Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Multijurisdictional Practice v. Castille, Civil Action No. 13–7382.

• Court: United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
• Writing for the Court: McHUGH, District Judge.
• Citation: 66 F.Supp.3d 633
• Decision Date: 11 December 2014
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13–7382.
• Parties: NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE (NAAMJP), et al., Plaintiffs, v. Hon. Chief Justice Ronald D. CASTILLE, et al., Defendants.

66 F.Supp.3d 633

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE (NAAMJP), et al., Plaintiffs
v.
Hon. Chief Justice Ronald D. CASTILLE, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 13–7382.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed Dec. 11, 2014.

66 F.Supp.3d 638

Joseph Robert Giannini, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Michael Daley, Supreme Court of PA, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

McHUGH, District Judge.

Summary of the Facts

This lawsuit is a constitutional challenge to Pennsylvania's reciprocal bar admissions rule. The rule in question, Rule 204, Pennsylvania Bar Admission Rules, provides that the Pennsylvania bar will allow experienced lawyers admitted in other states to join the Pennsylvania bar without taking the Pennsylvania bar exam, subject to certain additional requirements. The particular additional requirement at issue here limits admission by motion to lawyers practicing law in states that also allow Pennsylvania lawyers to gain admission by motion. In other words, Rule 204 only allows admission by motion for lawyers admitted in states with reciprocal admission-by-motion policies. Plaintiffs contend that this reciprocity policy infringes the rights of lawyers who wish to practice in Pennsylvania but now practice only in a state that does not have a reciprocal admission policy.

Plaintiffs are two individuals and an organization. Mr. Rosario, an attorney, graduated from an accredited law school in Maryland and is admitted to practice law in Maryland and Washington, D.C. He applied for admission to the Pennsylvania bar, but Pennsylvania rejected his application because Maryland is not a reciprocal state, and he had gained admission to the D.C. bar by motion rather than exam. Mr. Rosario asserts that he would apply for reciprocal admission in Pennsylvania again if the rules changed.

Mr. Riviere is admitted to the New Jersey bar. He asserts that he would apply for reciprocal admission in Pennsylvania, but that he would be rejected because New Jersey does not grant admission by motion to Pennsylvania lawyers.

The National Association for the Advancement of Multijurisdictional Practice (NAAMJP) describes itself as “a public benefit corporation organized under California law with offices in Los Angeles.”

66 F.Supp.3d 639

First Amended Complaint ¶ 3. NAAMJP's mission is to challenge the traditional bar admissions system that places high barriers before lawyers who wish to practice in multiple states.

Defendants are the Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The Justices promulgated Rule 204, though they contend that they do not enforce it.

Discussion

I. Standard of Review

The case is now before me on cross motions for summary judgment. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs district courts to “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). By filing their cross motions, both parties have claimed there is no material factual dispute and that each is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

After reading the parties' briefs, including their joint statement of undisputed facts, and hearing oral argument from counsel, I am satisfied there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. The sole question is which party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Plaintiffs contend that Rule 204 violates many provisions of the Constitution, beginning with Article I, Section 8's Commerce Clause, and continuing all the way through to the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants offer several responses. First, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge Rule 204. Second, Defendants argue that even if Plaintiffs have standing, Defendants are immune from Plaintiffs' challenge. Finally, Defendants argue that even if Plaintiffs have standing, and there is no immunity, Rule 204 does not violate any part of the Federal Constitution.

II. Standing

A. Standing Generally

I will consider Plaintiffs' standing first. The Federal Constitution prohibits courts from taking jurisdiction over disputes that do not involve a justiciable case or controversy. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). One of the requirements of establishing a ‘case or controversy’ is that the plaintiffs must have standing to pursue their claims. The Supreme Court outlined three necessary elements of standing in Lujan:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’ ” .... Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” .... Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, “ ‘a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press' and ‘for each form of relief’ that is sought.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) ).

Lack of standing is a jurisdictional bar, so even if parties never raise the issue, a court cannot hear a case if the plaintiffs lack standing to bring it:

66 F.Supp.3d 640

The question of standing is not subject to waiver, however: “[W]e are required to address the issue even if the courts below have not passed on it, and even if the parties fail to raise the issue before us. The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing ‘is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines.’ ”

FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230–231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607–608, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995). A court must independently evaluate whether it has standing to hear plaintiffs' claims.

Here, Defendants themselves challenge Plaintiffs' standing, at least as to NAAMJP. Though Defendants do not challenge the standing of Plaintiffs Rosario and Riviere, I have considered their standing as well because the question is fundamental to my jurisdiction over the case, and I am being asked to invalidate a rule established by the highest court of a state.

B. Standing as to Richard Rosario and Paul Riviere

I am satisfied that Rosario and Riviere both have standing to press their claims. Their alleged injury—denial of admission to the bar because of a policy of unequal treatment of lawyers from non-reciprocity states—is concrete and particularized. There is also an obvious causal connection between their injury and the rule they claim is unconstitutional. The remedy they seek—prohibiting unequal treatment of lawyers in non-reciprocity states—would redress the claimed injury, at least to the extent that it would even the playing field for lawyers seeking to admission to the Pennsylvania bar.¹ The only remaining concern is whether the injury they claim is sufficiently ‘actual or imminent.’ I conclude that it is.

Standing doctrine limits plaintiffs to bringing claims based on actual injuries. However this requirement does not mean that an injury must be in the past. While an injury may not be speculative, an individual can sue to avoid a “real, immediate and direct” prospective injury. Davis, 554 U.S. at 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759 ; City of LA v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing present adverse effects.”).

One situation in which courts recognize that a future injury is sufficiently real, immediate, and direct arises when a plaintiff challenges a rule that would incontestably be applied to the plaintiff in a harmful way. In Sammon v. New Jersey Bd. of Medical Examiners, 66 F.3d 639 (3d Cir.1995), the Third Circuit found that aspiring midwives had standing to challenge a rule that would prevent them from acquiring a license. The court wrote:

[T]here is no indication that the aspiring midwives possibly could obtain a license or a physician's indorsement without first going through the 1800 hours of instruction. Requiring these women to apply for a license or to approach physicians asking for indorsements before going through the required training—as the district court appears to suggest—accordingly would serve no purpose. Litigants are not required to make

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