Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ctr. for Med. Progress
| Decision Date | 06 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-03522-WHO |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION, Plaintiff, v. CENTER FOR MEDICAL PROGRESS, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff National Abortion Federation (NAF) urges me to interfere with defendant Center for Medical Progress's (CMP) response to a Congressional subpoena that seeks documents that CMP has indicated are covered by the Temporary Restraining Order entered by this Court.1 NAF makes no argument that the subpoena itself is infirm. Congress has the power to investigate, and it is not up to the courts to go beyond the narrow confines of determining that the committee's inquiry is in its province. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 506 (1975). Nor may courts assume (and I do not assume) that an unworthy purpose prompts a congressional act. Id. at 508. And, importantly in our Constitutional system, there are three equal branches of government, and courts should refrain from creating needless friction with a coordinate branch of government. Exxon Corp. v. Fed. Trade Com., 589 F.2d 582, 590 (1978). For these reasons, Iwill not interfere with CMP's response to the subpoena.
NAF argues that (i) responding to the Congressional subpoena would violate the Court's TRO, (ii) Daleiden need not comply with the subpoena because the subpoena was issued to CMP (and not Daleiden), (iii) the subpoena cannot be enforced absent full House authorization, and (iv) the appropriate recourse for the House Committee is to move to intervene in this action to seek amendment of the TRO. Docket No. 154. But NAF does not argue that the information sought by the subpoena falls outside the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity" of the House Committee. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U. S. at 501. Absent an attempt to exceed that sphere, the Speech and Debate Clause provides immunity to allow Congress to independently perform its legislative duties through its subpoena powers. Id. at 502, 505. As explained by the Supreme Court, it is not the Court's role to determine the legitimacy of the Congressional investigation by looking to the Committee's motives. Id. at 508.
I issued the TRO because defendants, after entering into nondisclosure agreements with NAF under false pretenses, clearly breached the agreements not to disclose information learned at NAF's annual meetings. I remain concerned about the threat of irreparable injury to the privacy rights of NAF's members, shown by NAF through the history of violence against providers of abortion care and the specific acts of intimidation against NAF members, including death threats, harassment and reputational harm, apparently caused by the release of defendants' videos prior to the TRO. But as defendant points out, disclosure to a Congressional committee is not "public disclosure." Exxon Corp. v. Fed. Trade Com., 589 F.2d 582, 589 (1978). And courts "must presume that the committees of Congress will exercise their powers responsibly and with due regard for the rights of affected parties." Id. Likewise, the "court cannot assume that Congress will act irresponsibly in regulating or disclosing" the information at issue. Id. at 590. While case law allows courts to modify or quash Congressional subpoenas in order to protect constitutional rights from infringement by Congress, id., there is no evidence on this record that the subpoena at issue will result in that type of infringement, and NAF does not argue it would.
NAF's arguments that Daleidin need not comply with the subpoena do not require my intervention to prevent him from voluntarily doing so. Daleidin, as executive director of CMP,has been directed to comply with the subpoena. This is not an issue of the House Committee taking legal action "to enforce" a subpoena - thereby requiring full House authorization - but the question of whether a recipient may voluntarily comply with a subpoena. Similarly, this is not a case where Congress is asking a Court to modify a protective order to provide it access to information only received by a party through discovery sanctioned by the Court. But see In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 457 F. Supp. 210, 211 (N.D. Tex. 1978); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 589 F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir. 1979).
All that said, it is not lost on me that defendants seek...
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