Nashville Lodging Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp., Civ. A. No. 92-1615 SSH.

CourtUnited States District Courts. United States District Court (Columbia)
Citation839 F. Supp. 58
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 92-1615 SSH.
PartiesNASHVILLE LODGING CO., et al., Plaintiffs, v. RESOLUTION TRUST CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
Decision Date30 December 1993

839 F. Supp. 58

NASHVILLE LODGING CO., et al., Plaintiffs,

Civ. A. No. 92-1615 SSH.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

December 30, 1993.

839 F. Supp. 59

Charles E. Raley, Timothy E. Heffernan, Israel & Raley, Washington, DC, for plaintiffs.

Barbara E. Nicastro, Bethel & Nicastro, Washington, DC, for defendants.

Howard B. Possick, Sharon M. Schroer, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn, Washington, DC, for Southeast Real Estate/Jer Southeast Services/J.E. Robert Co., Inc.


STANLEY S. HARRIS, District Judge.

Before the Court are the summary judgment motions of plaintiffs, defendant Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC/Receiver") as receiver for Savers Savings Association ("Savers Savings"), and defendants Southeast Real Estate Operating Company, L.P. ("SREOC"), JER Southeast Services, Inc., and J.E. Robert Company, Inc. (collectively "the Southeast defendants"), and the oppositions and replies thereto. Plaintiffs claim damages against RTC/Receiver for repudiation of a refinancing agreement between plaintiffs and Savers Savings. Plaintiffs also seek a determination that they are entitled to equitable set-off or recoupment of the

839 F. Supp. 60
amount of payments made to Savers Savings under the now-repudiated refinancing agreement against amounts they owe under a note and mortgage held by SREOC. Upon consideration of the entire record, the Court grants the summary judgment motions of RTC/Receiver and the Southeast defendants, and denies plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Although "findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56," Fed. R.Civ.P. 52(a), the Court nonetheless sets forth its analysis


On June 14, 1983, Savers Federal Savings and Loan Association ("Savers Federal"), the predecessor in interest to Savers Savings, made a $9.5 million loan to Nashville Residence Corporation ("NRC (1983)") for the development of what is now called the Brock Residence Inn. As part of the same transaction, on April 6, 1983, Savers Federal and NRC (1983) executed a refinancing agreement. Under this agreement, Savers Federal agreed to refinance the loan at maturity in 1998, in return, inter alia, for the payment by NRC (1983) of monthly refinancing fees, which were to be paid along with the regular payment of principal and interest due under the loan. Ultimately, NRC (1983) transferred the property to Nashville Lodging Company ("NLC"). NLC was substituted as a borrower of the loan in 1989. NLC, and its predecessors, made payments under the refinancing agreement until October, 1991.

Prior to February 10, 1989, Savers Federal was a federally chartered savings association, the accounts of which were insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation ("FSLIC"). By Resolution Nos. 89-173-p and 89-176-p, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board appointed FSLIC as Conservator for Savers Federal, and upon the enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), on August 9, 1989, RTC succeeded FSLIC as Conservator for Savers Federal.

On October 4, 1989, by Order No. 89-263, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") replaced RTC as Conservator with RTC as Receiver for Savers Federal. The same day, by Order No. 89-264, OTS formed Savers Savings. By Order No. 89-265, OTS appointed RTC as Conservator for Savers Savings. Subsequently, RTC as Receiver for Savers Federal sold and transferred certain assets to Savers Savings, including the loan and refinancing agreement. On September 20, 1991, OTS replaced RTC as Conservator for Savers Savings with RTC as Receiver for Savers Savings.

By letter dated December 19, 1991, RTC/Receiver repudiated the refinancing agreement pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1). On February 12, 1992, NLC submitted a claim for damages to RTC/Receiver pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3). NLC sought return of all amounts paid under the refinancing agreement, plus prejudgment interest. RTC/Receiver denied NLC's claim on May 12, 1992.

By a purchase agreement dated February 28, 1992, SREOC purchased the loan from RTC/Receiver as part of a pool of mortgage loans. On March 30, 1992, NLC notified SREOC that it had submitted a claim based on RTC/Receiver's repudiation of the refinancing agreement. The purchase of the pool of assets closed on April 29, 1992.

On July 10, 1992, NLC, along with Nashville Residence Corporation (1986) and Nelson (collectively "plaintiffs"), filed suit in this court against RTC/Receiver, and the Southeast defendants. Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(3), plaintiffs seek direct compensatory damages, which they define as all amounts paid under the refinancing agreement, plus prejudgment interest, from RTC/Receiver due to the repudiation of the refinancing agreement. Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment for equitable set-off or recoupment against the Southeast defendants for amounts paid under the refinancing agreement, plus prejudgment interest.


A court may grant summary judgment when the pleadings and supplemental materials present no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex

839 F. Supp. 61
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Because the issues raised by the present motions concern only questions of law, this matter is ripe for resolution on summary judgment

FIRREA confers extremely broad powers upon receivers and conservators of failed depository institutions. Gross v. Bell Sav. Bank, 974 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir.1992). This power includes the authority to...

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6 cases
  • Edwards v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 7 Junio 1994
    ...(to pay the Directors). That is an accurate statement of the law. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II); Nashville Lodging Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 839 F.Supp. 58, 62 (D.D.C.1993) and authorities cited therein. However, it is an inaccurate statement of fact. The P & A Agreement reflects th......
  • Nashville Lodging Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 14 Septiembre 1995 Id. at 8-9. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on all counts of the complaint. Nashville Lodging Co. v. RTC, 839 F.Supp. 58 (D.D.C.1993). It held first that Nashville was not entitled to any relief against the RTC because it had been in default under the ref......
  • Resolution Trust Corp. v. Management, Inc., 93-2252
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 25 Mayo 1994
    ..."determined" as of June 22, 1990, when the RTC was appointed receiver. See 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(e)(3)(A)(ii)(I); Nashville Lodging Co. v. RTC, 839 F.Supp. 58, 62 (D.D.C.1993); Citibank (South Dakota) v. FDIC, 827 F.Supp. 789, 791 (D.D.C.1993); cf. Dababneh v. FDIC, 971 F.2d 428, 434-35 (10th......
  • Nashville Lodging Co. v. FDIC, Civil Action No. 92-1615.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • 31 Julio 1996
    ...sets forth its reasoning. Background The history of this case is fully set out in this Court's Opinion of December 30, 1993, 839 F.Supp. 58 (D.D.C.1993), and the Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, issued on July 18, 1995, 59 F.3d 236 (D.C.Cir......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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