Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Taylor

• Citation: 86 F. 168
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee
• Decision Date: 15 March 1898
• Parties: NASHVILLE, C. & ST. L. RY. v. TAYLOR et al.

86 F. 168

NASHVILLE, C. & ST. L. RY. v. TAYLOR et al.

United States Circuit Court, M.D. Tennessee.

March 15, 1898

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Vertrees & Vertrees, J. M. Dickinson, Smith & Maddin, East & Fogg, and J. D. B. De Bow, for complainant.

G. W Pickle, Atty. Gen., James C. Bradford, and Granberry & Marks for defendants.

CLARK District Judge.

This suit is brought against the defendants as the state board of equalizers, to enjoin the certification by them to the state comptroller of the assessed valuation on complainant's property for taxation for 1897 and 1898, and in this method to prevent the comptroller from certifying the apportioned valuations to the various counties and municipal corporations in the state entitled to collect taxes in proportion to the mileage of railway lying in such counties and municipal corporations. It appears from the allegations of the bill in this case, as it did in those in Railroad and Telephone Cases, 85 F. 302, that the complainant sought to have the assessments corrected before the board of equalizers, and the bills tender or offer to pay the full amount of the taxes which would be due with complainants' property assessed at the same rate at which other property in the state is assessed. The general grounds of relief stated in the bill are:

'(1) That the assessments were made by the state railroad commissioners, appointed under an act which, it is claimed, is unconstitutional, as violating the state constitution, and the United States constitution, and these assessors could not, therefore, lawfully make the assessments. (2) That the same property had been already validly assessed and certified for the year 1897, and that a reassessment for the year 1897 is unauthorized and void. (3) That discrimination is made against railroad property, which, if sold for unpaid taxes, is not sold subject to redemption, while other property as a species or class is. This, it is claimed, is a denial of the equal protection of the law by the state. (4) Errors in receiving and rejecting evidence by the board are specified. (5) It is alleged that plaintiff has been deprived of the right of equalization under the laws applicable to railroad and telephone properties, while such equalization is provided for and allowed in respect to all other property in the state subject to taxation. It is alleged that, in consequence of the denial of this right, complainant's property is assessed at 25 to 40 per cent. more in proportion to value than other classes or property in the state. This, it is said, is in violation of the state constitution, and also of Const. U.S. Amend. 14, wherein it is provided: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

The provision of the state constitution is as follows:

'All property shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be ascertained in such manner as the legislature shall direct, so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout the state. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected, shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of the same value. ' Const. Tenn. art. 2, Sec. 28.

In this connection the bill sets out, somewhat in detail, the provisions of the tax laws applicable to railroad and telephone properties as a class, and those which apply to other property as a class, including the features which it is claimed are discriminating in character, stating also the results of these laws in their practical administration.

The case is heard on application for injunction and on demurrer to the bill.

The question as to the jurisdiction of this court, raised by the demurrer, must first be considered and decided, for it depends upon the disposition to be made of that question whether it is within the province of this court to determine any other issue presented in the case. This is the question to which the discussion has been mainly directed, and relates to federal, as distinguished from state, jurisdiction. The argument has taken such a range as renders it necessary to examine at some length into the general jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, original and appellate, over 'suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,' as shown by the decisions of the supreme court of the United States and the legislation of congress, first referring to the constitutional grant or declaration of the judicial power, which lies at the very foundation of the whole matter. Among other specified cases, the national constitution declares that 'the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority. ' Const. art. 3, Sec. 2. The constitution further ordains 'that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. ' Id. Sec. 1. The constitution expressly extended the original jurisdiction of the supreme court of the United States to certain named cases, and conferred on that court appellate jurisdiction over all other cases coming within the national judicial power, 'with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the congress shall make. ' The constitution did not otherwise undertake to distribute the jurisdiction,-- that subject being left to congress,-- the constitution in that respect not being self-executing. It has consequently been held from the beginning that the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court can only be exercised in accordance with the acts and regulations of congress upon that subject. Wiscart v. D'Auchy (1794) 3 Dall. 321; American Const. Co. v. Jacksonville, T. & K.W. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 378, 13 Sup.Ct. 758; Mining Co. v. Turck, 150 U.S. 141, 14 Sup.Ct. 35. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy between parties to a suit, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power over them. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657. The supremacy of the national constitution and laws was declared in this language:

'This constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land. ' Const. U.S. art. 6, cl .2.

To preserve this supremacy, it was deemed necessary to invest the courts of the United States with the power of original or final determination of all causes of the classes specified in the constitution.

In Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 380, the supreme court of the United States said:

'The general government, though limited as to its objects, is supreme with respect to those objects. This principle is a part of the constitution, and, if there be any who deny its necessity, none can deny its authority.' And, speaking of the obligation to preserve the principles and supremacy of the constitution, the court observed:

'One of the instruments by which this duty may be peaceably performed is the judicial department. It is authorized to decide all cases of every description arising under the constitution or laws of the United States.'

The same proposition was stated in another form by the court in Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 238, 16 Sup.Ct. 300, Mr. Justice Gray saying:

'By the judicial system of the United States, established by congress under the power conferred upon it by the constitution, the jurisdiction of the courts of the several states has not been controlled or interfered with, except so far as necessary to secure the supremacy of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.'

And so, in Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 818, the court said:

'All governments which are not extremely defective in their organization must possess, within themselves, the means of expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws. If we examine the constitution of the United States, we find that its framers kept this great political principle in view. The second article vests the whole executive power in the president, and the third article declares 'that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority.' This clause enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full extent of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, when any question respecting them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on it. That power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law. It then becomes a case, and the constitution declares that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States.'

In the cases of Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, and Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, the reasons for the grant of judicial power to the courts of the United States, and the extent and limits of such power, are explained at length, and with great care; and these leading cases have been often affirmed, followed, and applied down to the present time. U.S. v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 468, 13 Sup.Ct. 650.

It must be observed in the outset, and never forgotten, that the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, depending on the subject-matter or character of the case, whether exercised directly as original jurisdiction, or indirectly in the form of appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of the state courts, extends to and is limited by the class of cases specified in the constitution in which the...