transpired to his present incarceration are barred by Heck v. Humphrey and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint centers on his arrest, prosecution, and adjudication by Defendants. Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant played an unlawful role in a conspiracy to convict him without probable cause and without due process. (Docs. 9-4, 9-5.) Further, Plaintiff alleges certain unnamed officials with Defendants the State of Georgia, Douglas County, Gwinnett County, Douglas County Superior Court, City of Douglasville, and City of Tucker,also deprived him of federal rights in this alleged conspiracy against him. (Id.) However, even assuming the truth of these "clearly baseless" claims, Plaintiff has not shown that his conviction has been reversed, expunged, invalidated, called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, or otherwise overturned. As such, this Court is precluded from reviewing Plaintiff's alleged conspiracy claims by the decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

In Heck, a state prisoner filed a Section 1983 damages action against the prosecutors and investigator in his criminal case for their actions which resulted in his conviction. The United States Supreme Court analogized the plaintiff's claim to a common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution, which requires as an element of the claim that the prior criminal proceeding be terminated in favor of the accused. 512 U.S. at 484. The Supreme Court reasoned:

We think the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution (footnote omitted).

We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly

...