Nat. Bank of N. America v. LOC. 553 PENSION FUND, ETC.
Decision Date | 28 December 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 78 C 758.,78 C 758. |
Parties | NATIONAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA, Petitioner, v. LOCAL 553 PENSION FUND OF the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS AND CHAUFFEURS, Respondent. Anthony Lombardo, Judgment-Debtor. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Halpern, Halpern & Axelrod, Mineola, N.Y. by Elliot Pecker, Mineola, N.Y., for petitioner.
Cohen, Weiss & Simon, New York City by Samuel J. Cohen, Keith E. Secular, New York City, for respondent.
In October 1975, petitioner, the National Bank of North America (the "Bank"), obtained a money judgment for $3,414.65 against Anthony Lombardo in the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County, $2,639.05 of which remains unsatisfied. Petitioner commenced the above-styled special proceeding in the Civil Court in April 1978, to obtain an order, pursuant to N.Y. CPLR § 5225(b), directing the respondent, Local 553 Pension Fund (the "Fund"), to make monthly payments to it of $32.85, representing ten percent of Lombardo's monthly pension benefits, in satisfaction of the 1975 judgment.1 Respondent thereafter removed the proceedings to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The matter is before the court on petitioner's motion to remand to the Civil Court on the ground that the removal was improvident. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Resolution of this motion turns on whether the claim sued upon arises under federal law. The parties agree that the Local 553 Pension Fund constitutes a "plan" subject to the provisions of the Employees Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. But their accord extends no further. Respondent urges that the cause of action properly sounds under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), which provides that:
Section 502(e)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), in turn confers on federal and State courts concurrent original jurisdiction of actions brought under subsection (a)(1)(B). Hence, if this proceeding falls within Section 502(a)(1)(B), removal was proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
To span the apparent gulf between the kind of action contemplated by Section 502(a)(1)(B) and the relief sought by the Bank in this proceeding—garnishment of a portion of Lombardo's monthly pension benefits —as well as the fact that the Bank, as judgment creditor, hardly qualifies as a "participant" or "beneficiary" as those terms are defined in ERISA, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) & (8),2 the Fund offers a two-pronged argument. First, it contends that the order petitioner seeks would necessarily modify Lombardo's right to receive benefits from the Fund and that the proceeding must, therefore, be viewed as one brought "to clarify the rights of a pensioner to future benefits." Respondent's Memorandum (6/27/78), at 5. Second, the Fund invokes the familiar rule that a judgment creditor "stands in the shoes" of the judgment debtor when he seeks to enforce the judgment against property of the judgment debtor held by a third party. Id. at 5-6. Petitioner responds that it does not seek to clarify Lombardo's right to pension benefits but simply to "intercept" a portion of the benefits currently being paid to him, in order to satisfy the 1975 Civil Court judgment.
Phillips Petroleum Company v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127-28, 94 S.Ct. 1002, 1003-1004, 39 L.Ed.2d 209 (1974) (additional citations omitted).
A plaintiff may not, of course, defeat federal removal jurisdiction by casting in terms of State law a claim which is properly federal; nonetheless, where he has a right to relief under either State or federal law, a plaintiff may elect to rely exclusively on State law and his unasserted federal claim will not support removal. State of New York v. Local 1115, supra, 412 F.Supp. at 722; see Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Alexander (Hall's Adm'r), 246 U.S. 276, 282, 38 S.Ct. 237, 62 L.Ed. 713 (1918); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Company, 228 U.S. 22, 25, 33 S.Ct. 410, 57 L.Ed. 716 (1913).
It is evident here that the Bank's claim, as reflected in its petition to the State court, derives entirely from State, rather than federal, law. Indeed, the relief sought—an order directing the Fund to pay to the Bank a portion of Lombardo's monthly pension benefits—is purely a creation of New York law. See N.Y. CPLR § 5225(b). The Fund's effort to characterize the proceeding as an action brought to clarify a pensioner's right to future benefits from a plan subject to ERISA's substantive provisions —and therefore both within this court's subject matter jurisdiction and calling for a federally-created remedy—is foreclosed by the simple fact that the Bank is neither a "participant" nor a "beneficiary," and in any event falls with the Fund's concession of its obligation, under the terms of the plan, to Lombardo. Certainly, the Bank's claim presupposes Lombardo's right to receive pension benefit payments; but the Bank's right, if any, to reach those payments stems entirely from the judgment-enforcing remedies provided by the CPLR, and not from the common law notion that a judgment creditor's interest in property held by a third party is coextensive with that of his judgment debtor. Cf. Slaff v. Slaff, 9 A.D.2d 80, 191 N.Y.S.2d 636, 638-39 (1st Dep't 1959); Gombert v. George C. Fuller Contracting Co., 285 App. Div. 1053, 139 N.Y.S.2d 464, 466 (2d Dep't 1955); 6 Weinstein, Korn & Miller ¶ 5225.16 (1964).
While conceding that the merits are not before the court on this motion to remand, the Fund nonetheless urges that "important issues of federal pension policy" are raised which support a recognition of federal jurisdiction. Respondent's Memorandum (6/27/78) at 3. The Fund seemingly argues that it would be an exercise in futility to remand this case, since Sections 206(d)(1) and 1021(c) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13), preclude the relief now sought by the Bank.
Undeniably, as the Fund points out, § 206(d)(1) requires that "each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." Ostensibly in conformity with that requirement, the Local 553 Pension Plan "provides that no portion of any pension benefit paid by the Fund is subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or other legal equitable sic process against a plan participant." Respondent's Memorandum (6/27/78), at 3. The Plan's provision, however, parallels virtually identical language appearing in a Treasury Regulation, § 1.401(a)(13)(b)(1) (February 17, 1978), Section 1021(c), 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13), as making the inclusion of an anti-assignment and alienation term a precondition to treatment of a pension plan as a "qualified trust"—that is, one eligible for such tax advantages as exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501 and deferred taxation of employer contributions under id. § 402.
Despite the foregoing, this court (per Judge Nickerson) has recently held that neither ERISA nor the provisions of the pension fund agreement would prevent a levy against fund benefits to satisfy a State court judgment for familial support, Cody v. Riecker, 454 F.Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), the rule that federal legislation will not be interpreted as displacing the States' power to enforce such obligations, absent an "unambiguous declaration" of Congress' intent to do so.3 See generally Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 25 S.Ct. 172, 49 L.Ed. 390 (1904) ( ); Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 71 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 112 F.2d 177 (1940) (bankruptcy). Compare Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S.Ct. 1089, 8 L.Ed.2d 180 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 70 S.Ct. 398, 94 L.Ed. 424 (1950).
At least one other district court has reached a similar result, albeit in a somewhat different setting, declining to enjoin a Family Court order directing the diversion to a county social services agency of a portion of pension benefits otherwise payable to an individual in arrears in making court-directed support payments to his wife and children, where the wife had assigned to the agency her support rights in exchange for assistance provided by the agency, a practice required by Section 402(a)(26)(A) of...
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