Nassif Realty Corp. v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford
Decision Date | 30 June 1966 |
Citation | 220 A.2d 748,107 N.H. 267 |
Parties | NASSIF REALTY CORPORATION v. NATIONAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD. |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Faulkner, Plaut, Hanna & Zimmerman, Keene (George R. Hanna, Keene, orally), for plaintiff.
Wyman, Bean & Tefft and Francis B. McCaffrey, Manchester (Francis B. McCaffrey, Manchester, orally), for defendant.
The questions presented in this case are (1) the validity of Rule 5 of the Superior Court which provides that a jury trial is waived unless a timely request is made therefor; and (2) whether the Trial Court's denial of the plaintiff's motion to place the case on the jury list was erroneous. Superior Court Rule 5, effective August 31, 1963 (RSA 491 App R 5 (supp)) reads as follows:
The plaintiff brought a civil action to recover damages under a fire insurance policy with extended coverage endorsements issued by the defendant to the plaintiff. The action was instituted by the plaintiff's writ dated January 27, 1964, which was made returnable on the first Tuesday of March 1964. On the face of the writ spaces are provided for a party to check one of two boxes indicating whether the case is to be tried by the court or by a jury. On this writ the plaintiff checked the box indicating that the case was to be tried by the court. The case was listed by the clerk of the Superior Court as one of several 'issues to Court' cases to be in order for trial on February 3, 1965. By mutual agreement the case was continued. This case was similarly listed by the clerk for cases to be heard at the September term 1965. The plaintiff filed a motion on August 6, 1965 requesting that the case be placed on the jury list. After a hearing by the court, the motion was denied and the plaintiff's exceptions were reserved and transferred by Morris, J.
The rule-making power of the Superior and Supreme Courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, is broad and comprehensive. RSA 491:10; RSA 490:4. The rule-making power in this state is fortified not only by the statutory authorization cited but also by the common law. Boody v. Watson, 64 N.H. 162, 177, 9 A. 794; Seventh Report, N.H. Judicial Council 26 (1958). 'Independently of any statute, every court of record may make such rules for the transaction of its business as do not contravene the laws of the land.' Ricker's Petition, 66 N.H. 207, 211, 29 A. 559, 560, 24 A.L.R. 740. See Annot. 158 A.L.R. 705. Garabedian v. Donald William Inc., 106 N.H. 156, 157, 207 A.2d 425, 426.
Plaintiff's action was one entitled to have been tried before a jury unless the failure to proceed in accordance with Superior Court Rule 5 is a bar. N.H.Const., Part I, Art. 20th; RSA 519:17; American Employers Ins. Co. v. Liberi, 101 N.H. 480, 482, 147 A.2d 306. This brings us to the question whether Superior Court Rule 5 is a constitutional and valid regulation of the right to trial by jury. By the great weight of authority the right to a jury trial may be subjected to reasonable procedural regulation. Annot. 64 A.L.R.2d 506. This is supported by numerous cases, old as well as recent. Foster v. Morse, 132 Mass. 354 (1882); Houston v. Lloyd's Consumer Acceptance Corp., 241 Md. 10, 214 A.2d 192 (1965). The constitutional guaranty of jury trial James, Civil Procedure, s. 8.1, n. 11, p. 339 (1965). See also, 5 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed. 1964) s. 38.43 p. 336; United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 71 S.Ct. 524, 95 L.Ed. 582.
The plaintiff concedes that a jury trial may be waived by a party by conduct 'inconsistent with the right already asserted.' Stevens v. Mutual Protection Fire Insurance Co., 84 N.H. 275, 283, 149 A. 498, 504, 69 A.L.R. 624. However, the plaintiff contends that the waiver requires some positive affirmative action and that inaction in asserting the right to a jury trial is not enough. This contention has been made before but has generally been rejected by the authorities. Wilson v. Corning Glass Works, 195 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1952); General Tire & Rubber Company v. Watkins, 331 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1964). See 5 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed. 1964) s. 38.43, p. 336 (1965 supp.).
The plaintiff argues that Superior Court Rule 5 is mandatory and allows no flexibility for excusable neglect or innocent inadvertence in...
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In re S. N.H. Med. Ctr.
...This provision merely endorsed the judiciary's inherent authority to adopt such rules, see Nassif Realty Corp. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 107 N.H. 267, 268–69, 220 A.2d 748 (1966), and was not intended to divest the legislature of its concurrent authority to enact statutes on this subject. ......
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Opinion of the Justices
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