NAT. CENTER FOR IMMIGRANTS'RIGHTS v. INS
| Decision Date | 05 March 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 83-7927-KN (JRx).,CV 83-7927-KN (JRx). |
| Citation | 644 F. Supp. 5 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | NATIONAL CENTER FOR IMMIGRANTS' RIGHTS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, et al., Defendants. |
Peter A. Schey, Carlos Holguin, National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs.
George H. Wu, Asst. U.S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., Mark C. Walters, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendants.
In 1983, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") promulgated Regulations1 ("the Regulations") which place a condition barring employment in an appearance and delivery bond in connection with deportation proceedings. The no-work condition operates as follows: When a person is arrested as a suspected illegal alien and is later released on bond pending a deportation proceeding, the suspect is barred from becoming employed. However, the suspect may obtain employment authorization from the INS District Director upon application establishing "compelling reasons" for granting employment.
This action, brought by Plaintiffs2 on December 6, 1983, challenged the implementation of the Regulations on both statutory and constitutional grounds. On December 16, 1983, this Court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Regulations. The Court of Appeals upheld the preliminary injunction on September 28, 1984.
The INS then brought this Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(b), on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the INS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that summary adjudication is appropriate. The Court further finds that the Regulations at issue are invalid because they were promulgated beyond statutory authority. Therefore, the Court grants Summary Judgment for the Plaintiffs, National Center for Immigrants' Rights, et al., based upon its First Cause of Action.
This Court's grant of Summary Judgment for the Plaintiffs, as nonmoving parties, is consistent with prior case law. Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 311-12 (9th Cir.1982). Even though Plaintiffs have made no formal cross-motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, summary judgment is appropriate in this case because the INS has had an adequate opportunity to show that there is a genuine issue of fact and that their opponent is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Moreover, this is "in keeping with the objective of Rule 56 to expedite the disposition of cases and ... with the mandate of Rule 54(c) requiring the court to grant relief to which a party is entitled `even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.'" Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2720 (1983).
The Plaintiffs have asserted six Causes of Action in the instant case:
The Court bases its ruling on the First Cause of Action and finds as a matter of law that the Regulations at issue were promulgated without statutory authority and are therefore invalid. Further, since the Court grants summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action, consideration of the remaining five Causes of Action is unnecessary.
The Regulations state in relevant part:
8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6, 109.1 (1984).
The Court finds that two crucial issues are presented by this case. The first consists of whether the Attorney General can impose release conditions which are unrelated to securing the alien's presence at future deportation proceedings, yet which further the broad purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. The second issue involves the discretion of the Attorney General to impose a blanket condition which inherently precludes any individualized determination.
I. Can the Attorney General impose release conditions based on § 1252(a) which further a broad purpose of the Immigration and Nationality Act, but which are unrelated to securing the alien's presence at future deportation proceedings?
The INS claims that the Attorney General's authority to condition an alien's release with a no-work provision pending deportation proceedings is well within his discretionary powers to carry out the broad purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). Citing the protection of the U.S. domestic labor force as the broad purpose of the INA, the INS asserts that the no-work condition is reasonably related to this legitimate government interest. The INS bases its argument on the language, legislative history, and judicial and administrative interpretations of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).
That section states:
Pending a determination of deportability in the case of any alien ..., such alien may, upon warrant of the Attorney General, be arrested and taken into custody. Any such alien taken into custody may, in the discretion of the Attorney General and pending such final determination of deportability, (1) be continued in custody; or (2) be released under bond in the amount of not less than $500 with security approved by the Attorney General, containing such conditions as the Attorney General may prescribe; or (3) be released on conditional parole. But such bond or parole, whether heretofore or hereafter authorized, may be revoked at any time by the Attorney General, in his discretion, and the alien may be returned to custody and detained until final determination of his deportability.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (emphasis added).
Although § 1252(a) appears on its face to grant a great deal of discretion to the Attorney General in his decision on whether to release an alien under bond, this discretion must be interpreted in light of a previous version of § 1252(a) as contained in § 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and its legislative history. This previous version read in part:
... such alien may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, (1) be continued in custody; or (2) be released under bond in the amount of not less than $500, with security approved by the Attorney General; or (3) be released on conditional parole. It shall be among the conditions of any such bond, or of the terms of release on parole, that the alien shall be produced, or will produce himself when required to do so for the purpose of defending himself against the charge or charges under which he was taken into custody....
Pub.L. 831, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 23, reprinted in 1950 U.S.Code Serv. 1006 (emphasis added).
The accompanying legislative history of the previous version of § 1252(a) stated:
These provisions, of course, enumerate only one of the conditions which is mandatory in the bond or as a parole condition. This bill intends that the Attorney General shall have full discretion in imposing any other conditions or terms in the bond or parole agreement which he may see fit to include. Thus, a man released on bond might have as a condition of the bond that he also be subject to make periodic reports to the immigration officials as to his whereabouts and furnish other desired information. Or a bond might provide as one of its conditions that upon demand by the Attorney General the existing bond shall be surrendered and a new bond in greater or less amount or other conditions shall be furnished. This bill intends that the Attorney General shall have untrammeled authority to impose such conditions or terms as he sees fit in releasing an alien under bond or conditional parole pending final determination of the deportability of the alien....
H.R.Rep. No. 1192, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949); S.Rep. No. 2239, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1950) (emphasis added). The applicability of this legislative history is underscored by H.R.Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 57, reprinted in 1952 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1653, 1711, which indicates that when Congress enacted § 1252(a) in its present form in 1952, that "this provision, in general, follows the procedure established by section 23 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950." Id. Therefore, the scope of discretionary authority given to the Attorney General under the previous version also governs the scope...
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National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. I.N.S.
...to those conditions which are related to securing the alien's presence at future deportation hearings. National Center for Immigrants' Rights v. I.N.S., 644 F.Supp. 5 (C.D.Cal.1985). The Attorney General's discretion could not extend to the blanket imposition of a no-work condition on all a......
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