Nassar v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 03 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–1953.,13–1953. |
| Citation | 779 F.3d 547 |
| Parties | Ray NASSAR, Ph.D.; Gena Smith, Plaintiffs–Appellees v. Earnestine JACKSON, Individually & in her official capacity as a Hughes School Board member, Defendant–Appellant Jimmy Wilkins, Individually & in his Capacity as Superintendent of the Hughes School District, Defendant Hughes School District, Defendant–Appellant Hughes School Board, Members in their Official Capacities; Rudolph Robinson, in Official Capacity as member of Hughes School Board; Demarcus Burks, in Official Capacity as member of Hughes School Board; Leitha Cupples, in Official Capacity as member of Hughes School Board; Irene Combs, in Official Capacity as member of Hughes School Board; Jeff Spaletta, in Official Capacity as member of Hughes School Board; W E Duckworth, in Official Capacity as member of Hughes School Board, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant was Gary D. Marts, Jr., of Little Rock, AR. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellant brief; David L. Jones, of Little Rock, AR.
Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Austin Hayes Easley, of Forrest City, AR. The following attorney(s) appeared on the appellee brief; Brian Gene Brooks, of Greenbrier, AR.
Before BYE, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
Believing that the school district of Hughes, Arkansas (“school district”) fired them because of their race, Ray Nassar and Gena Smith sued and won under several legal theories. The school district and one school-board member, Earnestine Jackson, now appeal several orders of the district court. We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.
The school district hired Ray Nassar as superintendent in 2008. While superintendent, Nassar hired Gena Smith as a business manager. The school district renewed Nassar's contract for the three years running from July 1, 2010 until June 30, 2013. Over those three years, the contract provided for a total salary of $274,000, plus benefits.
Both Nassar and Smith are white. After the racial composition of the school board shifted from a white majority to an African–American majority, Nassar's already-poor relationship with two African–American board members deteriorated further. One of those board members was Earnestine Jackson. At one public meeting, she referred to Smith as Nassar's “girlfriend,” though both Nassar and Smith are married to other people. Jackson also said at a meeting that Nassar “lie[s].” The hostility devolved into a profanity-laced exchange, and soon after, on February 8, 2011, the school district fired Nassar without a hearing. A few months later, the school district fired Smith, also without a hearing.
Nassar and Smith sued the school district, Jackson, and others, alleging violations of due process, unlawful racial discrimination, and breach of contract. Nassar and Smith both claimed that Jackson's “girlfriend” comment was defamatory, and Nassar individually complained of Jackson's saying that he “lie[s].” The district court granted partial summary judgment for Nassar and Smith on the due-process claims, reserving the remaining claims and the determination of damages for trial.
At trial, an economist testified to different measures of Nassar's damages from losing his job. The net salary and benefits lost between the date of Nassar's firing and the trial were worth $195,639.38. During cross-examination, the economist valued at about $50,000 the salary and benefits that would have remained on Nassar's contract from the time of the trial until the contract would have expired. Thus, Nassar's damages to the end of his contract totaled about $245,639.38. The economist also testified that the present value of Nassar's lost salary, lost benefits, and added travel costs for seven years after trial was $283,577.77. The school district and Jackson did not object to the testimony about future damages.
After the close of all the evidence, the defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law, citing only “the plaintiffs' failure to carry their burden.” The court denied the motion and instructed the jury on the measure of damages appropriate under each of Nassar's and Smith's claims. The court further instructed the jury to reduce its awards so as not to duplicate recovery for the same misconduct.
The jury found for Nassar and Smith on all claims. Specifically finding that Nassar would not have been fired had the school district provided a proper hearing, the jury awarded Nassar $340,000 on his due-process claim—more than he would have earned in salary and benefits through the end of the term of his contract—$1.00 on his discrimination claim, and $1.00 on his contract claim.1 The defendants then renewed under Rule 50(b) their motion for judgment as a matter of law, claiming for the first time with specificity that the discrimination claims failed for insufficient evidence of racial discrimination and that the $340,000 due-process damages exceeded the amount supported by the evidence. The district court denied the defendants' motion.
Nassar and Smith requested attorney's fees. Their lead counsel's usual rate was $250 per hour, but they requested fees “more in line with the contingency fee agreement they had with their attorneys”—about $440 per hour for lead counsel. The court granted Nassar and Smith attorney's fees at a rate of $375 per hour for their lead counsel.
The school district and Jackson appealed. Their brief argues that (1) they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the discrimination claims because there was insufficient evidence of racial discrimination, (2) Jackson was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the defamation claims because there was insufficient evidence of publication and “actual malice,” (3) the court should have reduced the due-process damages awarded or granted a new trial on that issue, and (4) the award of attorney's fees was excessive.
We turn first to the school district and Jackson's argument that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the discrimination claims. They assert that the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find racial discrimination, an assertion that they first raised in their post-trial motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). We conclude that the school district and Jackson have waived this issue.
Rule 50(b) provides for post-trial renewal of a Rule 50(a) trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. A court reviewing a Rule 50(b) motion is limited to consideration of only those grounds advanced in the original, Rule 50(a) motion. Graham Constr. Servs. v. Hammer & Steel Inc., 755 F.3d 611, 617–18 (8th Cir.2014). Rule 50(a) in turn requires that a “motion for judgment as a matter of law ... specify ... the law and facts that entitle the movant to judgment.”
The school district and Jackson did specify why they believed they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law in their post-trial, Rule 50(b) motion. But in their Rule 50(a) motion, the school district and Jackson's attorney said only that:
the defendants would move for a directed verdict based on the plaintiffs' failure to carry their burden on all but the due process claim. And I–I could go through all the evidence, but the Court–I won't go any further.
This statement, which specifies neither law nor facts, lacks the particularity required of a Rule 50(a) motion. See Alternate Fuels, Inc. v. Cabanas, 538 F.3d 969, 973–74 (8th Cir.2008) (); Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 571–72 (3d Cir.1997) (). Accordingly, despite the more particular Rule 50(b) motion, the school district and Jackson's nebulous Rule 50(a) motion “cannot be the basis of an appeal.”2 Alternate Fuels, 538 F.3d at 973–74; see also Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven–Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 900–01 (8th Cir.2006) (). For this reason, we also do not consider Jackson's argument that the defamation claims failed for lack of publication or “actual malice.”3
The school district and Jackson next contest the $340,000 award to Nassar on his due-process claim. They assert that the damages could not have exceeded the value of the salary and benefits remaining on Nassar's contract. Expert testimony established that this value was about $245,639.38—$195,639.38 for damages from the date of Nassar's firing until the trial, plus approximately $50,000 from the trial until the end of the contract term. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in sustaining the $340,000 award, and with respect to this issue, we vacate and remand with instructions to offer remittitur.
The court had instructed the jury to award Nassar the economic damages caused by the denial of due process, that is:
[a]ny wages or fringe benefits you find that the plaintiff would have earned ... if he ... had received the type of hearing required under the Constitution. In order to fairly compensate a plaintiff, any award should put the plaintiff in no better position than he ... would have been in if the Hughes School District had provided the plaintiff a hearing prior to termination.
The parties agree that the jury was properly instructed as to the measure of damages. Nonetheless, the school district and Jackson argue that the $340,000 award improperly exceeded the only demonstrated value of Nassar's lost salary and benefits during the term of his contract,...
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