Nassif v. Boston & M. R. R.

• Decision Date: 15 March 1960
• Citation: 340 Mass. 557,165 N.E.2d 397
• Parties: David NASSIF et al., Trustees, v. BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 397

165 N.E.2d 397

340 Mass. 557

David NASSIF et al., Trustees, v.BOSTON AND MAINE RAILROAD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Dec. 11, 1959.

Decided March 15, 1960.

Arthur L. Brown and Lawrence R. Cohen, Boston (Albert R. Mezoff and Thomas E. Goode, Boston, with them), for defendant.

George A. McLaughlin, Boston (Arthur M. Gilman, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, COUNIHAN, WHITTEMORE, and CUTTER, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

This is a bill in equity by the trustees of Nassif Realty Trust (the trust) to compel the defendant(the railroad) to convey premises (the option area) on Rutherford Avenue in Charlestown.The trust alleged that it had exercised an option under an indenture of January 15, 1954(the 1954 indenture) to purchase the option area which is near land acquired by the trust from the railroad in 1952.The trial judge concluded that the trust was entitled to specific performance of the railroad's agreement under the option and a final decree was entered directing a conveyance.The railroad has appealed.The evidence is reported.

The trial judge found the following facts.For many years prior to 1952, the railroad had owned freight yards on Rutherford Avenue susceptible of development for industrial and freight revenue purposes.The area contained 'a number of very old and unsightly * * * freight houses.'Negotiations between David Nassif, later one of the trustees of the trust, and the railroad resulted in an agreement dated July 18, 1952, (a) for the conveyance of specified land to Nassif and his partners, who were to construct buildings and obtain tenants approved by the railroad, and (b) for an option to the partners to purchase other land in the area 'under specific conditions for similar purposes.'The agreement was extended or amended several times.The trust was formed September 22, 1952, and by deed of October 17, 1952, the railroad conveyed to the trust two parcels in accordance with the agreement of July 18, 1952.The trust paid to the railroad $25,000 in cash and gave to the railroad a mortgage and note for $100,000.

Simultaneously, on October 17, 1952, an agreement ¹ was executed which contained 'specific provisions for the conditions under which the option could be exercised * * * the terms thereof, and the obligations of the plaintiffs thereafter.'The $100,000 mortgage 'provided that it was also 'to secure performance by the * * * [trust] of all * * * obligations of the'' trust contained in the October 17 agreement.The deed of October 17, 1952, was reformed and amended on January 15, 1954, to change the description of the land conveyed in 1952.This reformation indenture was executed contemporaneously with the 1954 indenture.The $100,000 mortgage of October 17, 1952, was then discharged and the trust gave to the railroad a new mortgage, dated January 15, 1954, for $95,000.This latter mortgage provided that it was 'also to secure performance * * * of all the obligations of the' trust contained in the 1954 indenture.There was 'a further slight modification on June 15, 1954.'

The 1954 indenture modified the agreement of October 17, 1952, with respect to the option in a manner discussed more fully later in this opinion, and in various other respects, ² but, under both agreements, 'the option was to be exercised on or before October 17, 1955.'At the railroad's suggestion, the time for exercise of the option was extended to November 14, 1955.On that day the trust by letter exercised the option to purchase portions of the option area, excluding street areas shown on a plan accompanying the letter.After further correspondence between the trust and the railroad, in which the trust directed the railroad's attention to its obligations under the option, the trust gave notice on February 10, 1956, that its representatives would be present at the Suffolk County registry of deeds on February 13, 1956, to receive a conveyance and to perform its duties under the option.The railroad did not appear and has refused conveyance of the option area.On April 11, 1955, there had been a change in the management of the railroad.The trustees, at the railroad's request, thereafter had delayed exercising the option to give the railroad's new officers and counsel time to study the contracts.

In 1953 and 1954 buildings for tenants approved by the railroad had been erected upon several lots formed from the area sold to the trust by the 1952 deed (as reformed in 1954).Arrangements had also been made for placing a building on a parcel known as lot 4, a part of the original 1952 option area, in fact conveyed to the trust by deed dated January 18, 1954.The judge found that the fair market value of the properties was at least $1,475,000, approximately the cost of the buildings and land.The trust, as of the date of trial (early in July, 1958), owed on notes secured by mortgages covering the land then owned by the trust and four buildings (including mortgages to the railroad) a total of about $997,653.The trust thus then had an equity in the properties of 'at least $478,000.'

The judge concluded (1) that the trust had 'been diligent in endeavoring to secure tenants who would be approved by the' railroad; (2) that the trust has 'at all times acted in good faith and * * * [has] not been guilty of * * * inequitable conduct'; (3) that the pertinent 'contracts are valid and binding'; (4) that the railroad 'is well secured for future performance by the * * * [trust] of all * * * [its] obligations to the' railroad; and (5) that the trust on February 13, 1956, was 'ready, able and willing to perform.'

The railroad contends that these conclusions were not justified, that the contracts between the trust and the railroad are invalid for uncertainty, that various legal and practical reasons make specific performance inappropriate, and that there was prejudidial error in the exclusion of certain evidence.

1.The principal contract document, now effective, is the 1954 indenture which substituted new provisions for all the substantive provisions of the agreement of October 17, 1952.The original agreement of October 17, 1952, had provided that if 'within three years from * * * [its] date * * * the construction on * * * [the] premises of buildings * * * for occupants approved by the [r]ailroad shall have been completed or commenced under arrangements which give reasonable assurance of completion * * * thereafter, and if such buildings provide or will * * * provide * * * at least 125,000 square feet of interior floor space, and if within said three-year period the * * * [trust] shall have entered into at least one bona fide contract * * * for * * * a building * * * upon the adjacent land of the [r]ailroad [the option area] * * * [then] the * * * [trust] shall have the * * * option to purchase' the option area, with the exception of the fee in proposed ways, upon stipulated terms.By the 1954 indenture this condition precedent to the exercise of the option was wholly eliminated and for it was substituted (see footnote 2, supra) an absolute option (a) to purchase lot 4 and (b) to purchase the whole or designated parts of the option area (exclusive of the fee in proposed ways).The new 1954 options were not in any respect made conditional upon the construction of buildings on the land conveyed in 1952.That construction, as stated above, had substantially been done.

No obligation is now imposed on the trust to build upon the option area by the preamble (see footnote 1, supra) to the agreement of October 17, 1952, which was not eliminated by the 1954 indenture.The preamble contains merely recitals, not undertakings.Indeed, certain recitals, which related to the construction of specified buildings as a condition precedent to the exercise of the original options, became out of date at least as early as the signing of the 1954 indenture.At most, the preamble constitutes a general statement of the 1952 plans of the parties and a summary description of some of the background of the negotiations.If the parties had intended to impose on the trust contract obligations to build on the option area, it would have been natural for them to have stated these provisions, not in the preamble, but in explicit covenants or agreements.

The 1954 indenture obviously was carefully drawn by counsel.In it the obligations of the parties are stated with precision.We thus are not considering an inadequate document, which lacks explicit provision with respect to the consideration to be paid to the railroad.There is no occasion for resort to recitals in the preamble to determine matters relating to that consideration.Cf.Pearlstein v. Novitch, 239 Mass. 228, 231-232, 131 N.E. 853.Here the price and the consideration for the conveyances to be made following exercise of the options were set out in great detail, without any statement that an obligation to build on the option area was a part of that consideration.Doubtless, the recitals of the preamble may be used to assist in interpreting other parts of the contract, but, as such, they impose no obligations upon the trust.

The provisions of the 1954 indenture other than the preamble also do not purport to require any building upon the option area, although the instrument defines in various respects the character of a building program, if in fact one is undertaken.These provisions do no more than to require the trust to make (a) its partial exercises of option 'in general conform to the pattern of the development' of the lots acquired in 1952 and (b) its sketch plan submitted with any notice exercising the options 'in general follow the [same] pattern.'The 1954 indenture, however, does not leave the railroad wholly without influence upon the development of the option area, for art. 1 provides that with respect to 'all buildings * * * on any of said land * * * construction * * * shall not be undertaken * * *...