Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach
| Decision Date | 26 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:18-cv-00554-SAL |
| Parties | NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR the ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MYRTLE BEACH, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Peter Wilborn, Law Office of Peter Wilborn, Charleston, SC, Angela A. Groves, Pro Hac Vice, Kali Jones Schellenberg, Pro Hac Vice, Reed N. Colfax, Pro Hac Vice, Tara K. Ramchandani, Pro Hac Vice, Relman Colfax PLLC, Dorian Lawrence Spence, Pro Hac Vice, Maryum Jamal Jordan, Pro Hac Vice, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
James Richard Battle, II, Battle Vaught and Howe, Michael Warner Battle, Battle Law Firm, Conway, SC, for Defendants.
Sherri A. Lydon, United States District Judge Pending before the Court are Defendants’ first and amended second1 motions in limine. [ECF Nos. 177, 184]. Also pending is Plaintiffs’ motion in limine. [ECF No. 179]. For the following reasons, Defendants’ first motion in limine, ECF No. 177, and Defendants’ amended second motion in limine, ECF No. 184, are GRANTED in PART. Plaintiffs’ motion in limine, ECF No. 179, is GRANTED.
Defendants move the Court for an order preventing the Plaintiffs from introducing evidence at trial of the contents of the Preliminary Injunction Order in National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. City of Myrtle Beach (the "2005 Order"), No. 4:03-1732-25, 2006 WL 2038257 (D.S.C. July 20, 2006). Defendants argue that any mention of the 2005 Order should be excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because its probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury. [ECF No. 177 p.2]. Alternatively, if the Court determines the 2005 Order is admissible, Defendants ask the Court to allow Defendants to offer evidence of the two orders denying Plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunction in the present action. Id. at 3.
Plaintiffs counter that the 2005 Order is highly probative of the historical background and sequence of events in this case: both factors to consider in determining discriminatory intent under the Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. framework. 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977) ; [ECF No. 186 p.1]. With respect to the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury, Plaintiffs argue that the dangers do not substantially outweigh the probative value of the 2005 Order and that any potential danger could be addressed by a limiting instruction. [ECF No. 186 p.2]. Finally, Plaintiffs contend the alternative relief sought by Defendants is not proper because prior orders in the same action are generally inadmissible and the preliminary injunction orders in this case are irrelevant. Id. at 6.
In 2003, the NAACP sued the City of Myrtle Beach following the City's implementation of a one-way traffic pattern for "Black Bike Week." [ECF No. 186-2]; 2003 WL 23877894 (D.S.C.) (2003 complaint). At that time, two bike-week events took place in the City of Myrtle Beach in May: "Black Bike Week" and "Harley Week." The parties in the 2003 lawsuit described "Harley Week" as attracting predominantly white tourists and "Black Bike Week" attracting predominantly African-American tourists. NAACP , 2006 WL 2038257, at *1 n.1. There, the NAACP challenged the City's one-way traffic pattern for "Black Bike Week" because the City did not impose a similar traffic pattern for "Harley Week." In considering the NAACP's motion for preliminary injunction, the Honorable Terry L. Wooten concluded, "at [that] stage in the proceedings, that race was a motivating factor in the decision to implement the traffic plans at issue." Id. at *5. Judge Wooten granted the NAACP's motion for a preliminary injunction, requiring the City of Myrtle Beach to "maintain a substantially similar traffic pattern during both the ‘Black Bike Week’ and the ‘Harley Week.’ " Id. at *8. The type of traffic pattern—one way, two way, or some other pattern—was left for the defendants to determine. Id. The pattern simply had to "be implemented for both events." Id. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the injunction without a discussion of its merits. [ECF No. 186-4]. Shortly after the 2005 Order, the City of Myrtle Beach and the NAACP entered into a settlement agreement. [ECF No. 186-3].
"The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. Certain circumstances call for the exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned relevance. Id. (). A court must balance the probative value of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result from its admission. Id. .
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the action. Fed. R. Evid. 401. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. , the Supreme Court held that the historical background and specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision are relevant factors in determining whether discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the decision. 429 U.S. at 266–67, 97 S.Ct. 555.
Here, the 2005 Order is relevant to and probative of the historical background of the challenged decision in this case. As this Court discussed in its Order resolving Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 2005 Order is part of the historical background of the decision. [ECF No. p.18]; Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc. v. City of Myrtle, Beach , No. 4:18-CV-00554, 476 F.Supp.3d 308, 323–24, (D.S.C. Aug. 4, 2020). Further, the 2005 Order is relevant to and probative of the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision. The 2005 Order imposed requirements on Defendants’ treatment of "Black Bike Week." In light of the Arlington Heights framework, the 2005 Order satisfies the permissive standard for relevance under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The procedural posture of the 2005 Order detracts from its probative value.
A preliminary injunction is issued to protect the plaintiff from irreparable injury and to preserve the court's power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits. 11A Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2947 (3d ed.). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is not to determine any controverted right. Benson Hotel Corp. v. Woods, 168 F.2d 694, 696 (8th Cir. 1948). In fact, a court may issue a preliminary injunction even though plaintiff's right to permanent relief is still uncertain. 11A Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2947 (3d ed). Therefore, a party is not required to prove its case on the merits at a preliminary injunction hearing. Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell , 286 F.2d 222, 233 (7th Cir. 1961). Given its limited purpose, a preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits. Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch , 451 U.S. 390, 395, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981).
The 2005 Order addressed the substance of the NAACP's Equal Protection claim only in evaluating its likelihood of success on the merits. NAACP , 2006 WL 2038257, at *7. In order to make this determination, the court considered the question of discriminatory intent. Id. at *4. The court found "at this stage in the proceedings , that race was a motivating factor when the issue of traffic plans was decided." Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
At the time of Judge Wooten's 2005 Order, the standard for likelihood of success on the merits was governed by Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville v. Seilig Manufacturing Co. , 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977). In Blackwelder , the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals "instructed that the likelihood-of-success requirement be considered, if at all, only after a balancing of hardships is conducted and then only under the relaxed standard of showing that ‘grave or serious questions are presented’ for litigation." Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 559 U.S. 1089, 130 S.Ct. 2371, 176 L.Ed.2d 764 (2010), and adhered to in part sub nom. The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. F.E.C. , 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010). The 2005 Order adhered to this standard, stating:
If the balance of the hardships "tips decidedly in favor of the plaintiff," then typically it will "be enough that the plaintiff has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation." Id. (). But if the balance of hardships is substantially equal as between the plaintiff and defendant, then "the probability of success begins to assume real significance, and interim relief is more likely to require a clear showing of a likelihood of success." Id....
To continue reading
Request your trial