Nat'L. Assoc. of Home Builders v. Us. Envl. Prot. Agency

• Decision Date: 30 December 2009
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 09-0548 (RMU).
• Citation: 675 F.Supp.2d 173
• Parties: NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

675 F.Supp.2d 173

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 09-0548 (RMU).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

December 30, 2009.

Duane Joseph Desiderio, National Association of Home Builders, Washington, DC, Jaron J. Bromm, Fennemore Craig, P.C., Denver, CO, Norman D. James, Fennemore Craig, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiffs.

Andrew J. Doyle, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

RICARDO M. URBINA, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on the motion to transfer venue filed by the defendants, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"). The plaintiffs, trade associations representing businesses in the housing and construction fields, seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., of the defendants' designation of two reaches of the Santa Cruz River in Arizona as "traditional navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. The defendants move to transfer venue to the District of Arizona. After weighing the considerations of convenience and the interests of justice, the court denies the defendants' motion.

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 23, 2009, the plaintiffs commenced this action, challenging the decision of the defendants¹ to classify two reaches of the Santa Cruz River² as "traditional navigable waters," a term of art under the CWA. Compl. ¶ 2. These reaches are located in Arizona. Id. ¶ 1.

The EPA's decision to designate these reaches as traditional navigable waters was communicated in a letter written by the EPA's Assistant Administrator for Water, Benjamin Grumbles, on December 3, 2008. Id. ¶ 3, Ex. 1. The letter was signed at the EPA's headquarters in the District of Columbia. Defs.' Mot. at 9. In this letter, Grumbles affirmed an earlier determination made by the Corps' Los Angeles District that the reaches qualified as traditional navigable waters. Compl. ¶ 4.

In their first claim for relief, the plaintiffs allege that the Corps and the EPA violated the APA's procedural requirements in making this determination. Id. ¶¶ 58-66. More specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the agencies failed to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking and give interested parties an opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations, in violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c) and 706(2)(D). Id. The plaintiffs' second claim concerns the substance of the determinations. Id. ¶¶ 67-79. The plaintiffs contend that the determinations by the agencies in question were arbitrary and capricious, were unsupported by sufficient evidence and exceeded the agencies' statutory authority. Id.

On April 10, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to transfer this case to the District of Arizona pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See generally Defs.' Mot. The court now turns to the applicable legal standard and the parties' arguments.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) and Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

When federal jurisdiction is not premised solely on diversity and a defendant is an officer, employee, or agency of the United States, venue is proper in:

any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

If, upon objection of a party, the court concludes that venue is improper, it may transfer the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406. In an action where venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) nonetheless authorizes a court to transfer a civil action to any other district where it could have been brought "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) vests "discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions to transfer according to an `individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.'" Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964)). Under this statute, the moving party bears the burden of establishing that transfer is proper. Trout Unlimited v. Dep't of Agric., 944 F.Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1996).

Accordingly, the defendants must make two showings to justify transfer. First, the defendants must establish that the plaintiffs originally could have brought the action in the proposed transferee district. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622, 84 S.Ct. 805. Second, the defendants must demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh in favor of transfer to that district. Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 16. As to the second showing, the statute calls on the court to weigh a number of case-specific private- and public-interest factors. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239. The private-interest considerations include: (1) the plaintiffs' choice of forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendants; (2) the defendants' choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof. Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 16 (citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Riverdale Auto Parts, Inc., 713 F.Supp. 1125, 1129 (N.D.Ill.1989); 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3848). The public-interest considerations include: (1) the transferee's familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home. Id.

B. The Court Denies the Defendants' Motion for Transfer

As noted above, to justify a transfer of venue, the defendants must, as a threshold matter, demonstrate that the plaintiffs could have originally brought the case in the proposed transferee district. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622, 84 S.Ct. 805. The plaintiffs concede that venue would have been appropriate in the District of Arizona had the case originally been brought there.³ See Pls.' Opp'n at 12. Next, the defendants must show that the private- and public-interest factors weigh in favor of transfer. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622, 84 S.Ct. 805; Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 16. Four factors are particularly relevant to this case and are contested by the parties.⁴

First, the parties dispute whether there is a strong local interest in deciding this controversy in Arizona. See Defs.' Mot. at 8-9; Pls.' Opp'n at 11-14. Second, the parties disagree over whether the relative congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts supports transfer. See Defs.' Mot. at 10; Pls.' Opp'n at 11. Third, the parties dispute where the claims arose. See Defs.' Mot. at 11; Pls.' Opp'n at 8-9. Fourth, the parties disagree over how much deference should be given to the parties' chosen forums. See Defs.' Mot. at 11-12; Pls.' Opp'n at 5-8. As the moving party, the defendants carry the burden of demonstrating that these factors weigh in favor of transfer. Peter B. v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 620 F.Supp.2d 58, 66 (D.D.C.2009). The court turns now to the four contested factors.

1. Local Interest in Deciding Local Controversies at Home

The defendants argue that there is a strong local interest in having this case decided in the District of Arizona because the relevant portions of the Santa Cruz River are all located in Arizona. Defs.' Mot. at 9. The plaintiffs acknowledge as much, noting that the designation at issue will directly affect the "use and development of real property" located in Arizona. Compl. ¶ 27. The plaintiffs argue, however, that the case should remain in the District of Columbia because the questions of federal law and alleged procedural violations at issue in this case have broad implications for the application of the CWA nationwide. Pls.' Opp'n at 13. Further, the plaintiffs contend that the involvement of officials outside of Arizona indicates that the determination concerning the Santa Cruz River carries national significance. Id. at 14.

This Circuit has acknowledged that "[t]here is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home." Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 167 (D.C.Cir. 1983) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947)). When a case affects the rights and interests of citizens of a particular state or locality, conducting a trial in that state or locality is one way for the courts to show respect to those citizens' interests. Adams, 711 F.2d at 167 n. 34. In addition, the "geographic dispersion of cases is one way to avoid excessive concentration of judicial power in a single tribunal." Id. at 167; see also Stawnee v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 928 (D.C.Cir.1974) (stating that there is no "blanket rule that `national policy' cases should be brought" in the District of Columbia).

In cases in which the land in dispute is located entirely within the proposed transferee district, there is some degree of local interest in deciding the case in that district. See, e.g., Shawnee Tribe v. United States, 298 F.Supp.2d 21, 26 (D.D.C.2002); Trout Unlimited, 944 F.Supp. at 19. In Shawnee Tribe, the property at issue was located near a major metropolitan center, and the allocation of the ownership of that property necessarily "implicate[d] considerable local economic, political, and environmental interests." 298 F.Supp.2d at 26. Similarly, in Trout Unlimited, the court...